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ABSTRACT
This dissertation considers the dynamic and resilient influence of the jeremiad, an early
American religious and literary mode, on contemporary American literature and culture. It
argues that the polemical, dystopian, and apocalyptic narratives so abundant in twentieth-century
literature and film participate in an ingrained literary tradition that accounts for society's
misfortunes as penalty for its social and moral evils while, at the same time, emphasizing an
American exceptionalism born out of a belief in the society's election through its covenant with
God. The project makes connections between early-American texts and related works of
twentieth and twenty-first century American literature and science fiction in order to engage
issues of American nationalism and to interrogate how these texts construct and reinforce an
American identity. It investigates how groups during different historical periods adapted the
jeremiad either to advocate or to critique political and cultural movements. Chapter one
discusses this history of the jeremiad, situates the project within previous scholarship on the
form, and argues for the continued relevance of the jeremiad in twentieth and twenty-first
century fiction. Chapter two considers the role of the jeremiad in the work of Robert A. Heinlein
during the cultural Cold War. Chapter three concerns the indebtedness of environmental science
fiction and film to the American jeremiad tradition and, more specifically, how their dual
imperatives of polemical and exceptionalism rhetoric continue to shape the ways that Americans
conceive of environmental problems and policy. Finally, chapter four interrogates the role of the
jeremiad in science fiction films since 1980 that function as countersubversive texts and,
subsequently, in films that serve as critical responses to earlier attempts at foreclosing dissent.
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INTRODUCTION
“MAY THE LORD MAKE IT LIKE THAT OF NEW ENGLAND”

It has become commonplace to talk of America as a city upon a hill. Contemporary
American politicians of all persuasions have invoked the historical metaphor to advocate for
their particular policies or ideology. Some have conjured the metaphor for the nation in order to
invoke its greatness and prowess, while others have used it to appeal to the nation’s virtuous
founding principles in calls for reform. President Ronald Reagan’s frequent reference to “the
shining city on a hill” stands as the most well-known example of its use (though embellished).
Of course, the original sentiment, of America as a city upon a hill, was articulated first by John
Winthrop in his 1630 speech given to the new members of the Massachusetts Bay colony as they
arrived aboard the Arbella. We have come to know his speech as “A Model of Christian Charity.”
Winthrop’s speech is a short sermon on the new demands, economic, social, political and
spiritual, that life in the new world would require. A broad-ranging sermon, it covered aspects as
pragmatic as how the new community would approach lending, forgiveness of debts, and how
neighbors would provide for each other in times of calamity or of scarcity. More importantly,
however, the sermon described the relationship this new community would have with God.
Comparing themselves to the Israelites, these colonists saw themselves as entering a new
wilderness and, as such, having entered into a new covenant with God: what Winthrop likened to
a marriage of “most strict and peculiar manner” in which God would be “the more jealous of our
love and obedience.”
His message carried with it a dual meaning: great is the reward if the covenant is kept,
but great too is the damnation risked in failing. Reminding his fellow colonists of this charge, he
used the metaphor, now famous, of a city upon a hill. He explained that the “eyes of the world
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are upon us” and that, if we were to fail, “we shall be made a story and a by-word through the
world.” Their failure, he said, would “open the mouths of enemies to speak evil of the ways of
God.” On the other hand, their success would provide an example to the rest of the world. People
then would say, Winthrop thought, “May the lord make it like that of New England.”
When Winthrop talked of the new American community as something exceptional, he
was drawing attention to the tremendous burden that such a relationship meant for the colonists.
This was no source of pride. Instead, it was a charge to be modest. This was not a boast of the
colony’s covenant with God, but a reminder of the virtue and righteousness such a relationship
demanded of them. Few other metaphors are so foundational to American discourse. The notion
of American exceptionalism, borne from this early rhetoric, continues to permeate American
culture. American fiction and discourse continue to assert that such a burden, and its ultimate
promise of election and salvation, define the American experience. As late as the 2009 inaugural
address, President Barack Obama referred to this burden as “the source of our confidence- the
knowledge that God calls on us to shape an uncertain destiny.” This project considers recent
attempts in popular genres such as Science Fiction to imagine, understand, and to critique this
destiny.
Winthrop’s sermon stands as one of the earliest examples of the American jeremiad: an
early sermonic form, known popularly as the election sermon, brought to North America by the
early colonists. Though the following chapter will provide a much more detailed definition of
the form and its place within the context of American discourse, suffice it to say that the jeremiad
had a profound influence on the way the early colonists conceived of themselves, their
relationship to their new home, and their community’s place in the world. The form’s
contribution to American letters has been explored by scholars such as Perry Miller and, more
2

recently, by Sacvan Bercovitch. It is hard to overstate the influence of their work on American
studies. However, there are two major areas concerning the jeremiad on which Miller and
Bercovitch are silent. First, since the American jeremiad was a popular form, sometimes
preached before hundreds of people or read so repetitiously that copies were read, literally, to
pieces, it stands to reason that an analysis of its influence on subsequent popular American forms
is a valid and needed area of inquiry. Secondly, both scholars appear reserved or unwilling to
extend an analysis of the jeremiad’s influence into the twentieth century. As we will see, Miller,
while gesturing at the continued influence of the jeremiad in American culture, argues that the
jeremiad is subsumed into other forms in the nineteenth century. While Bercovitch argues the
jeremiad’s role in constructing a myth of America that would serve as a cultural consensusbuilding narrative, his analysis, though suggesting a continuing function in American culture, is
situated overtly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It seems a great oversight that few
have considered the role of this form in the twentieth century. It is, after all, known popularly as
the “American century.”
At the same time, there have been few genres as popular and influential in the twentieth
century as science fiction. In a century dominated by the rise of American ingenuity and
technological advancement, no other genre can claim to have engendered and reflected this
achievement, led and facilitated the kinds of reflection and critique necessary in a century
defined by such rapid change, and, finally, no genre as much as science fiction served to
stimulate a nation’s imagination of the future. A major subgenre of science fiction in the
twentieth century has become known popularly as apocalyptic science fiction. This subgenre
usually consists of stories set after, or in the middle of, a disastrous event that has left Earth’s
population severely decreased and prostrate and its landscape altered dramatically or nearly
3

destroyed. These texts and films usually provide some sort of social criticism by way of a
warning message to their readers or audiences. On the Beach (Stanley Kramer, 1959), for
example, functions in precisely this way. At the end of the film, an ominous sequence of images
show a Melbourne cityscape devoid of human life, killed presumably by the radioactive fallout
from the third World War. The film ends with the camera resting on a sign that reads “There’s
still time, brothers!” Messages like this one and others in similar texts and films are meant to
encourage social criticism and urge the reader or the audience to action.
However, as we will see in the subsequent chapter, after carefully considering the
definition of “apocalyptic,” such a distinction is incomplete and misleading. A better description
of how these texts and films function can be found in understanding how they function as
twentieth-century American jeremiads. The jeremiad, not the apocalyptic narrative, better
explains the warning rhetoric aimed at the audience, the insistence on a national covenant, and
the frequent assertion of American exceptionalism. Scholarship that has referred to such texts as
apocalyptic, that is, texts that render nuclear, environmental, or biological disaster on a global
scale, has fallen victim to a critical laziness and imprecision. In doing so, scholars have
neglected a significant link to one of American literature's most enduring and important genres.
It is the jeremiad that accurately describes and elucidates both the warning rhetoric found in
these post-World War Two narratives and, more importantly, the insistence in these narratives of
an American exceptionalism invested firmly in the concept of the Puritan covenant and errand.
Therefore, the jeremiad better explains why these narratives lack the emphasis on revelation that
the apocalyptic genre demands and their overwhelming insistence on articulating a national
identity and national errand that places them in a much longer tradition in American thought. In
short, what the generic distinction "jeremiad" offers that "apocalyptic" cannot is a connection to
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a literary genre that explains both the destruction imagery characteristic to these texts and, more
importantly, the definitions of American identity and nationalism that they frequently propose.
Repositioning such texts is essential when it becomes clear that what is at stake is no less than
America's grappling with the idea of itself consistently in its most popular of forms. Finally,
what such an analysis suggests is that the genre of American science fiction has played a much
larger role than previously considered in the process of American national identity formation
while, at the same time, playing a significant role in the critique of that process and the concepts,
more generally, of American identity and exceptionalism.
I begin by situating the project within the history and current scholarship on the jeremiad.
After a brief survey of the history of the form (as a means of bridging it to the twentieth century),
I consider landmark works by Miller and Bercovitch and illustrate how the jeremiad still
functions as a twentieth-century popular form. Next, the discussion turns to Philip Fisher’s work
on popular forms to emphasize how certain narratives, in the way they are consumed, become
incorporated into the culture. Science fiction, as one such popular form, works in this way. This
is not inconsistent with the genre’s definition as the literature of cognitive estrangement. Instead,
twentieth-century jeremiads (such as Soylent Green, Red Dawn, or I Am Legend) can serve a
critical function in providing critique of contemporary society by conjuring failed futures and
incorporating the errands found in popular texts and film as a means of avoiding futures of
ecological or nuclear disaster. The chapter concludes with a number of readings to illustrate the
jeremiad’s vitality in twentieth-century fiction. First, Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49, a
widely-acknowledged jeremiad, and Walker Percy’s Love in the Ruins, a novel straddling the
borders of southern fiction, science fiction, and American literature, illustrate aspects of the
jeremiad that have survived to the twentieth century. Interestingly, both serve as jeremiads on the
5

notion of American exceptionalism itself. Finally, the chapter concludes with an analysis of a
popular television program, Jericho, set after a surprise nuclear attack on American soil. While
the show serves as a jeremiad on the threat of terrorism and nuclear proliferation, it is equally
interested in notions of national identity and community, thus providing an example of how the
American jeremiad, science fiction, and questions of American identity coalesced in the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
Chapter two considers the role of the American jeremiad during the era known popularly
as the Cold War. I begin by establishing the well-documented efforts by the Central Intelligence
Agency to wage a cultural Cold War in the scholarly and artistic communities of the Western
world. Interestingly, the Agency’s efforts were built upon the same notions of exceptionalism
and errand rhetoric that dates back to the Puritan era and, I argue, that this fact contributed to a
positivistic understanding of the world and how the cultural Cold War had to be fought.
Alongside this covert effort, I note the voluntary efforts that emerged from popular culture.
Popular music, for example, reflected a conflation of fear, anxiety, and confidence identical to
the jeremiad’s dual rhetoric of warning and exceptionalism. The most influential effort in
popular culture, though, can be found in the science fiction of Robert A. Heinlein. I argue that
the political in Heinlein’s work, often the subject of analysis in science fiction scholarship, is a
function of the epistemological positivism that characterizes much of his fiction. Heinlein is, in
other words, an author with a very particular, positivistic way of seeing the empirical world, the
promises and limitations of knowledge, and the agency humanity has in its journey outward from
Earth. Heinlein's definition of the role of science fiction domesticates scientific speculation and
the role the genre plays in imagining the future. I argue that his works, including the twelve
well-known Scribner juvenile novels, serve to incorporate particular cultural narratives and
6

determine the expectations of a generation coming to maturity during the Cold War. In their
warnings about the Red Menace, the pitfalls of failing to reach a particular definition of
masculinity and maturity, and their assertions on the kind of politics responsible for America’s
prominence, they serve as Cold War jeremiads.
The third chapter considers the indebtedness of environmental science fiction and film to
the American jeremiad tradition and, more specifically, how their dual imperatives of polemical
and exceptionalism rhetoric continue to shape the ways that Americans conceive of
environmental problems and policy. I begin by establishing the moral warrants behind works
such as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, a landmark of environmental writing, and Al Gore’s
documentary An Inconvenient Truth, a recent important film, in illustrating how closely their
rhetoric aligns with the jeremiad tradition. Next, I situate the discussion within the broader
context of ecocriticism scholarship and bridge the analysis to the works of Kim Stanley
Robinson, the most important American science fiction writer of his generation and one
consistently interested in environmental issues. In his Three Californias trilogy, Mars trilogy,
and his Science in the Capital trilogy, Robinson renders remarkable and effective contemplations
about the nature of American identity and how such an identity translates to political and social
action on the world’s biggest problems; providing a savvy, complex dialogue with the form’s
characteristic emphases on polemical rhetoric and the concept of American exceptionalism.
Finally, I explore the role of science fiction film in rendering ecological disaster and consider the
implications of Susan Sontag’s well-known criticism of science fiction film, that its sensational
aspects (spectacle and special effects) disarm and frustrate any attempt at social criticism, for
recent entries in the genre such as The Day After Tomorrow, The Core, and Wall-E.
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Chapter four considers the role of the jeremiad in science fiction films from 1980 to the
present that function as countersubversive texts, those that promote particular and intensely
partisan cultural narratives at the same time that they advocate for particular notions of American
identity, as well as subsequent films that respond to these attempts to foreclose dissent. I begin
by situating the discussion within scholarship on 1980s culture and 1980s film such as Michael
Rogin’s work on countersubversion and political demagoguery and Richard Slotkin’s work on
the Frontier narrative (particularly his work on war films after Vietnam). I argue that John
Milius’ 1980s cult film Red Dawn functions as a countersubversive text reflective of the
resurgent political conservatism of the 1980s and its re-embracing of a Cold War-era Manichean
worldview. I suggest that Red Dawn and other films like it participate in the American jeremiad
tradition in their use of warning rhetoric to articulate the dangers posed by political enemies and
in their advocacy of specifically termed conceptions of American identity and the nation’s
preeminent role in world affairs. However, the jeremiad also comes into service in the
subsequent critical response by later films. Films like Children of Men and 28 Weeks Later take
issue, specifically, with notions of American identity put forward by previous countersubversive
films and by American political rhetoric in the first years of the twenty-first century. These
narratives reflect an articulate and substantial opposition to such rhetoric and to American
foreign policy more generally. By utilizing the jeremiad themselves, though, these responses
utilize a proven American form in an attempt to counter the cultural directives and appeal to
Americans in a traditional and familiar form. Finally, I consider the role of the jeremiad when
the incomprehensible, global economic processes of the postmodern era frustrate concepts like
national identity and community.
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In conclusion, I would like to say a few words about my approach to this project that the
reader may find helpful. This project is heavily indebted to the idea of making meaningful
connections between American literature’s past and present. I have tried to avoid the trap of
forcing the jeremiad on my readings of these texts and films or having the category of the
jeremiad become so expansive or inclusive as to become meaningless. What I have done, then,
is to set up a strict set of characteristics that, when expressed, I have identified in the science
fiction and film of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. It is important that science fiction,
regarded by some as the genre of the future, continues to be the genre that says something
essential and meaningful about our present. By considering the influence of the American
jeremiad on American science fiction, I hope to illustrate that new thinkers in dynamic genres
continue to grapple with fundamental questions about American culture.
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CHAPTER ONE
A VEIL OF PROTECTION
“The malaise has settled like a fall-out and what people really fear is not that the bomb
will fall but that the bomb will not fall...”
-Binx Bolling, Walker Percy’s The Moviegoer
Only two days after the attacks on September 11th, 2001, Rev. Jerry Falwell,
appearing on Pat Robertson's The 700 Club, attributed the single deadliest terrorist attack
on American soil not to the Islamic-fundamentalist terrorists who hijacked the four
commercial airliners used in the attack, but instead to groups actively working to
"secularize America" and to a God who, according to Falwell, was increasingly
withdrawing his "veil of protection" ("Falwell Apologizes"). He explained:
I really believe that the pagans and the abortionists and the feminists and the gays
and the lesbians, who are actively trying to make that an alternative lifestyle, the
ACLU, People for the American Way, all of them who try to secularize America, I
point the finger in their face and say "You helped this happen." ("Falwell
Apologizes")
Immediately, Falwell's comments drew harsh criticism. The Executive Director of the
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Lorri L. Jean, denounced Falwell's comments as
"hate against those who do not think, live, or love as he does" and drew parallels between
Falwell's speech and the fanaticism responsible for the attacks. Indeed, Falwell's
comments drew criticism from many quarters and, by the day's end, he issued an apology
clarifying that "only the hijackers and terrorists were responsible for the deadly
attacks" ("Falwell Apologizes"). However, he continued to insist that groups, such as the
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ACLU, "which have attempted to secularize America, have removed our nation from its
relationship with Christ on which it was founded…[creating] an environment which
possibly has caused God to lift the veil of protection." Four years later, after Hurricane
Katrina ravaged the American Gulf Coast, Alabama State Senator, Hank Erwin (RMontevallo), became briefly notorious for suggesting that the hurricane's destruction was
the result of the wrath of God drawn out upon an area "known for gambling, sin, and
wickedness" ("Senator: God Judging U.S."). "America has been moving away from
God," he intoned, "we all need to embrace godliness and churchgoing and good, godly
living, and we can get divine protection."
While many found these comments objectionable, inappropriate, and insensitive,
what is striking about them is their connection to similar rhetoric in the American
tradition. That is, in the hectic but increasingly patriotic days shortly after 9/11 or in the,
sometimes despairing, sometimes rallying and regenerate energies along the Gulf Coast
in the days following Hurricane Katrina, there was something distasteful and, almost, unAmerican in their castigations of American culture. Yet, their jeremiads, paltry as they
are, stand as reminders that in the opening years of the twenty-first century, one of the
nation's oldest literary and rhetorical forms continues to shape and influence American
culture and thought.
Both men, in attempting to read the signs of the times, in trying to explain major
cultural (near apocalyptic) events, reach for interpretations structured on a religious
typology. Both men articulate societal ills, shortcomings, and, of course, sins as the
reasons for divine punishment. Both emphatically assert an American exceptionalism
(that, like the Israelites of the Old Testament, Americans are God's chosen people) born
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out of a belief in a covenant with God. Falwell and Erwin are cheating, of course, in that
their comments are reactive and, not, like the Jeremiahs of the American seventeenth
century, prophetic. Nevertheless, their rhetoric only hints at the preponderance of
jeremiads found in twentieth and twenty-first century literature and film.
Even casual observers will recognize the sheer quantity of what have come to be
called apocalyptic, disaster, or end-of-the-world narratives (in film, television, and
literature) released in the first years of the twenty-first century. Last December’s I Am
Legend, the third film adaptation of Richard Matheson’s same-titled novel, stunned
audiences with its spectacular views of a desolate New York City landscape and its
dystopian narrative of Robert Neville’s (Will Smith) struggle for survival as the apparent
last man on earth. Making nearly seventy-seven million dollars on its first weekend, the
film boasted the most lucrative December opening in history. A few months earlier, 28
Weeks Later, the sequel to Danny Boyles’s highly successful 28 Days Later, continued to
thrill audiences with “rage infected” zombies and an American military-led attempt to
repopulate a London cityscape ravaged by the disease. In 2006, Alfonso Cuarón, in his
film adaptation of P.D. James’s Children of Men, posited an anomic future in which
human beings can no longer reproduce. Furthermore, disaster films, The Core (2003),
The Day After Tomorrow (2004), Steven Spielberg’s War of the Worlds (2005) and the
2006 remake of The Poseidon Adventure to name a few, enjoyed a revival in the opening
years of the twenty-first century due in part to staggering advances in computer graphics
in film, an increasing interest in environmental concerns such as global warming, and the
national shame over government inaction in the days after Hurricane Katrina. In
addition, zombie films, as hinted above, have achieved a resurgence with the return of
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Romero’s Dead films (including the 2004 remake of Dawn of the Dead by Zack Snyder
and Romero’s own 2005 film Land of the Dead) and recent newcomer imitations (the
Resident Evil films or the hilariously clever 2004 homage Shaun of the Dead).
If it seems that such an emphasis on (what has been termed) the apocalyptic
narrative resides primarily in one medium, film, one need only look to the popularity of
Cormac McCarthy’s 2006 novel The Road. McCarthy’s novel about a father and son
traveling through a post-apocalyptic wasteland won the 2007 Pulitzer prize for fiction
and, perhaps more telling in terms of its cultural influence, was a popular selection in
Oprah Winfrey’s book club. In addition, Alan Weisman’s The World Without Us, a work
of scientific non-fiction/journalism that explored the possibility of the earth’s response if
humanity were to suddenly disappear, was named the top nonfiction book of 2007 by
Time magazine (Grossman). In television, CBS’s Jericho told the story of a small Kansas
town isolated after a large-scale nuclear attack on major American cities and, became
such a cult hit that, after being cancelled by the network in the spring of 2007, it was
brought back through an extensive internet and mail campaign.
The point to be emphasized here, however, is not merely the particular relevance
of these narratives in the first decade of the twenty-first century, but how they fit within a
much larger tradition in American literature and culture. It is a tradition that predates the
nation itself, going back even as far as the earliest colonies. Michael Wigglesworth’s The
Day of Doom (1662) rendered the last day of judgment into a long poem that, in its use of
a common hymn meter (alternating rhymed lines of eight and six syllables) and imagery
familiar to its Puritan audience, became such a popular text that it was memorized by
many, sold some eighteen hundred copies, and, since there are no surviving printings,
13

was literally read to pieces (Baym 284). With little effort, texts can be identified tracing
the genre’s persistence in American literature from that period forward. However, this
project is concerned with the explosion of apocalyptic, disaster, and end-of-the-world
narratives starting in the middle of the twentieth century. While such texts will be
explored in greater depth later, a few key factors can be highlighted as reasons for the
preponderance and persistence of the genre at just such a cultural moment. The rather
dramatic introduction of the atomic bomb onto the world stage on August 6th, 1945
provided a concrete, material referent for the imagery of destruction long a part of
eschatological fiction in American letters. It was an image that was quickly consumed by
popular forms, most notably science fiction, in depictions of the end of the world.
Secondly, and in large part due to the atomic bomb, the United States, at the end of the
second world war, was ushered into an unprecedented period of political and economic
prosperity. Such an environment emboldened a long-standing notion of American
exceptionalism that, as we will see, was either reinforced or reconsidered in narratives of
this genre. Finally, advances in motion picture technology thrust the science fiction
genre, benefitting from an investment in the magazines edited by Hugo Gernsback, John
W. Campbell, and Horace Gold, squarely into mainstream popular culture. These
narratives became the primary form for the modern jeremiad and constituted a new,
spectacular permutation of the form in which its characteristic warning rhetoric and the
old questions of salvation, damnation, and exceptionalism were considered alongside the
fantastic narratives and stunning imagery of the burgeoning science fiction film. Films
such as On the Beach, The Manchurian Candidate, and Dr. Strangelove or: How I
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb are examples of mainstream films from the
14

era some scholars have termed the “long 1950s,” (that is, the period between 1946-1964)
that function in precisely this way (Booker 3). Planet of the Apes (1968), The Omega
Man (1971), Silent Running (1972), Soylent Green (1973), and Logan’s Run (1976)
continued the tradition into the pessimism of the 1970s through a resurgent conservatism,
of which the film Red Dawn (1984) is the most obvious example, in the 1980s. Yet
again, lest one thinks that film is the primary medium for this new permutation of the
jeremiad form, one need only look to some of the major works of the latter half of the
twentieth century. Walter Miller’s A Canticle for Leibowitz (1959), winner of the 1961
Hugo Award, is an example of the form in mainstream science fiction, while Walker
Percy’s Love in the Ruins: The Adventures of a Bad Catholic at a Time Near the End of
the World (1971) is often ascribed to other genres.
This essay will consider how the jeremiad continues to shape American
consciousness and culture, how it continues to package the old dialectic of salvation and
damnation into a narrative of national identity, and it will consider how resilient the form
has been in adopting imperatives of different historical eras as America set out on her
errand into the wilderness.
The American Jeremiad: A Critical Context
The American Jeremiad, also known as the political sermon, has its roots in the
earliest of American rhetorical and literary forms. Perry Miller, historian and author of
one of the first critical works on the form, Errand into the Wilderness (1956), argued that
the New England jeremiad was America’s first distinct literary genre (10). Historically,
as a literary term, the jeremiad has come to encompass a variety of rhetorical forms,
taking their tenor from the biblical prophet Jeremiah, that account for a society’s or era’s
15

misfortunes as just penalty for great social and moral evils, while typically holding out
the possibility that change would bring a happier future (Abrams 138). However, in early
seventeenth century America, the form evolved and the jeremiac rhetoric was mapped
onto a growing national narrative of election and purpose. Although Perry Miller takes
his title and his iconic metaphor from Samuel Danforth’s 1670 election sermon, A Brief
Recognition of New England’s Errand into the Wilderness, it was John Winthrop’s 1630
“A Modell of Christian Charity,” said Miller, that laid out the sense of mission
characteristic to the American form. Many students of the period are familiar with
Wintrop’s celebrated metaphor for the Massachusetts Bay Colony as a “city upon a hill.”
Certainly this has been due, in large part, to the resiliency of the metaphor in adopting
emerging national narratives throughout the nation’s history (America’s economic and
territorial expansion in the nineteenth century to foreign policy in the twentieth). In
1630, however, Winthrop’s metaphor was born out of an effort to theorize this new space,
a vast landscape, within the context of politico-religious Puritan thought dominating
English culture at the time of the Great Migration. It was in this context, Perry Miller
argues, that Winthrop and his fellow colonists, saw themselves not as outpost but as
exemplar. Hence, Winthrop termed their errand as an inauguration of a divine covenant:
We have professed to enterprise these actions, upon these and those ends,
we have hereupon besought Him of favor and blessing. Now if the Lord
shall please to hear us, and bring us in peace to the place we desire, then
hath He ratified this covenant and sealed our commission, [and] will
expect a strict performance of the articles contained in it; but if we shall
neglect the observation of these articles…and shall fall to embrace this
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present world and prosecute our carnal intentions…the Lord will surely
break out in wrath against us; be revenged of such a perjured people and
make us know the price of the breach of such a covenant. (Baym 216)
Here, one may already see the beginnings of the saved/damned rhetoric that Bercovitch
would argue later characterizes the double-duty the jeremiad must pull as both warning of
future punishment alongside assurances of eventual salvation. Winthrop, Miller explains,
is quite explicit about what was expected of this new community. In short, in describing
the ecclesiastical government he articulated a “pure Biblical polity set forth in full detail
by the New Testament” (5). For Winthrop, this meant “a political regime, possessing
power, which would consider its main function to be the erecting, protecting, and
preserving of this form of polity…[and] would have, at the very beginning of its list of
responsibilities, the duty of suppressing heresy…of subduing or somehow getting rid of
dissenters” (5). “Of being,” Miller quips, “deliberately, vigorously, and consistently
intolerant” (5).
Despite such definition and seeming clarity of purpose, ambiguity was inculcated
into the colonist’s very concept of the errand they were upon. As Miller argues, there is,
latent in Danforth’s title, ambiguity in precisely what kind of errand the Massachusetts
Bay colonists were engaged (3). In the first sense, errand can mean a “short journey on
which an inferior is sent to convey a message or to perform a service for his superior” (3).
Miller notes, though, that by the end of the Middle Ages, errand had come to denote “the
actual business on which the actor goes, the purpose itself, the conscious intention of his
mind” (3). The tragedy the colonists eventually faced, Sacvan Bercovitch later
condenses, “was that their errand shifted from one meaning to another in the course of the
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seventeenth century” (5). Originally, the colonists most likely considered themselves on
an errand in the first sense of the word. “These Puritans did not flee to America,” Miller
explains, “they went in order to work out that complete reformation which was not yet
accomplished in Europe or England, but which would quickly be accomplished if only
the saints back there had a working model to guide them” (11). Indeed, Miller notes that
the large unspoken assumption in the errand of 1630 was that if all went as planned in
America “not only would a federated Jehovah bless the new land, but He would bring
back these temporary colonials to govern England” (11). However, events in England in
the 1640s rendered the Puritan colonies without an audience and, Miller argues, the
colonists were forced to reconsider the sense in which their errand was run. “Their
errand having failed in the first sense of the term,” Miller writes, “they were left with the
second, and required to fill it with meaning by themselves and out of themselves” (15). It
is in this turning inward, this taking account, that the jeremiad gained prominence.
Fueled possibly by the second generation’s anxiety over moral backsliding since the days
of great men like Bradford and Winthrop, the jeremiads, argued Miller, attempted to
address the view the Puritans had of themselves that, when turning inward, appeared on
first glance to be “nothing but a sink of iniquity” (15).
Herein, though, were found the beginnings of a distinct, domestic rhetoric and
aesthetic. Miller argues that the jeremiad was the first uniquely American (or colonial)
literary form. He argues that early works of literature or scholarship coming from the
colonies, such as Thomas Hooker’s Survey of the Summe of Church Discipline or the
poetry of Anne Bradstreet, while accomplished, maintained an aesthetic and focus that
was still firmly rooted in England. Miller explains that “Anne’s flowers are English
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flowers, the birds, English birds, and the landscape is Lincolnshire” (10). However, the
jeremiad, of which he uses the published proceedings of the 1679 Boston synod, The
Necessity of Reformation, as example, in its denunciations and lamenting of specific sins
in New England (which, Miller tells us, makes for quite interesting reading) are
necessarily forced to focus on the provincial (10). “Every effort, no matter how brief,”
Miller concludes, “is addressed to the persistent question: what is the meaning of this
society in the wilderness?” (10).
This is perhaps the clearest point of distinction between Miller and Bercovitch’s
concepts of the jeremiad. In Miller’s formulation, the colonists would never receive an
answer to that question but their striving would, in essence, launch them on a process of
Americanization. Miller’s example of this dilemma is found in his reading of Cotton
Mather’s Magnalia Christi Americana which, while fiercely asserting that it is “not an
abject book,” Miller explains that it is, rather, characterized by “bewilderment, confusion,
chagrin, but... no surrender” (15). “A task has been assigned upon which the populace
are in fact intensely engaged,” Miller concludes, “but they are not sure any more for just
whom they are working” (15). On the other hand, Bercovitch asserts the form’s
“unshakeable optimism” found specifically within the jeremiad’s complaint (7). The
American form of the jeremiad, Bercovitch argues, “in explicit opposition to the
traditional mode, inverts the doctrine of vengeance into a promise of ultimate success,
affirming to the world, and despite the world, the inviolability of the colonial cause” (7).
In Bercovitch’s formulation, the very anxiety that Miller argued threw the errand into
ambiguity is celebrated by the colonists as an affirmation, alongside more straightforward
trials and punishments, of their election. The jeremiad’s function, Bercovitch argues,
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“was to create a climate of anxiety that helped release the restless ‘progressivist’ energies
required for the venture” (23). Bercovitch explains:
To this end, they revised the message of the jeremiad. Not that they
minimized the threat of divine retribution; on the contrary, they asserted it
with a ferocity unparalleled in the European pulpit. But they qualified it in
a way that turned threat into celebration. In their case, they believed,
God’s punishments were corrective, not destructive. Here, as nowhere
else, His vengeance was a sign of love, a father’s rod used to improve the
errant child. In short, their punishments confirmed their promise. (8)
The divergence in thought between Miller and Bercovitch seems to stem from the
arguments each makes for the future of the errand. For Miller, the nineteenth century
completes and subsumes the errand within a narrative of economic progress and
expansion (236). In addition, after looking specifically at the apocalyptic imagery of the
early jeremiads and the increasingly contradictory view that modern science cast on such
predictions, prophesies, and warnings, Miller concludes that the jeremiad and its errand
waned because “men cannot be scared into virtue” (238). Bercovitch, on the other hand,
argues that the errand is a fundamental and guiding narrative indelibly tied into the
overarching myth of America (xiv). He insists, contrary to Miller, that the jeremiad
persists throughout “the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in all forms of the literature,
including the literature of westward expansion” (11). It is an understanding of the
American jeremiad, Bercovitch offers, that explains America’s ability to conceive of itself
(while not monolithically) as a culture that could transcend differences in landscape, race,
and creed “to believe in something called an American mission, and could invest that
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patent fiction with all the emotional, spiritual, and intellectual appeal of a religious
quest” (11). What is of particular interest to this study is how the jeremiad’s rise as a
major rhetorical and literary mode in colonial America coincided with the budding of a
new literary genre that, among other things, attempted to resolve the tradition of religious
discourse with the burgeoning scientific knowledge characteristic to the era: science
fiction.
Early America, Early Science Fiction
In the final chapter of Errand into the Wilderness, “The End of the World,” Miller
argues that the jeremiad’s reliance on apocalyptic imagery and emphasis on resulting
judgment were both thrown into doubt by the advances of modern science. Christian
eschatology, which argued that the physical end of the world would be followed by divine
judgment, was increasingly difficult to resolve with an emerging science that articulated
and argued the rules by which the universe was uniformly governed. The question
became, jokes Miller, “Could it any longer be assumed that the heavens would be rolled
up like a scroll in order that adulterers and tavern-sots be judged… How was God
Himself to intervene if motion, once started, continued eternally in a straight line?” (222).
From this point, Miller says, the challenge that modern science placed on Christianity
was that “the judgment must henceforth be preached as depending upon the feasibility of
destruction” (222) and that “no religious thinker after Milton was again able to say with
such magisterial indifference that the precise character of the conflagration was
irrelevant” (221).
What followed was an attempt to resolve popular eschatology with the
imperatives of modern science. However, this is not necessarily to say that, at this point,
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eschatology and science were at odds. Indeed, Miller argues that scientific writings of
the late seventeenth century showed significant collaboration in an effort to resolve and
understand how the final days would come about. For example, Thomas Burnett’s The
Sacred Theory of the Earth (1681), which attempts to explain the biblical flood and the
future apocalypse as the result of various geothermal properties of the earth’s crust, was
significant, according to Miller, in that it attempted to combine the providence of God
with natural (or scientifically explainable) causation (225). “The breaking of the crust,
both at the deluge and at the end, has the quality of an intentional act,” Miller explains,
“and can therefore serve…both as detonation and a judgment” (225). Indeed, William
Whiston’s A New Theory of the Earth (1696) utilized one of the last remaining
unexplained phenomenon, comets, in trying to predict Earth’s destruction (225). It was a
trope that was popular, according to Miller, precisely because of its identity as a natural
phenomenon that, while unexplained, could also be directed by divine intent. Increase
Mather, for example, would incorporate the image of the comet in 1680 as a portent of
“Droughts, Catterpillars, Tempests, Inundations, Sickness” even well after Edmond
Halley calculated the orbit of his comet (229). Even Newton, who Miller reminds us
was, “a Puritan by inheritance and a theologian by temperament” studied physics, posits
Miller, “to know God” ( 228).
Eventually, however, notions of the scientific plausibility of the end of the world
and a resulting divine judgment shear apart. An end can be imagined, but there is no
space for imagining how judgment would follow. This is evident in the awkwardness,
says Miller, of Jonathon Edwards’ pushing back against the mechanical/ scientific cause
for apocalypse while, at the same time, having respect for Newtonian science (234).
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According to Miller, Edwards’ imagery “revealed the Newtonian…It is ruthlessly
physical- the stroke will crunch both rocks and mountains” (234). The separation
between these two concepts coincided with a burgeoning narrative of economic progress
totally at odds with a yearning for the end. Miller explains:
Thus the nineteenth century was completing the seventeenth’s errand into
the wilderness: the meaning was at last emerging, the meaning hidden
from Winthrop and from the Puritan pioneers. After all, it now appeared,
they had been dispatched into the forests not to set up a holy city on some
Old World model but to commence the gigantic industrial expansion
which, launched upon a limitless prospect, would demonstrate the folly of
anxieties about, or even a lust for, the end of this physical universe. (236)
It is easy to see how Miller could make this argument; writing, as he does, only five short
years after the release of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (the chapter first
appeared in article form in the William and Mary Quarterly in 1951). In fact, Miller’s
extensive reference to the apocalyptic imagery in the descriptions of the atomic bomb
attacks in the United States Bombing Survey is done so to reinforce this separation. For
Miller, the world described in that mid-century document had come about. With the
advent of the atomic bomb, the end of the world was indeed conceivable outside of any
notions of eschatology or divine judgment. Perhaps, during this major historical moment,
Miller was too quick to fold the old Puritan errand into the narrative of economic
progress without pondering the possibility that both could still exist and in relation to
each other. If the rhetoric of the post-war years illustrated anything, it was the resiliency
of the American myth and its ability to refashion post-war economic and political
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prosperity into a national narrative of election. After all, was it not possible that the
errand and its typology was still with us? Would not America, then, continue to try to
explain events, even the apocalyptic, in terms of this fundamental narrative of its
election?
Miller’s argument, despite his conclusion about the jeremiad’s end, is intriguing
because it establishes a precedent for the collaboration between the jeremiad and the
genre of science fiction. Admittedly, these are two genres seldom placed within the same
century, let alone the same literary mode. It should come as no surprise, however, that
alongside an emerging scientific outlook, a complimentary scientific-focused literary
mode was evolving. Of course, the genre, as it is now known, began in England with the
publication of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein in 1818 (and in America in the nineteenth
century by Edgar Allen Poe), but it is clear that precursors to the science fiction genre
were certainly present in the seventeenth century. Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis (c. 1617)
and Johannes Kepler’s Somnium (1634), for example, attest to the existence of a protoscience fiction during the seventeenth century that speculated on the outcomes of new
technologies and discoveries resulting from the emerging scientific method. The fact that
these texts were published outside of the Americas does not weaken their influence on
colonial thought since intellectual discourse during this time period was necessarily transatlantic. Whether or not the jeremiad was, as Miller argued, folded under the nineteenthcentury narrative of economic progress is irrelevant. What this connection to the science
fiction genre makes clear is that some primary characteristics of the form survived and
were incorporated into emerging popular American genres. While other scholars have
argued the influence of the jeremiad on contemporary science fiction (David Seed, for
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example), they have only done so as a means of explaining the polemical nature of
dystopian narratives. Likewise, they focus only on the polemical nature of the sermon
and its warning rhetoric. However, what these readings have neglected is the promise of
the jeremiad, that sense of purpose, of being on an errand, and reading these events as
evidence of American culture’s covenanted election. In this way, even the most
pessimistic dystopian text or film can (upon the reflection of the reader or audience that
this future, horrific world can be avoided if certain steps are taken) reinforce an idea of
American exceptionalism born out of one of the earliest American literary forms.
New Forms, New Warnings
One of the best examples of the continued relevance of the jeremiad tradition,
although completely ignored by Bercovitch, is its persistence in popular culture and
popular genres. As suggested above, even a cursory analysis of science fiction film in the
twentieth century provides evidence of the jeremiad’s persistence for those familiar with
the tradition and its hallmarks. If pressed, however, it is doubtful that many observers
would identify these narratives as jeremiads if only because they have been told,
overwhelmingly so, that these belong to another genre: the apocalyptic narrative.
It is a mistake common to the latter half of the twentieth century (that is, after the
discovery of the atomic bomb) that critics have been much too quick to assign texts to the
apocalyptic genre based solely on an iconography of disaster (be it bombs, floods,
earthquakes, etc.) comparable to that found in the book of Revelation while disregarding
rhetoric that more accurately places them in the jeremiad tradition. In this way, the term,
“apocalyptic,” has become critically imprecise and all related genres have suffered from a
kind of critical laziness. It is not uncommon, for example, to find disaster narratives
25

grouped into this genre as well. Films like Earthquake (1974), The Towering Inferno
(1974), and, more recently, Armageddon (1998) and Deep Impact (1998) are attributed to
the apocalyptic genre with little thought as to what makes them apocalyptic. The point
becomes especially clear when one reflects that these disaster films have very little to
nothing to do with the spirituality that characterizes the truly apocalyptic narrative. Most
recently this problem was noted by Jerome Shapiro in his study of atomic bomb films,
Atomic Bomb Cinema (2002). “Apocalypse” according to Shapiro, “has generally been
misused, or misunderstood, to denote an end rather than a continuum” (25). Instead,
Shapiro, pulling from both Jewish and Christian traditions, emphasizes that the
apocalyptic tradition is focused on the promise of rebirth (28). In Shapiro’s analysis,
despite the initial appearance of a dystopian future, the focus of the apocalyptic narrative
is on the ultimate goal of the establishment of the kingdom of heaven on earth. Shapiro
argues that “the apocalypse does not bring about the end of the world, but a crisis-like
period of intense suffering that cleanses the world of evil” (28). “What was good or pure
in the previous era survives to be reborn in the new era,” continues Shapiro, “and a just
community or heaven on earth flourishes” (28). In this way, the apocalyptic tradition is
inherently hopeful (28). Understanding the distinction between the genres is especially
important when considering popular texts (which, because of the spectacle of film, have
participated more than most) if any substantial consideration is to be made of their role in
reflecting and influencing American cultural attitudes and anxieties. Put simply,
“apocalyptic” has become a catch-all genre especially in the popular realm, for texts or
films that are dystopian, for one reason or another, and offer a vision of the future in
which some event, usually nuclear, has nearly destroyed society as we know it. The
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problem, however, is that little or no attention is given to the didactic (perhaps political)
and rhetorical purposes of imagining or showing such a future. When closely considered,
what becomes instantly apparent is that the rhetoric of these texts is not a desire for the
end as a means towards rebirth, for the kingdom of heaven on earth, but a depiction of a
horrific end for humanity that serves as a warning aimed at the present reality of the
reader or viewer. To put it succinctly, the jeremiad is about the end, about the horrors that
await humanity if it should continue to slide, and, ultimately, influencing the present to
avoid such an end.
However, instead of thinking of genre as a series of boxes into which texts must
be accurately (or inaccurately) placed, it is perhaps more helpful in our attempt to
understand a particular text to consider how it behaves as a product of a certain genre.
Here, Carl Freedman’s dialectical conceptualization of genre is very helpful in
emphasizing how various tendencies are at work within a given text (20).1 In this
formulation, a reading of the way a text exhibits characteristics of (or functions within) a
certain genre can be a way of allowing a multiplicity of readings that help illustrate and
unpack a greater understanding of that text. This allowance of other possible generic
interpretations, understanding how different genres are expressed in the text, is precisely
what has not occurred because of the slap-dash assignment of the apocalyptic label. My
argument, then, offers a reading of these texts as jeremiads in order to open up a line of
discourse currently foreclosed by current generic definition.
The ending of Stanley Kramer's 1959 film On the Beach is indicative of just such
a generic problem with a considerable number of post-World War II texts and films often
described as apocalyptic. The film's final scene finds all of Melbourne's residents dead
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from exposure to fallout drifting southward from a nuclear war between the United States
and the Soviet Union that engulfed the northern hemisphere. The film’s final shot rests
on the city center where, earlier in the film, the city's residents met to gather news, food,
and supplies. Now, the banner situated in the middle of city square, used earlier in the
film in conjunction with a revival-like religious service, looms over a desolate city-scape
and its message speaks to no one but the audience: "There is still time…brother!" The
rhetoric is hard to miss. It implores them to do something to avoid this vision of the
future. Avoid nuclear war. Avoid nuclear proliferation. If you do not, the film says
(nearly screams) to the audience, this is your fate.
Such an ending is fundamentally different from what Shapiro argued occurs in an
apocalyptic narrative. That tradition, he argues, is ultimately hopeful. The book of
Revelation, in the Christian tradition, is filled with destructive imagery but only as a
means toward the establishment of New Jerusalem and the kingdom of heaven on Earth.
Revelation, in other words, is supposed to alleviate anxiety over the Earth's final days,
and not, through its descriptions of destruction, elevate it. This is not at all what occurs in
On the Beach. The film offers no such hope of the creation of a better world. Perhaps
there is still time for the audience, but for Commander Dwight Towers (Gregory Peck),
Moira Davidson (Ava Gardner), and the rest of humanity there is only death.
Shapiro reads the film quite differently and it is his reading of On the Beach as an
example of the apocalyptic genre, his argument for how the film behaves within the
conventions of apocalyptic literature that he has outlined, that determines his
interpretation of the film’s ending. For, in Shapiro’s reading, he must find that emphasis
on rebirth that he has, up to this point, strongly asserted is a hallmark of the apocalyptic
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genre. As can be gathered from my sketch of the scene, the ending of On the Beach, the
fact that everyone at the film’s end is dead, makes this nearly impossible. In short,
Shapiro suggests that the camera's lingering on the empty streets and buildings itself
implies a continuance. “While the narrative suggests that everyone dies (which is
antithetical to the apocalyptic imagination),” says Shapiro, “where there is a camera,
there is a camera operator and a narrative that continues” (90). He concludes, “the
cinematic structure reassures the audience that surviving a nuclear war is possible” (91).
In contrast, I would argue that the film, frankly, does nothing of the sort. In Shapiro’s
rendering, the final image of the film, “There is still time, brother,” is completely
meaningless. In my reading it is important and meaningful. Let us explore, for a
moment, how the film might carry another set of generic expectations.
As a jeremiad, the film functions to generate a sense of urgency and anxiety (and
not a desire and excitement for rebirth). It is as a jeremiad that the film’s call to action
and the didactic rhetoric of showing a major city, Melbourne, completely dead, provide
meaning for an audience living during the Cold War. In the film’s final moments, the
Australian folk song (and unofficial national anthem) “Waltzing Matilda” fills the
background as Captain Towers’s submarine, the Sawfish, sails, with American flag
waving, out of the Australian harbor and towards North America (to die, as it were, on
native soil). It is an unmistakably nationalistic moment, so much so, that the “Starspangled Banner” might as well play instead (since Australia, in essence, has been
standing in throughout the film for the United States, England, or any other major
western power). The apocalyptic genre cannot explain this nationalistic moment. There
is no space for nationalism when the tradition’s emphasis is placed on the destruction of
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the world as we know it in order to resurrect itself as a new and better one. However, the
American jeremiad provides meaning for this esoteric musical cue by highlighting how
the film participates in this tradition of constructing a narrative of national identity. That
narrative, as we will soon see, has a great deal more to do with Cold War America than
the Australia of the film.
A Diet of Reality
It may be unsurprising, then, that texts and films like On the Beach mirror so
closely the jeremiad in both its formal characteristics and in its function as a popular
form. It was in 1634 that the election sermon began to be preached as the traditional
opening of the annual General Court in Boston (Elliot 102). Most of New England’s
best-known ministers appeared each year to give at least one election sermon (102). A
few years later, in 1637, the sermons began to be printed and disseminated yearly. As a
traditional part of the sermon, the minister would conclude by directly addressing various
groups in the audience. Usually, such an audience would include the governor, current
representatives, those standing for election, voters, and other clergy. Emory Elliot notes
that the election sermon became quite a popular event both because of its presentation
(or, one may say, performance) and because of the nature of its form. “The content of the
election sermons,” says Elliot, “was expected to integrate the theory of Puritan society
and the current social and religious practices” (103). By its nature, then, the sermon was
designed to connect the theoretical with the practical; religious dogma and moral
imperatives with everyday New England existence. In doing so, Elliot says, “the pattern
created a familiar ritual” (103). Audiences came to expect a certain experience and form
from an election sermon: summary of the larger historical picture, a taking stock of the
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past and present, and an articulation of a prophecy for the future, designed to inspire the
people and leaders to pursue heavenly as well as earthly callings. These aims appeared in
the standard sermon’s three-part division (explication, doctrine, application) as significant
modifications (103). In the “Explication,” for example, as the minister closely examined
the meanings of the words of a chosen text (and the biblical events foreshadowing the
passage), his audience was invited to make typological parallels to their current situation.
Later, in the “Application,” the minister would make explicit how the “Doctrine” and the
“Proposition” related to contemporary New England. The major themes of sermons from
earlier in the century, notes Elliot, ranged from “the nature of good leadership, the limits
of liberty and authority, the biblical roots of Puritan ideas of government and the proper
relationships between the governor and the deputies, between all leaders and the people,
and between civil and ecclesiastical powers” (103). However, from the 1660s through
the 1690s, the anxiety of the colonists and the fear over the loss of their divine errand led
ministers to construct their sermons in the bleak and cautionary rhetoric that has come to
define the form.
Like the election sermons preached to the seventeenth-century Boston audience,
texts and films like On the Beach are primarily popular forms designed from the outset to
be consumed quite differently from other forms. Both forms invite audiences to see
connections between the text and their empirical world. Both forms address their
audiences directly and aim to inspire some kind of action or focused reflection. Finally,
both forms function as a kind of ritual, in which the content both produces anxiety over
the threat and reinforces a hope that change can be enacted by a diligent audience.2

31

It is precisely the extra-textual work these forms are designed to do that Philip
Fisher argues was responsible for “setting in place part of the framework of national selfimagination” (8). In his study of popular forms in the American tradition, Fisher found
that popular genres were essential in incorporating certain cultural imperatives, “central
facts” he calls them, that in a process of recognition, repetition, and working through,
became consolidated within the American consciousness (8). The cultural work of these
forms, Fisher argues, was so effective and these facts became so ingrained, that what was
previously considered unimaginable became obvious and accepted. For example, Fisher
explores the role of Cooper’s Leatherstocking tales in dealing with the “hard fact” of the
killing of the Indians and incorporating the notion of a “‘clear land’ where a ‘new world’
might be built” (5). He explains:
My interest here...was this act of inserting into the already filled moral and
cultural realm one new reality. The strategies of this act seem to me to be
the most radical of which culture is capable. Cooper “made up” the
wilderness; the Indian and the killing of the Indian; the process of
settlement and, along with that process, the single white figure,
Leatherstocking, who made morally tolerable the ethical complexities of
settlement and the superseding of the Indians [...]. To say that Cooper
“made up” this reality is only to say that he was able to lodge the details,
the settings and the characters, the moral pride and moral shame of this
history in the imagination of the American and European world, and that
later representations drew on the history that he made symbolically
concrete. (6)
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This process is contingent, says Fisher, on the repetitive nature of popular forms and how
they are read (7). Citing such genres as detective novels, westerns, and romances, Fisher
suggests that these forms make up a “diet of reality” that “returns again and again to the
same few motifs so that they might not slip away” (7). One may very well add science
fiction to such a list and, in doing so, shed light on the cultural work the genre did as it
came to prominence in post-World War II America. This makes the cultural work of
science fiction very similar to that which Fisher argues occurs in the historical,
sentimental, and naturalist novels. Citing the criticism characters such as Uncle Tom,
from Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, received from critics of later periods for being
“wooden, offensive, and trite,” Fisher suggests that these forms were not written for the
future, but were “forms for the active transformation of the present” (7). Fisher’s point
explains a great deal about the stodginess or downright silliness that characterizes some
older, jeremiac, science fiction narratives. Their warning rhetoric has already been
incorporated by the culture and, likely, overcome or dismissed. Instead of threatening,
they have become signposts of a bygone era’s anxieties. Robert Wise’s The Day the
Earth Stood Still is an excellent example of this process at work. Klaatu’s message,
culminating in what amounts to a lecture at the end of the film, chastises Earth for its
increasing global hostilities and warns humans, now that Earth possesses the power (in
this case, nuclear) to harm other planets, that their hostility and violence will not be
tolerated by other planets. Gort, Klaatu explains, will destroy them if they continue down
this path. It should be a sobering ending, but it is not. It is not Klaatu’s strong anti-global
violence/ Cold War/ anti-nuclear statement that characterizes the film. Instead, despite
being a classic of science fiction cinema, the film is most often viewed today as an
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example of the typical science fiction camp that dominated the American film industry of
the 1950s. That is, Klaatu’s message is drowned out by Gort’s lasers and Bernard
Herrman’s theremin-heavy score. What this understanding of popular forms suggests is
that the film is considered campy and trite precisely because a fear of nuclear global
annihilation has already been articulated, incorporated, and worked through. What is left
is an entertaining, but predictable classic of science fiction cinema that warns audiences
about a threat that has already been incorporated addressed by the culture.
While twentieth century jeremiads, like The Day the Earth Stood Still, explored
individual threats against the community (such as nuclear annihilation or environmental
damage), the central fact that is most frequently explored, promoted, or critiqued is the
central fact of American exceptionalism. Deborah Madsen describes the concept of
American exceptionalism as the “perception of Massachusetts Bay colonists that...they
were charged with a special spiritual and political destiny: to create in the New World a
church and a society that would provide the model for all the nations of Europe as they
struggled to reform themselves (a redeemer nation)” (2). According to Madsen, this view
holds that the New World “is the last and best chance offered by God to a fallen humanity
that has only to look at His exceptional new church for redemption” (2). “Thus, America
and Americans are special, exceptional” she explains, “because they are charged with
saving the world from itself and, at the same time, America and Americans must sustain a
high level of spiritual, political and moral commitment to this special destiny” (2). This
charge the Puritans felt, and Americans continue to feel now (if one accepts the
argument) is born out of the covenant discussed earlier. Madsen describes the “federal
covenant” as the “agreement or contract by which the Puritan community could expect
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collective salvation” (3). “Just as a redeemed individual exhibited signs of sainthood
through pious behaviour, serious demeanor, and the keeping of God’s laws and those of
the magistrates,” she explains, “so a redeemed community expected itself to be pious,
well regulated and observant of divine and civil laws” (3). Both Madsen and Ernest
Tuveson, in his Redeemer Nation, emphasize the collective interdependence that such a
contract meant for the community. Any sin committed by a member of the community
placed the entire community in jeopardy. Backsliding, of any kind, then, was closely
watched. Ultimately, this emphasis on introspection, both individually and communally,
led to attempts by the members of the community to gauge their success by reading signs
of God’s favor or displeasure. According to Madsen, this led to the two major
characteristics of subsequent exceptionalist rhetoric:
The glory...will be theirs, if the community of saints keeps to the terms
of the covenant, creates a purified and perfectly reformed church to be the
world’s model, and establishes the conditions for the realisation of
millennial hopes. Alternatively, if they should fail then their failure will
be as humiliating as their glory would have been, in equal measure. The
world’s eyes are upon them and if they should betray the covenant then all
the world will know and scorn them for their excess of ambition and
pride. (20)
American exceptionalism, Madsen argues, has its roots in reform movements of
the Tudor period Church of England. In the 1500s, various attempts were made to
reinterpret the history and lineage of the Church of England as a means of reforming it
further. Madsen shows that such efforts attempted to align the church with the primitive
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church of the Apostles: arguing that the true origin of the church could be traced back to
the arrival in England of Joseph of Arimathea (7). The effect of these historicizing efforts
was a shift in the power structure of the church. Elizabeth, reigning over a reformed and
purified church, now had power over the bishops and “ruled by divine right and by the
authority of divine Providence that placed her at the culminating point of ecclesiastical
history” (8). This understanding of ecclesiastical history, what Madsen calls an
interpretation of history that is both temporal and divine, is precisely what becomes
exported to the New World. In other words, it was a narrative of the church and the role it
would play in secular and spiritual affairs.
This is essential to understanding, then, the various strains that were exported to
the New World. Madsen distinguishes between the “non-separating” Congregationalists
of the Massachusetts Bay colony (led by John Winthrop) and the “separating”
Congregationalists who settled at Plymouth (led by William Bradford) in order to
illustrate the theology and the social aspects that led to such a strong assertion of
American exceptionalism.3 The Separatists believed that the bible’s promises, found in
the Old and New Testaments, could only be fulfilled on a purely spiritual plane, that the
Bible could no longer be used to predict the future of human history (thus negating, for
the most part, the typology so important to the Massachusetts Bay Congregationalists and
the jeremiad) (17). The non-separating Congregationalists, however, saw the promise
represented by the Israelites and New Canaan as both a worldly possibility and a spiritual
reward (18). In other words, this ideal community was both a physical (and thus,
geographical) as well as spiritual possibility. That the Massachusetts Bay colonists saw
their mission as both spiritual and physical in setting up the ideal church, is important in
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understanding what of this rhetoric has survived in the nation’s discourse. Madsen aptly
traces this rhetoric as it adapts to political influences of the late 1700s. In Benjamin
Franklin’s Autobiography, for example, Madsen finds that Franklin recast “the terms of
success, where material property assumed a prominence it had not had before,... where
the collective salvation of the community was transformed into a form of government
that would protect the rights of all citizens” (37). What has remained to the present day,
argues Madsen, is “the perception that America would continue to be judged by the other
nations of the world to whom America would remain a model, guide, a measure...and also
a guardian of the inalienable rights of man” (38).
Perhaps one of the most often cited examples of a twentieth-century jeremiad is
Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49. That novel, while concerned with many issues,
is not as overt in articulating its concern as, say, The Day the Earth Stood Still is about
nuclear proliferation. However, an analysis of Pynchon’s novel can help us explore the
form in its current state, highlight which characteristics of the traditional form are now
emphasized, and to consider to what end the form is now used. Outside of its frame
narrative of Oedipa Maas’ attempts to execute Pierce Inverarity’s will, Pynchon’s novel
can be considered a jeremiad on a variety of issues. At times, the novel functions as a
jeremiad on the consumer culture of the mid-twentieth century in which it was written
(having been published in 1965). The novel begins, after all, with Oedipa Maas returning
home from a Tupperware party to find that she has been named executrix of Pierce
Inverarity’s estate. The novel ends, appropriately, with the crying or (auctioning) of his
estate. In this way, the novel can be read as an attempt by Oedipa Maas (and the reader)
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to make meaning out of the disparate and dizzying financial and material aspects of one
man’s life.
In another but related sense, the novel can be seen as a jeremiad against the
fractured nature of American culture in its postmodern state (a well-known concern of
Pynchon’s). Upon exploring the various holdings of Pierce’s estate, Oedipa struggles to
understand the world in which she is thrust. Indeed, the more she learns about the
Tristero, for example, the more she appears to be estranged from her understanding of her
marriage, her community, and (the novel suggests) her understanding of America. In fact,
this is how Deborah Madsen reads Pynchon’s novel. Striking at the very heart of the
tradition, The Crying of Lot 49, she argues, is a jeremiad on American exceptionalism
itself. She reads Pynchon’s novel as a critique of the uses of the mythology of
exceptionalism to “perpetuate internal class divisions and to further America’s
imperialistic ambitions” (152). Madsen points out that Oedipa Mass learns, throughout
the novel, that her conception of America is woefully incomplete because it is based on a
“mythology of visible sainthood, which means that a class of the unredeemed must be
defined in order to distinguish God’s chosen few” (154). “As a member of the
redeemed,” Madsen explains, “Oedipa has never known those who are sacrificed,
dispossessed, disinherited, to make her privilege possible” (154). Indeed, much of the
novel shows Oedipa exploring and learning about this part of the culture that, to her and
the reader, did not exist before. The reader follows Oedipa as she learns the significance
of the muted horn symbol, discovers the existence of a separate, subversive postal system
(under the acronym WASTE), and, ultimately, comes to question the possibility of
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knowing anything with her former degree of certainty. At the end of the novel, Pynchon
considers Oedipa’s position:
Another mode of meaning behind the obvious, or none. Either Oedipa in
the orbiting ecstasy of true paranoia, or a real Tristero. For there either
was some Tristero beyond the appearance of the legacy America, or there
was just America and if there was just America then it seemed the only
way she could continue, and manage to be at all relevant to it, was as an
alien, unfurrowed, assumed full circle into some paranoia. (150-1)
But instead of this being a place to despair, of knowledge and understanding of Oedipa’s
nation and culture spiraling into a nihilistic nothingness, it is, argues Madsen, a space for
understanding America outside of the strict categories of saved and damned. “What she
does find,” says Madsen of Oedipa Maas, “is a sense of the limitlessness of the land upon
which she stands, in the absence of the divisions that are imposed by society” (154).
What Pynchon’s novel accomplishes in its jeremiac mode, then, Madsen argues, is the
questioning of “how it could have happened that in the New World, in a land of infinite
possibility, all should be reduced to binary choices: elect or preterite, citizen or
exile” (154). Madsen’s argument is particularly useful because it makes visible the
aspects of the jeremiad tradition at work in Pynchon’s novel. Though not as overt as
other texts I have cited, Pynchon’s polemic on American culture is, at times, pointed.
Although he ranges over different aspects of culture (consumer culture, American
exceptionalism and identity, etc) he is calling attention to matters that continue to affect
the lives of people within the culture (namely Oedipa Mass and, presumably, the readers).
Furthermore, by packaging this polemic against American exceptionalism itself (in this
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way turning the jeremiad on itself), Pynchon can have it both ways: he can both critique
the effects of American exceptionalism at the same time that he utilizes a genre and
rhetoric that has had, traditionally, a great deal to do promoting it (thus using its
traditional cultural effectiveness to lay down his complaint). Such a complex situation
fits ideally with Pynchon’s focus in the novel.
The Crying of Lot 49 is not a novel with overt answers or suggestions as to how,
like the old jeremiads, the community can atone and improve. What it does offer,
however, is the assertion that the American experience is much more complex and
dynamic than such certitudes and answers would suggest. Understanding how Pynchon’s
novel participates in this tradition, and what aspects are promoted and muted, can allow
for a reading of a similar text that straddles the border between American literature
proper, Southern literature, and Science Fiction.
Many have read Walker Percy’s third novel, Love in the Ruins: The Adventures of
a Bad Catholic at a Time Near the End of the World, as an exploration of the regenerative
powers of the apocalyptic in a world characterized by postmodern alienation and ennui.
There are strong reasons to read the novel this way. The novel, whose subtitle is “the
adventures of a bad Catholic at a time near the end of the world,” concerns Dr. Tom
More, a psychiatrist and scientist who believes he has invented a device that promises no
less than the ability to save mankind by healing the Cartesian rift separating essence from
body. The device, the More’s Quantitative-Qualitative Ontological Lapsometer
(truncated to MOQUOL), reads electrical energy in the brain that More then correlates
with “the manifold woes of the Western world, its terrors and rages and murderous
impulses” (28-29). Later in the novel, More’s device, which previously had only been a
40

diagnostic tool, is fitted with an adapter that allows More to apply doses of sulfur
radiation to certain areas of the brain in an attempt to stimulate and heal the rift that
rendered man with a permanent complex that More describes as “angelism-bestialism.”
As a scene late in the novel illustrates, the device, in the hands of others, can be
destructive: creating exacerbated cases of the very “angelism-bestialism” that More’s
device was designed to treat and sowing discord and violence in the small Louisiana
community. That is not to say that the community was not already at odds. The
geography of Percy’s fictional Louisiana parish is divided by the ennui-plagued suburban
secular utopia of Paradise Estates, occupied by clashing left and right-wingers, and
Honey Island Swamp, which has become a refuge for college drop-outs, failed
communitarians (seemingly out of Heinlein’s Stranger in a Strange Land), and the
militant Bantus (African Americans whose response to the civil rights debate of the 1960s
and 1970s is outright violence staged against the community).
Lois Parkinson Zamora, for example, points to the persistent images of
“exhilarating” destruction (war, natural disaster, acts of sexual violence) in Percy’s fiction
as “the antithesis of everydayness” (126). J. Gerald Kennedy, exploring the polemical
aspect of Percy’s novel, situates Percy’s complaint within an attempt to diagnose the
roiling discord in American society in the late 1960s and early 1970s (the novel was
published in 1971) as the result of “the manifestation of the subject-object split which has
been central to Western experience since the philosophy of Descartes and the beginning
of the modern age” (116). Ultimately, Kennedy concludes that Percy’s novel “reminds us
that if a person is to recover a fresh perception of the world, he must be prepared to
circumvent established Cartesian modes of experiencing and understanding
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reality” (119). It is only then, writes Kennedy, “he can recover what Emerson called ‘an
original relation with the universe’...only then can he redeem his existence from the
patterns contrived by the engineers of human happiness” (119). Such an emphasis on
polemics, though specifically situated on this question of Cartesian metaphysics, leads
Percy, according to Kennedy, to a “commitment to Christian eschatology [that] inevitably
binds him to a didactic program and governs his representation of experience” (135).
Brannon Costello, situating the novel’s regenerative energy on its criticism of traditional
understandings of race and class in the American south (particularly racial paternalism)
that serve to handicap progress and stifle “nonoppressive models of identity and political
participation,” finds, in the novel’s epilogue, the hope of a new social arrangement
represented by More’s inclusion in Victor Charles’s campaign for the United States
Congress (159). This, he argues, despite the novel’s curious resolution in the epilogue
that emphasizes Tom’s commitment to the system of race and class to the point of
accepting, if he cannot play the part of wealthy paternalist, the role of “simple, rural,
humble Other” (157).
Perhaps because of this commitment to the apocalyptic and the polemical, the
novel was widely considered to be Percy’s weakest novel. William Allen argues, for
example, that the “subtle ironies and complex but unobtrusive allusiveness of the first
two books give way in Percy’s satire to broad, highly topical humor and heavy-handed
allusion” (78). It is not a great novel, Allen contends, “because it is predominantly a
vehicle for propagating ideas rather than a means of discovering them” (79). Allen may
be correct in asserting that the novel functions in this way. However, this is no reason to
disparage the novel. Instead, it may signal that a different set of generic expectations are
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at work. In addition, the novel very well may be apocalyptic in precisely the way that the
term is supposed to be used: that is, emphasizing the regenerative aspects of apocalypse’s
characteristic destructive imagery. In fact, I find Zamora’s reading of the novel
convincing even though, like Zamora, I find that the serene aesthetic of the novel’s
epilogue (in contrast to the violence that characterizes the novel proper) causes such a
reading to unravel: she argues that the epilogue “serves to trivialize the apocalyptic
aspirations described in the body of the novel” (133). Yet, there continues to be frequent
images of and references to a strange brand of American nationalism. Given the
previously discussed characteristics of the American jeremiad tradition, this prevalence of
nationalism and the polemical mode are connected, I assert, to the novel’s didactic
posture. A consideration of Love in the Ruins as a jeremiad allows us to explore certain
traits that have been, until now, unexpressed.
In addition, the novel’s connection to the jeremiad coincides with Percy’s
argument for the role of the novelist in contemporary culture. In his “Notes for a Novel
About the End of the World,” Percy speaks directly to this function an author can
perform:
Perhaps it is only through the conjuring up of catastrophe, the destruction
of all Exxon signs, and the sprouting of vines in the church pews, that the
novelist can make vicarious use of catastrophe in order that he and his
reader may come to themselves. Whether or not the catastrophe actually
befalls us, or is deserved- whether reconciliation and renewal may yet take
place- is not for the novelist to say. (118)
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Perhaps not, but this consideration seems interestingly epistemological. It suggests a
connection between author and reader and of that connection having implications for the
empirical world outside of the novel. Such a connection seems to be precisely the kind of
function the American jeremiad wished to accomplish.
Furthermore, rather early in the novel, Percy connects a concern that appears
throughout his novels to the rhetoric of exceptionalism:
Is it that God has at last removed his blessing from the U.S.A. and what
we feel now is just the clank of the old historical machinery, the sudden
jerking ahead of the roller-coaster cars as the chain catches hold and
carries us back into history with its ordinary catastrophes, carries us out
and up toward the brink from that felicitous and privileged siding where
even unbelievers admitted that if it was not God who blessed the U.S.A.,
then at least some great good luck had befallen us, and that now the
blessing or the luck is over, the machinery clanks, the chain catches hold,
and the cars jerk forward? (3-4)
Here, readers identify the same concern over American exceptionalism so characteristic
to the jeremiad along with Percy’s characteristic anxiety over experience without
meaning. In The Moviegoer, by comparison, Binx Bolling ruminated that what people
really feared was that the bomb would not fall. In other words, their lives were
characterized more by the constant anxiety of living under the threat of the bomb (until
even that became, posits Percy, commonplace) than by definitive and violent events
supplying meaning and definition to their lives. At the beginning of this novel, Dr. More,
sitting by a pine tree next to the interstate, carbine rifle slung across his lap, and breaking
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out in hives, reflects that “Undoubtedly something is about to happen...Or is it that
something has stopped happening?” (3). More’s concern is that the cultural schism in
American society, itself having become trite, now only exists as a conflict without
meaning and as a conflict drained of its transformative, progressive power through which
the future of a supposedly exceptional nation is determined. There is also another way
Bolling’s statement, echoed by More in Love in the Ruins, can be interpreted: that such
exceptionalism is contingent upon the threat and realization of dramatic, defining (and,
perhaps, violent) events. It would suggest, in other words, that part of what makes the
American experience distinct and exceptional is, not only the focusing effect such threats
cause in a society under fear (be it A-bomb or God), but the regenerative energies of
contemplation, accountability, and refocusing that naturally must take place after one
occurs. It is significant, then, that Percy’s novel begins in medias res, tellingly, on the
Fourth of July. In its second section, the novel then flashes back to July 1st and in
subsequent sections, July 2nd, 3rd, and ultimately resuming where it left off on July 4th
before, at novel’s end, skipping ahead five years in the epilogue. In other words, the
novel’s narrative very closely follows a format of revelation, reflection, regeneration that
is posited as being the very process throughout the jeremiad tradition that led
communities to consider their ways and whether or not they may regard themselves just
and principled.
However, the novel’s early engagement with the rhetoric of exceptionalism also
serves to illustrate More’s, not necessarily Percy’s, investment with such rhetoric. In one
particular passage, he considers whether this exceptionalism was sacrificed by the
national sin of slavery:
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Even now, late as it is, nobody can really believe that it didn’t work after
all. The U.S.A. didn’t work! Is it even possible that from the beginning it
never did work? that the thing always had a flaw in it, a place where it
would shear, and that all this time we were not really different from
Ecuador and Bosnia-Herzegovina, just richer...Was it the nigger business
from the beginning? What a bad joke: God saying, here it is, the new
Eden, and it is yours because you’re the apple of my eye...And all you had
to do was pass one little test...One little test: here’s a helpless man in
Africa, all you have to do is not violate him. That’s all...One little test: you
flunk! (56-7)
Earlier I noted that Costello’s reading of Love in the Ruins argued that the novel examines
the consequences of a society that remains committed to the ideology of paternalism.
The above passage would suggest, similarly, that the novel is just as interested in
examining the tradition of exceptionalism in American culture. The passage clearly
illustrates More’s need to read his nation’s history in terms of this narrative and, more to
the point of Percy’s novel, understand the role he plays in its redemption and
regeneration. More’s reaction, after all, borders on indignation: “No! No fair! Foul! The
test was too much!” (57). In perhaps the most direct connection to the rhetoric of
exceptionalism, More distinguishes (presumably to God) America’s perception in the
world:
You tested us because bad as we were there was no one else, and
everybody knew it, even our enemies, and that is why they curse us. Who
curses the Chinese? Who ever imagined the Chinese were blessed by God
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and asked to save the world? Who ever expected anything else from them
than what they did? (58)
It is essential to remember that, like an investment in the ideology of paternalism, More is
invested in seeing the cultural rifts in his community within the rhetoric of
exceptionalism because of his personal interest in his invention and his hubristic belief
that he can save mankind. After all, shortly after the above passage, More, thinking on
his invention, exclaims, “But wait. It is still not too late. I can save you, America!” (58).
It is a statement that only suggests what the rest of the novel makes explicit: Tom thinks
of himself as the new Christ.
Like Pynchon’s novel, Love in the Ruins functions as a twentieth century
jeremiad, as the form’s latest permutation, because it disrupts easy answers in favor of
acknowledgment of the complexity of the human, and specifically American, experience.
The novel functions as Tom’s (and by extension our) coming to terms with such dizzying
complexity in a way that does not end in frustration and pessimism. In this way, the
novel’s ending, in which Tom agrees to join Victor Charles’s new political coalition, is
not so much Revelation itself, but a reinvigoration of the hope for a meaningful
Revelation (or merely revelation) in the future. In other words, the novel ends with a
rejuvenated covenant. Of course, such a situation is jeremiac because of its investment in
the rhetoric of exceptionalism. As we will see, such an investment and its corresponding
critique have become overt hallmarks of the jeremiad form in the twentieth and twentyfirst centuries. Having considered how the jeremiad mutated in two major works of the
twentieth century, we will now turn to an example of the form in the first years of the
new century.
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Twenty-First Century Warnings
A more recent example of the jeremiad in American fiction is CBS’s Jericho
(2006).4 The show, which ran for two seasons (2006-2008), concerns a fictional, small
Kansan town, Jericho, in the days after a nationwide nuclear terrorist attack. Much of the
plot centered around the efforts of the town’s attempt to survive the aftereffects of such a
devastating attack. In fact, much of Jericho is conventional in the sense that it engages
many of the same ideas other texts and films considered fifty years earlier during the
Cold War. In an update of the familiar Cold War narrative, terrorists (or rogue
government agents posing as terrorists) have been substituted for Soviets. In fact, upon
closer examination, the show’s pilot, plays out much like an old civil defense film. After
showing the initial attack in what is, frankly, an unsurprising and conventional way, the
show busies itself with illustrating how the town deals with the resulting hysteria,
paranoia, and confusion. In the show’s decidedly local focus, for example, a rush on the
local supermarket or gas station is posited to be a greater threat to the town than any
possible armed invader. In another episode, the former U.S. Marine turned town mayor,
Johston Greene (Gerald McRaney), his sons Jake (Skeet Ulrich) and Eric (Kenneth
Mitchell), and the town’s law enforcement personnel rush to find adequate shelter for the
town’s residents as a massive storm carrying radioactive fallout approaches and threatens
to blanket the town. If it seems that the show suffered from a characteristic banality, this
was due in large part to its indebtedness to the genre of texts devoted to exploring postnuclear scenarios and its commitment to updating that narrative in a post-9/11 landscape.
Literally, viewers had seen most of this before.
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However, by the end of the first season, the show had found a particularly vocal
audience. When CBS tried to cancel the show in early 2007, fans notoriously inundated
CBS with letters and roughly forty thousand pounds of peanuts (a reference to the season
finale’s final dialogue: itself an allusion to World War II 101st Airborne artillery
commander Gen.Anthony McAuliffe’s famous response to a German commander’s call
for surrender at the Battle of the Bulge). By May 2007 the show had been renewed for a
second season, thus making it one of only a few shows to have ever returned after being
cancelled (“Thanks to the fans...”). The show’s cult status firmly in place, television and
popular culture analysts scrambled to explain the show’s resurrection as the result of the
network’s miscalculation of the show’s viewership and argued that the traditional Nielsen
ratings did not take into account new methods of television viewing (Digital Video
Recorders-DVRs-such as Tivo and online downloading on services such as iTunes) in
their estimation of the show’s audience (La Monica). By the middle of the second season
the show was consistently attracting upwards of five million viewers an episode in a
television season postponed and depressed by the 2007-2008 WGA Writer’s Strike.
How, then, can one resolve Jericho’s banal subject matter with its popularity,
resilient production history, and cult status? Assuming that viewers are not uncritical
consumers of whatever product is thrust on them, it appears that Jericho behaves
precisely as Fisher claims popular texts have for some time. In this formation, the show’s
popularity and the particular zeal of Jericho’s fan base is consistent with the ways Fisher
argued popular forms have been traditionally consumed. The question then arises: what
cultural imperatives, themes, and ideas are being incorporated? How, in other words,
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does this television show function as a product of the culture and as one that influences
the culture?
In his analysis, Fisher describes the process through which a group of ideas
become incorporated in the larger cultural narrative as a kind of “psychological
rehearsal” (18). Jericho participates in this process in two important ways. The first and
most obvious example is Jericho’s literal rehearsal of how a community faced with the
post-nuclear scenario reacts. This is perhaps the most banal element of the show and the
one reaching as far back to the Cold War for its precedent. Much of Jericho serves as a
performance of behavior in the event that one is presented with this scenario. In an odd
twist, the show’s writers apparently know this and in the places that the show looks most
like a Department of Homeland Security preparation film, it is also a comment on the
increased presence of such rhetoric in daily American life (color-coded threat level
systems, for example). While Jericho serves to literally show Americans how to behave
in such a scenario, a much more subtle act of psychological rehearsal is present. In the
second sense, Fisher means that the text posits certain ideas that, through their frequent
repetition, become ingrained into the cultural consciousness and lay the ground work for
future conceptions of our present. For example, he notes how Cooper made the moral
complexities of settlement (dispossessing and killing Native Americans) more palatable
through a frequent aesthetic maneuver in positing the American landscape (making it
“symbolically concrete”) in certain terms that later representations drew upon until,
eventually, it became the accepted version. The cultural imperatives undergirding
Jericho are similarly subtle but are related to the rehearsal we see in the first sense of the
term. To put it succinctly, Jericho is a show that constantly asserts the importance of
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community, family, and patriotism. Then, it reinforces those claims by showing the
town’s residents surviving precisely because they band together as a community, because
they depend on family, and, more to the point, because they are guided by what they
believe are uniquely American values.
It is in this way that the show behaves most convincingly as a twenty-first century
jeremiad. Alongside these assertions of what makes Jericho and its residents exceptional
(and thus the reason for their survival), the show also renders the jeremiad’s characteristic
warning rhetoric in its critique of the security state that grew substantially in the United
States after the 9/11 attacks. Specifically, viewers eventually learn that the fictional attack
was perpetrated by rogue agents in the United States government, led by none other than
the director of the Department of Homeland Security, in what amounts to an
ultraconservative coup d’etat. In a variety of other ways the show functions as a rather
overt allegory for many of the fundamental domestic and foreign policy issues of the
opening years of the twenty-first century. For example, late in the show’s first season
Jericho has to defend itself against a group of pillaging military contractors, known as
Ravenwood (a clear reference to Blackwater U.S.A.: a private security firm criticized for
questionable actions in Iraq). In addition, in the show’s second season, the town’s
reconstruction effort is facilitated by a private company, Jennings and Rall, who, for all
intents and purposes, looks and functions identically to Halliburton.5 In another sense,
Jericho updates the traditional Cold War narrative by rendering the confusion and
misinformation characteristic to the geo-political realities of the War on Terror. That is,
Jericho illustrates the shift from anxiety over attack from a clearly defined enemy in a
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rival nation-state to anxiety over influence and attack at the hands of shadowy, nongovernmental organizations and foreign terrorist organizations.
This is not, however, how allegory usually functions. Jericho pushes the
connections to the point of collapsing the allegory. In such cases, the connections are
unequivocal and it seems that, instead of allegory, another, more didactic, narrative
strategy is at work. Much like the Puritan pulpit, in Jericho’s case the frequent references
to and criticisms of popular culture, domestic politics, and foreign policy aim for much
more than assurance and entertainment. What an understanding of Jericho as a jeremiad
suggests is that alongside a conventional survival narrative (packaged with all of its
traditional warnings and castigations of the society that led to its downfall), notions of
family, community, and country are reinforced as reasons for their ultimate
exceptionalism and salvation. Finally, Jericho’s role as a popular form would suggest
that such frequent assertions about the contemporary state of the American republic are
designed to transform both contemporary and, by extension, future conceptions of the
political and social landscape. After all, it was the series’s unofficial theme song, Five for
Fighting’s “World,” that, in the show’s pilot episode and throughout first-season
commercials, asked, “What kind of world do you want?” Jericho, it seems, was a show
that provided an answer.
As these examples have shown, the jeremiad remains a vibrant form. Ideas of
national identity, community, and salvation (secular or spiritual) continue to be as central
to the form and as relevant in the new century and its forms as they were in the
seventeenth century. The analysis in following pages considers the extent to which
contemporary popular forms are indebted to the jeremiad, how such a relationship
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continues to shape American thought, and the promise and peril of an American discourse
that continues to impress the notion of being exceptional upon its people.
End Notes
1 Freedman

explains: “In this understanding, a genre is not a classification but an element or,
better still, a tendency that, in combination with other relatively autonomous generic elements or
tendencies, is active to a greater or lesser degree within a literary text that is itself understood as
a complexly structured totality. In other words: a text is not filed under a generic category;
instead, a generic tendency is something that happens within a text” (20).
2

Elliot, owing a great deal to Bercovitch, sums up the seemingly contradictory nature of the
ritualistic aspect of the election sermon: “Overall, the jeremiads had a complicated, seemingly
contradictory, communal function. On the one hand, they were designed to awaken a lethargic
people. On the other hand, in their repetitive and ritualistic nature, they functioned as a form of
reassurance, reinscribing proof that the saints were still a coherent body who ruled New England
in covenant with God under His sometimes chastising and yet ultimately protective hand” (104).
3

What this meant, according to Madsen, was that Separatists “intended to make a permanent and
lasting colony in the New World rather than a temporary refuge from the difficulties and
persecutions they had endured in Europe” (16). “Bradford,” Madsen explains, “had no intention
of developing a perfecting reformed church, to be a model to the imperfectly reformed churches
of England” (16).
4

Beyond the show’s post-nuclear focus, connections to the jeremiad tradition appear even as
immediately as in the show’s title: a clear reference to the Old Testament’s Book of Joshua and
its narrative of the Israelite occupation of New Canaan.
5

One humorous example can be found in the fact that the website created for the fictional
Jennings and Rall (http://www.jenningsandrall.com), as a web-based promotion for the show,
looks nearly identical to Halliburton’s official site (http://www.halliburton.com/).
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CHAPTER TWO
“PEACEFUL” METHODS: SCIENCE FICTION AND THE CULTURAL COLD WAR
In the previous chapter, I explored the powerful influence of the American Jeremiad, not
only at the nation’s inception (as the colonists attempted to theorize a new national identity that
would explain their place in the world), but also the continuing influence of the form in
contemporary American culture and letters. The fundamental argument was that the rhetoric of
the jeremiad was characterized by a polemic employed to emphasize a heavenly covenant and,
most importantly, the resounding assertion of an American exceptionalism. However,
Bercovitch’s argument for the persistence of this form does not include any discussion of
American literature after the nineteenth century and, specifically, American popular forms and
culture. It is precisely the jeremiad’s historical role as a popular form that connects it, I argue,
with some of the most dynamic expressions of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
It is the argument of the following pages that the jeremiad’s polemical and covenant/
exceptionalism rhetoric characterizes popular texts from the period of the twentieth century
known popularly as the Cold War era. These texts are significant because they, like their
seventeenth century forebears, participate in the articulation and construction of strong national
and cultural narratives aimed at promoting or revising a national identity at a time when America
and the Soviet Union were grappling over how the world would perceive American culture. It is
the assertion of this chapter that, while the CIA conducted a global cultural campaign designed to
convince the world’s intellectuals of America’s cultural and artistic merit, popular texts (usually
American science fiction) participated alongside, though not in overt collaboration, in a domestic
effort at articulating Cold War cultural narratives and, ultimately, asserting America’s
exceptionalism.
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At the end of Robert Heinlein’s The Puppet Masters, his novel of alien invasion
recognized universally by scholars as a Cold War allegory, the main character, Sam, is forced to
reconsider their new understanding of the cosmos. “If Man wants to be top dog- or even a
respected neighbor-” says Sam, “he’ll have to fight for it”(338). The following is a examination
of how the American jeremiad was drafted to do so.
The CIA and the Cultural Cold War
The winter of 1947 was an exceptionally hard one for post-war Europe. The unrelenting
cold, wind, and snow combined with the misery, destruction, and poverty that characterized the
first months following the war’s end. Francis Saunders, in her influential history of the cultural
Cold War, tells of ice floes running to the mouth of the Thames, trains carrying food supplies
freezing to their tracks, and coal barges headed for Paris becoming ice-bound (7). Upon seeing
Paris, devastated and prostrate, philosopher Isaiah Berlin described it as “empty and hollow and
dead, like an exquisite corpse” (qtd. in Saunders 7).
“There really is no food,” noted the wife of an American diplomat in Paris, “except for
people who can afford the black market and not much for them” (qtd. in Saunders 9). In Britain,
unemployment was rampant: rising by one million in just two months (7). By 1947, both the
Tiergarten park and the Grunewald had been hacked down to stumps after an emergency measure
alloted each family a tree for heating (8). All across Europe, Saunders notes, basic services
(water, sewage, etc) collapsed, food supplies dwindled, and coal reserves reached an all time low
(7). Indeed, Europe’s economic trouble was brought into sharp relief for American GIs, who
quickly found that a carton of cigarettes, purchased for fifty cents at an American base, could
fetch roughly eighteen hundred Reichsmarks on the black market or one hundred and eighty
dollars at the legal exchange rate (8). “For four cartons,” Saunders points out, “you could hire a
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German orchestra for the evening...or for twenty-four...acquire a 1939 Mercedes-Benz” (9).
While such an example may be amusing, it is set against stories of the misery and deprivation
where men pounced on discarded cigarette butts (10), families lived in underground bunkers with
no water or light, and children attempted to prostitute themselves to American GIs in exchange
for chocolate (24). However, even at this early date, in the midst of such suffering and before the
United States would set out on its bold Marshall plan to rehabilitate and secure Europe’s
economy, the U.S. would, as the following anecdote illustrates, prepare for the looming
ideological struggle with the Soviet Union.
On one of his first assignments, Michael Josselson, the CIA agent who would eventually
lead the Congress of Cultural Freedom from 1950-1967, accidentally crashed his jeep into a
Russian roadblock while driving through rainy weather on his way back to the Allied-controlled
sector from Berlin. Suffering from severe cuts and bruises, Josselson was taken to a Russian
military hospital where he was treated. Saunders characterizes it as one of history’s interesting
ironies that the Russians, in treating Josselson, ended up saving “the man who was, for the next
two decades, to do most to undermine their attempts at cultural hegemony” (18). As interesting
as this irony is, what is more relevant is the objective of Josselson’s mission that day. Josselson
and fellow agent Nicholas Nabokov (cousin to novelist Vladimir) were not tasked with retrieving
sensitive government documents or high-value German scientists. On this day they were asked to
retrieve thousands of costumes belonging to the former German State Opera safely housed
during the war by the Nazis at the bottom of a salt mine outside of Berlin (but within the US
occupation zone) (18). Saunders notes that the Deutsches Opernhaus Company was, at the time,
considered the only serious rival to the Russian State Opera, and the costumes would help
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provide a response to a highly successful performance of Gluck’s Orpheus staged by the
Russians in 1945 in the Admiralspalast (18).
The implications are startling. While Europeans were starving in the ruins of the last war,
the Soviets and Americans were already posturing for a new one. While many did not have
clothes to wear or shelter to keep them warm, American and Russian agents wrangled over who
could offer them the best and highest in culture. Such efforts, one nearly leading to Josselson’s
death, signaled the importance of culture in the looming battle for the minds of the world.
Starting in 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency (born out of the wartime Office of
Strategic Services) conducted an elaborate, well-funded, cultural propaganda campaign designed
to frustrate and debunk the allure and promises of Communism in favor of American-styled
democracy and democratic ideals. One of the major public organs of this covert effort was the
Congress for Cultural Freedom. Through the auspices of private patronage, the CCF served as a
front organization for the CIA’s efforts to “nudge the intelligentsia of western Europe away from
its lingering fascination with Marxism...towards a view more accommodating of ‘the American
way’” (Saunders 1). It is an important distinction that the CIA’s kulturkampf program was, at its
core, aimed primarily at persuading intellectuals across Europe (where the first battle lines in the
new Cold War were being drawn) as opposed to attempting to persuade or influence culture more
generally. In fact, one influential CIA agent, Tom Braden, joked that it could be considered “the
battle for Picasso’s mind” (qtd in Wilford 102). Its aim was to build “a consortium,” says
Saunders, “whose double task it was to inoculate the world against the contagion of
Communism, and to ease the passage of American foreign policy interests abroad” (2). Much of
this consortium was made up of former radicals and leftists who had become disillusioned with
Marxism and Communism after seeing evidence of Stalin’s totalitarianism (2). With the Cold
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War having been defined as a battle for men’s minds, this consortium set about waging its battles
from a stockpile of journals, books, conferences, seminars, art exhibitions, concerts, and awards
(2).
When the CCF was outed in 1967, it had already accumulated a list of considerable
achievements on its Cold War front. The organization sprawled across the globe, having offices
in over thirty-five countries. It published over twenty prestige magazines (including soft
patronage to literary quarterlies such as Partisan Review) (Wilford 103). It held various art
exhibitions such as the controversial “Masterpieces of the Twentieth Century” in Paris in 1952.
In addition to the organization of several high-profile international conferences, various
musicians and artists were rewarded with prizes and public performances (1). In its heyday the
CCF’s reach in the intellectual community was broad and its influence deep. “Whether they
liked it or not, whether they knew it or not,” Saunders explains, “there were few writers, poets,
artists, historians, scientists or critics in post-war Europe whose names were not in some way
linked to this covert enterprise” (2).
The cultivation of such influence was seen as a necessity because, in 1947, the Soviets
had a head start. After all, between 1946 and 1948 Bulgaria and Romania quickly followed
Poland in setting up servile, pro-Soviet governments (Walker 33). In Italy and France there were
rumors of Communist coups d’etat and, eventually, actual food strikes staged to protest the
Marshall Plan (17). Saunders describes America as being at a disadvantage in waging a cultural
war. Shortly after the war’s end, the Soviets established (and in some cases, reestablished) a vast
network of fronts among labor unions, women’s movements, youth groups, cultural institutions,
the press, and the publishing industry (17). America, she emphasizes, “was a virgin in the
practice of international Kulturkampf” (17). Together, argues Wilford, these Soviet fronts were
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working to portray the United States as “a cultural wasteland, its few artists treated as mere
ornaments by its capitalist class, and its workers cretinized by the idiotic products of its culture
industries” (100). Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, with its cinema, theater, dance, art, music, and
literature, was put forward as the “true heir of the European Enlightenment” (100).
However, the American intelligence community quickly came to understand the Soviets’
unconventional tactics, as well as the nature of the conflict in which it found itself. In one report
presented to General “Wild Bill” Donovan (the Chief of the Office of Strategic Services), an
intelligence analyst, Gregory Bateson (who, after his service in the OSS, would later become a
leading anthropologist of his generation), characterized the struggle in the following way:
The invention of the atomic bomb will cause a shift in balance between
“peaceful” and “warlike” methods of exerting international pressure...And we
must expect a very marked increase in the importance of “peaceful” methods.
Our enemies will be even freer than [ever] to propagandize, subvert, sabotage,
and exert...pressures upon us, and we ourselves shall be more willing to bear these
affronts and ourselves to indulge in such methods- in our eagerness to avoid at all
costs the tragedy of open war; “peaceful” techniques will become more vital in
times of pre-war softening up, actual overt war, and in times of post-war
manipulation. (qtd in Saunders 17)
Bateson’s use of the phrase,“peaceful” methods, with its quotation marks emphasizing the irony
of this new method of war fighting, captures, specifically, the complexity of the American
culture campaign and, generally, the larger Cold War effort. It expresses an understanding of a
new style of warfare, of coercion and pressure, that would take the place of open conflict in an
era, even at this early hour, characterized by the creation and proliferation of weapons of mass
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destruction. Saunders considers this understanding significant for its definition of the Cold War
“as a psychological contest, of the manufacturing of consent by ‘peaceful’ methods, of the use of
propaganda to erode hostile positions” (17). It seems that after the imposition of Soviet friendly
governments in Eastern Europe and the discovery, by large numbers of western intellectuals, of
the mass show trials and swelling gulags in Russia of the previous two decades (10), the Allies’
World War II consensus started to crack and the race for post-war influence (and eventual
supremacy) had begun.
The overall aim of the American campaign was to counter the Soviet argument of
America’s artistic depravity by “accusing the Russians of disregarding the inherent value of
culture, of subjugating art to the dreary dictates of a totalitarian political ideology” (Wilford
101). Not only, the U.S. claimed, was the picture of America as a bastion of philistinism badly
outdated, but, they asserted, America had become the very site of the most creative impulses in
modern culture (as shown by the influence of Ezra Pound and T.S. Eliot) (101). It should be
noted that one of the major arguments in contention among scholars of the cultural Cold War is
the extent to which the CIA’s emphasis and patronage of modernist art and literature artificially
buoyed its place in the intellectual community and scholarly discourse. Saunders argues that the
CIA’s influence did, in fact, have a large part in the promotion of some artists and forms (Jackson
Pollack and Abstract Expressionism, for example) while Wilford, of the post-revisionist school
of thought, paints a more complicated picture of the CIA’s efficacy in patronizing some forms
and artists.1
The Cold War began, as has been well noted, by a wholesale shift in attitude towards
those the Americans had so recently fought. Shortly after war’s end, many of Hitler’s
industrialists, scientists, administrators and high-ranking officers were reinstated by the Allies in
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effort to keep Germany from collapsing (Saunders 11). While Germany’s survival no doubt had
geopolitical implications in the new struggle against the Soviets, what had started as an attempt
to keep the country afloat, quickly morphed into a race to dominate various spheres within the
cultural Cold War. Many are familiar, of course, with the efforts to bring Werner Von Braun and
other German scientists to work for the United States. However, a less well-known example, and
perhaps more relevant to story of America’s cultural campaign, is the story of Herbert von
Karajan. Karajan, who had frequently opened his concerts to the Nazi favorite “Horst Wessel
Lied” and whose enemies referred to as “SS Colonel von Karajan,” was quickly reinstated as the
director of the Berlin Philharmonic: the orchestra which, in subsequent years, would be built up
as the “symbolic bulwark against Soviet totalitarianism” (15). Karajan’s reinstatement occurred
at the same time that a overzealous denazification program instituted across Germany was
characterized by ironies in which a janitor could be blacklisted, for example, for having swept
the halls of the Reichs Chancellery (11). However, such efforts by the CIA went forward
because, in this new Cold War, “someone,” says Saunders, “had to wield the baton against the
Soviets” (16).
Saunders uses the Karajan example to illustrate the moral complications posed by a “hitand-miss” denazification program. She suggests that Josselson and Nabokov, who were at this
point running the predecessor to the CIA’s cultural campaign, were victims of a moral confusion
when it came to judging an artist’s involvement with the Nazi regime (16). “The need to create
symbolic anti-communist rallying points,” says Saunders, “introduced an urgent- and hiddenpolitical imperative to clear those suspected of accomodating the Nazi regime” (16). This, she
said, “produced a tolerance of suspected proximity to fascism if the subject could be put to use
against Communism” (16).
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Finally, it is important and relevant to note the culture and character of the CIA at the
point of its inception. The ranks of the early agency were filled primarily by the historic
American elite (Saunders 33). These were Ivy Leaguers, influential throughout America’s
boardrooms, academic institutions, newspapers and media, law firms, and government, who
believed their mission was to “save western freedom from Communist darkness” (36). One
officer, in those early days, even went so far as to compare the atmosphere of the early agency to
an order of the Knights Templar (33). These early architects of the American intelligence and
foreign policy community, men like Charles “Chip” Bohlen, George Kennan, and Isaiah Berlin,
were “internationalist, abrasive, competitive [with] an unshakeable belief in their value system,
and in their duty to offer it to others” (37). Saunders futher describes them, or rather how they
thought of themselves, as “the patricians of the modern age, the paladins of democracy...[whose]
job it was to establish and then justify the post-war pax Americana” (37). Curiously, having
sprung from a class reared in both Christian values and the duties of privilege, these men brought
to the agency a belief in democracy but a wariness towards unchecked egalitarianism (36). They
were, as Saunders succinctly puts it, “the elect who had not been elected” (36).2
In addition to an institutional culture heavily indebted to the rhetoric of election, the CIA,
according to Wilford, was also very familiar with writing, literature, and the literary
establishment. James Angleton, the longtime chief of the CIA’s counterintelligence division,
was the founding editor of a literary magazine at Yale, Furioso, was sometimes known among
fellow agents by the codename “the Poet,” and was a personal friend of Ezra Pound (100). One
of his proteges, Cord Meyer, had edited the Yale Lit and had published several short stories in the
Atlantic Monthly before joining the agency (100). While Deputy Chief, then Chief, of the
International Organizations Division, Meyer recruited a number of poets and critics associated
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with John Crowe Ransom’s Kenyon Review (100). That these high-level agents in the CIA were
involved in such literary interests is an interesting fact if one considers that these men would set
out to direct a propaganda effort designed to “write” America for the international (and,
specifically, intellectual) community.
However, the CIA’s cultural campaign was primarily waged overseas, particularly in
western Europe. Wilford remarks that it was a fundamental irony of the agency’s efforts that
anticommunist American intellectuals stood to gain less from its patronage than their
uncommitted European colleagues (102). If the CIA’s cultural Cold War was waged primarily
outside of the United States, what was being done domestically? It is the argument of this essay
that, while a dynamic cultural campaign was being waged across the Atlantic by organs of the
US government, voluntary efforts at the same kind of cultural work sprung up spontaneously on
the mainland in the nation’s most popular forms. The rhetoric of the jeremiad became attached
to these popular forms to explore issues impacting the American consciousness during the
period. In these works, the characteristic polemical rhetoric and a revitalized belief in American
exceptionalism (due, specifically, to America’s post-war economic prowess and the fact of the
atomic bomb) coincide with interrogations of Cold War/ mid-century American culture found in
science fiction.
There are more than a few reasons why science fiction came to perform this function.
Easily one of the most popular genres in the post-war period, science fiction, more than any other
genre, came to embody America’s post-war technological and scientific prominence. In fact,
some suggest that science fiction was specifically poised, due to a tradition started well before
the war, to discuss contemporary issues, such as the atomic bomb, that other, more mainstream
genres found difficult. In his influential study on the effect of the atomic bomb on American
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culture, By the Bomb's Early Light, Paul Boyer argues that the literary world exhibited an
obvious discomfort with discourse about the bomb. Initially, he offers, "the literary response to
the atomic bomb was, to say the least, muted" (246). "Some writers," he continues, "seemed
almost deliberately to ignore it" (246). Boyer goes on to establish a tentativeness among authors
whose hesitancy, he offers, suggests a breakdown in the "intensity of imagination- a recognition
of the folly of too quickly trying to assimilate this monstrous novelty" (250). Boyer's reading
suggests, then, a breakdown of language to describe not only the bomb, but the cultural effect of
the bomb. Not so in science fiction, Boyer argues. Instead, he argues that the genre took up the
charge "with alacrity" (257). Citing SF's significant tradition of rendering atomic war in its
narratives even before 1945 (including the oft-cited anecdote concerning Astounding Science
Fiction editor John W. Campbell Jr.'s visit from War Department officials after publishing a 1944
story describing the possible construction of an atomic bomb), Boyer characterizes SF as
specifically poised and eager to render the kind of post-war (read specifically: post-Hiroshima/
Nagasaki) reflection and social commentary that other mainstream genres resisted.
From a more theoretical standpoint, science fiction has long been a genre interested in
critical analysis of culture. Again, Darko Suvin’s influential definition of science fiction as
cognitive estrangement suggests that the genre’s defining function is the critical thought that
necessarily must occur by the creation of an “imaginative framework alternative to the author’s
empirical environment” (8). The estranging element, or the "novum" as Suvin has termed it
(borrowing from Ernst Bloch), is an aesthetic element of the narrative that serves to pull the
reader out of the empirical world. According to Suvin, the novum is akin to poetic metaphor and
is a novelty that "is 'totalizing' in the sense that it entails a change of the whole universe of the
tale" (64). "As a consequence," writes Suvin, "the essential tension of SF is one between the
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readers, representing a certain number of types of Man of our times, and the encompassing and at
least equipollent Unknown or Other introduced by the novum" (64). To say that the novum is
something as concrete as, for example, a rocket-ship, would be to deflate the varying narrative
possibilities of the estranging element:
Quantitatively, the postulated innovation can be of quite different degrees of
magnitude, running from the minimum of one discrete new "invention" (gadget,
technique, phenomenon, relationship) to the maximum of a setting
(spatiotemporal locus), agent (main character or characters), and/ or relations
basically new and unknown to the author's environment. (64)
According to Suvin, the novum must be the common denominator of the narrative in order for it
to be called SF. The importance of this concept is in its emphasis on cognition. Suvin is
acerbically critical of fiction absent of the cognitive element (read: fantasy). That is because, for
Suvin, this interplay between the two is essential to how the genre functions in stimulating
critical analysis. "Cognition," Suvin writes, "implies not only a reflecting of but also on
reality" (10). Ultimately, Suvin’s aims for the genre are political. Science fiction is, by nature,
he argues, progressive and revolutionary. In such a way, this political aspect of cognitive
estrangement is similar to the CIA’s cultural program (utilizing art, literature, and music) which
sees, as its aim, an ideal social arrangement, the Pax Americana, it has already articulated.
This is different from Suvin’s ideal in a number of ways. The politics, of course, are antithetical
and Suvin’s definition (and science fiction’s function) suggests a process of imagination,
reflection, and scientific rigor in order to arrive at the ideal. The CIA’s cultural program suggests
an ideal already articulated.
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Finally, there is evidence that the popular culture industry voluntarily aided America’s
attempts at cultural hegemony. In fact, Wilford suggests that such efforts were perhaps,
ironically, the most successful. “The truth was,” Wilford explains, “that the great majority of
foreigners derived their main impressions of the United States not from Partisan Review, the
Museum of Modern Art, or the Boston Symphony Orchestra, but from American popular culture
and, most of all, the slick, spectacular, mass entertainments of Hollywood” (116). Strangely
enough, the industry to do the most to help the CIA’s efforts, was the one least reliant on its
financial support (and, thus, independent of its influence) (116). While this situation put the
industry in a position to do the most harm to America’s perception abroad, a strong tendency
towards self-censorship (after many years of experience avoiding giving offense to domestic
pressure groups) and the fact that the men who ran the studios were intensely patriotic and anticommunist, secured its place as an ally in America’s cultural Cold War (117). For example,
celebrities such as John Ford, John Wayne, and Cecil B. DeMille volunteered their services to
groups like “Militant Liberty”: a multi-agency propaganda campaign devised in 1954 that aimed
to embed American-style democratic values in foreign cultures such as Central America, the
Middle East, and Southeast Asia (117). In other cases, the industry portrayed the Army or Navy
in a favorable light (117). In other rare instances, the industry collaborated with the CIA on
various film projects. The most documented example of this collaboration is an animated
version of George Orwell’s Animal Farm (1954) featuring an altered ending that made it,
according to Wilford, more “positively anticommunist and possibly somewhat more favorable to
the western powers” (119).
What we find is that popular culture in general from this period is replete with images
and assertions of America’s post-war prominence. One of the most entertaining examples of this
66

phenomenon is the appearance of the atomic bomb in films, television, and music of the period.
The atomic bomb, after all, was becoming the great symbol of America’s post-war technological,
intellectual, and martial dominance. As such, it is within the realm of popular culture that these
Cold War jeremiads are so prominent: in most cases marrying the warning rhetoric of nuclear
annihilation with assertions of American exceptionalism (citing the Atomic bomb as evidence).
In the burgeoning genre of science fiction film, which was enjoying some success due to
advances in special effects, this tendency is perhaps most prominent. The Day the Earth Stood
Still (1951), Them! (1954), and War of the Worlds (1957) are only a few examples of the many
science fiction films that engage in this tradition. Even a film such as The Day the Earth Stood
Still, which takes great pains to present its message as one of global concern (thus frustrating a
reading of it as a film promoting American post-war exceptionalism), retains an unmistakeable
focus on American culture and a rather sanctimonious tone in its warnings of nuclear
annihilation. Indeed, American popular culture is saturated with similar rhetoric.
Popular music from the period, for example, has seen a recent revival of interest for its
emphasis on Cold War tropes (cashing in, it seems, on its camp value). Bill Haley & the
Comets’ “Thirteen Women (and Only One Man in Town)” is likely one of the most familiar
songs of this genre. However, recent efforts by Cold War culture enthusiasts such as Jayne
Loader & Kevin Rafferty (directors of the 1982 documentary The Atomic Cafe) and Bill Geerhart
(editor of Conelrad.com) have uncovered a plethora of similarly themed songs. One collection,
Atomic Platters: Cold War Music from the Golden Age of Homeland Security, runs the gamut
from fear of Atomic annihilation (Civil Defense public service announcements), to concern over
Communism (“Get that Communist Joe!” and Hank Williams’s “No, No Joe”), and concern over
Castro and Cuba (“Down in Havana” and “Hey Castro!”) to the overt conflation between the
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atomic bomb and America’s ability to spread evangelical Christianity to the rest of the world
(“Atomic Sermon,” “Atom and Evil,” “They Locked God Outside the Iron Curtain,” “Jesus is
God’s Atom Bomb,” and the subtle,“Jesus Hits Like an Atom Bomb”). However, it should be
pointed out that the majority of these songs were attempting to ride the sudden popularity of all
things atomic following the end of the war. Many, even the ones with seemingly serious subject
matter, are overwhelmingly lighthearted and fun. A track titled “Atomic Nightmare,” for
example, is set to a calypso beat. The track’s vocals playfully intone:
You’re gonna run, run, run back where you come from,
I just heard from a little bird they’re going to drop the atomic bomb.
Talk about a flying saucer streaking through the sky,
I’m not going to wait to find if they’re stopping or going by,
I’m gonna run, run, run like a son of a gun,
I don’t know where I’m going to go, but I’m really going to run!
While quite a departure from the tone of seventeenth century election sermons, I would argue
that the playfulness that characterizes many of these tracks, this conflation of fear, anxiety, and
confidence can be explained in terms of the jeremiad’s dual rhetoric of warning and
exceptionalism.
Robert A. Heinlein and the Cultural Cold War: Epistemology and Exceptionalism
In an essay written the same year as Starship Troopers, Robert A. Heinlein argued for a
definition of science fiction as "realistic speculation about possible future events, based solidly
on adequate knowledge of the real world, past and present, and on a thorough understanding of
the nature and significance of the scientific method" ("Science Fiction: Its Nature, Faults and
Virtues" 28). The genre's focus, he continued, should be "preparing our youngsters to be mature
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citizens of the Galaxy" (with the phrase “citizens of the galaxy” significant here because
Heinlein later uses it as the title of his most popular juvenile novel) (61). Heinlein's definition is
striking for its characterization of the galaxy and the role of humanity within it. In other words,
the mysteries of space exploration, in this configuration, are not very mysterious. Heinlein's
definition suggests a particular, positivistic way of seeing the empirical world, the promises and
limitations of knowledge, and the agency humanity has in its journey outward from Earth.
Finally, Heinlein's definition domesticates scientific speculation, the role the genre plays in
imagining the future, and the expectations of a generation coming to maturity during the Cold
War. By capturing contemporary anxieties and by asserting cultural narratives as a means of
transcending them, Heinlein’s text participates in the jeremiad tradition in ways entirely
consistent with his work’s positivism and his Cold War politics. Unlike traditional jeremiads, his
work’s insistence on his culture’s exceptionalism does not spring from any sort of spiritual belief,
but from an intensely nationalistic belief in his culture’s ingenuity, toughness, and prowess.
Although the role of the political in Heinlein's fiction has received a great deal of
attention among scholars and while, to a lesser extent, others have considered the role of
epistemology in his work, no one has attempted to explain the political as a function of the
epistemological positivism that characterizes Heinlein's fiction.3 A close analysis of Heinlein's
1951 novel The Puppet Masters and his Hugo award-winning 1956 novel Double Star, as well as
the Scribner juveniles published between 1947-1959, reveals that these much discussed political
tendencies result from the conspicuous epistemological positivism characteristic to Heinlein's
work during the Cold War. These novels present a fictional world entirely accessible and
knowable to its protagonists, where contact with aliens is, if not routine, then uncomfortably
unhindered (as in the case of parasitic aliens of The Puppet Masters). Ultimately, these
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narratives, in their expressed anxiety over duplicity, paranoia, and conformity, anticipate a
containment culture that was to dominate the global political landscape until the end of the
twentieth century. Indeed, Heinlein's positivism is best explained as a response to the Cold War
aimed at instructing as much as entertaining.
Because the Cold War was a sprawling conflict for ideological, cultural, and martial
supremacy that consumed nearly half of the twentieth century, it is necessary in a discussion of
its influence on fiction, to define precisely how Heinlein's works can be thought of as Cold War
texts. In Containment Culture, Alan Nadel argues that the policy of containment had significant
effects on domestic American life. It would result, he says, "in a rhetorical strategy that
functioned to foreclose dissent, preempt dialogue, and preclude contradiction" (14). This would
primarily take the form of cultural narratives that would serve to "unify, codify, and contain—
perhaps intimidate…the personal narratives of its population" (4). What makes the Cold War
(and he specifies its peak as 1946-1964) unique, according to Nadel, was "the general
acceptance…of a relatively small set of narratives by a relatively large portion of the
population" (4). Nadel highlights the virtue of conformity as one of the primary national
narratives. He argues that the Cold War was a period in which conformity "became a positive
value in and of itself" (4). What George Kennan's famous "containment" essay did, according to
Nadel, was to distinguish the Cold War narrative primarily as a battle between the Other and the
Same (5). He references the political circumstances of the 1950s and 1960s as an effort at
definition through, what he calls, a search for phonies:
Constantly legislation, hearings, speeches, and editorials warned Americans to be
suspicious of phonies, wary of associates, circumspect about their past, and
cautious about their speech. A new mode of behavior was necessary, the
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president's commission noted, because America was now confronted with
organizations that valorized duplicity[…]. (74)
Such a culture bred paranoia and suspicion, notes Nadel, and, in his resulting discussion
of J.D. Salinger's The Catcher in the Rye, he argues that such an emphasis manifested itself in the
text in the form of statements attesting to the narrator's truthfulness ("If you really want to know
the truth," "I really do," "I'll admit," etc). Nadel's reading of Salinger's novel leads naturally into
the historical fact of the pervasive presence of loyalty oaths in Cold War America. However,
Nadel is apt to point out that such loyalty oaths, inadequate by their nature, led to a natural
duplicity. "The 'true' test of loyalty," he notes, "became betrayal" (78). Indeed, congressional
hearings such as the HUAC only emphasized that an informer's willingness to name names
conflated betrayal and truthfulness (78). As will be discussed shortly, one of the outcomes of this
inherent duplicity was an anxiety over America's youth coming to maturity in such a culture.
Heinlein's fiction of this period is remarkable specifically for its representation and negotiation
of this fundamental aspect of the Cold War and for its worldview, determined by epistemology,
that gave guidance and answers to a young SF reading audience.
It has become commonplace to think of Heinlein as a product of American culture and as
one of its major guiding voices. H. Bruce Franklin calls Heinlein "a very representative
American" and argues that "to understand the phenomenon of Robert Heinlein is finally to
understand the culture that is the matrix for ourselves" (6). Indeed, Franklin sees this reflexivity
as the defining characteristic of Heinlein's work (Franklin marks 1947-1959 as Heinlein's most
productive burst) and sees Heinlein's science fiction "inseparably intertwined with the major
historical events that define the late Depression, the Truman-Eisenhower years, the 1960s, the
1970s, and perhaps the 1980s" (15). To put it another way, Heinlein's work is both product of
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and participant in the Cold War. Texts such as Double Star and The Puppet Masters rendered the
inherent duplicity of the age that Nadel described in a confidence/anxiety dichotomy while they,
reflexively, influenced perceptions of the Cold War. Franklin notes that the events of the late
1950s (specifically the launch of Sputnik in 1957) had a profound effect on Heinlein's fiction in
its inscription of two conflicting narratives of America's view of its present and future (66). "On
one hand," Franklin writes, "America's powers seemed invulnerable and its future…as boundless
as space" (66). However, he continues, "the combined force of the Soviet Union and the antiimperialist revolutionary movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America threatened the very
existence of a society based on worldwide economic and military hegemony" (66). Therefore, in
understanding Heinlein as a Cold War figure, it should be noted that it is possible for Heinlein
(and his mouthpiece characters) to be both the confident champion of personal liberties and
freedom and the critic of Soviet-style collectivism, alongside narratives that render possible
threats to American power. This is not to suggest that Heinlein is an uncomplicated Cold War
partisan. A strong strain of mid-century progressivism runs through Heinlein's fiction. In
characters that claim to be virulent anti-racist and the use of non-white protagonists (such as in
Juan Rico in Starship Troopers), Heinlein shows a willingness to articulate and criticize
American culture's shortcomings. In fact, by the time Heinlein publishes The Moon is a Harsh
Mistress in 1966, arguably his finest novel, one could argue that this tendency towards cultural
critique (particularly from his increasingly libertarian view) has become the defining
characteristic of his work. Unlike his earlier novels, The Moon is a Harsh Mistress admittedly
does not seem to promote the same Cold War cultural narratives. However, this jeremiac strain,
Heinlein’s cautionary rhetoric packaged with a strong sense of American exceptionalism (one
can conjure plenty of examples in which The Moon is a Harsh Mistress is wrapped in the flag, so
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to speak) still persists in the later novel. In that novel, perhaps, it is packaged as a response to the
democratic presidential administrations of Kennedy and Johnson and, particularly, Johnson’s
Great Society programs. Certainly that novel’s battle cry, “There ain’t no such thing as a free
lunch,” usually associated with Milton Friedman, can be read in this way. Nowhere is Heinlein’s
dynamism clearer than in his 1951 novel The Puppet Masters, in which the country, indeed the
world, is invaded by back-hugging, mind-controlling parasites. However, it is the solution (the
maturation into the Heinleinian hero) that Heinlein proposes to conquer such a threat that, while
instructive to youngsters trying to negotiate post-war American culture, was born out of a
political framework that was dependent on a positivist epistemology.
Perhaps Heinlein's epistemological stance is best clarified when it is considered in
dialogue with the epistemological pessimism of a major SF author outside of the American/
western tradition: Stanislaw Lem. This is not to suggest that simply because Lem wrote and
published his work from Soviet-controlled Poland that he is a Soviet writer (or that these two
authors are representative of the American-Soviet division). Instead, Lem is considered because
epistemology is so clearly the focus of Solaris and because Lem is a major SF writer outside of
the American tradition in which Heinlein is so invested. Indeed, Lem directly challenges this
positivism in his exhaustive romp through the canon of Solaristics in his 1961 novel Solaris (not
published into English until 1970). Lem’s novel follows the efforts of a team of scientists, the
most recent generation of what we learn is a long-running effort, to communicate with the planet
Solaris’s only sentient lifeform, the massive ocean covering the entirety of the planet’s surface.
Lem’s novel focuses on their failure, and the failures of their predecessors, in order to throw into
question the very endeavor of alien contact. The novel specifically concerns the efforts of Kris
Kelvin, psychologist tasked with understanding and communicating with Solaris. As the novel
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progresses, his inability to communicate with Solaris is juxtaposed with what we have come to
know of the failure of his marriage to Rheya (culminating in her suicide before his mission on
Solaris). Throughout the novel, the scientists struggle to understand the nature of the creatures
(copies of people the scientists knew on Earth) that the ocean manifests for them. For Kelvin,
Solaris copies Rheya and this only increases Kelvin’s confusion and consternation. Is Solaris
trying to torment him, as he comes to believe at one point in the novel? Is this a sort of
compassionate gesture? Or is it simply meaningless, having merely manifested the first image it
encountered in scanning his mind while asleep? In the well-known scene of the novel, Kelvin
sits in a small library on the station and recaps the major schools of thought from the last
hundred years of scholarship. At last coming to the current state of impasse in Solaristics he
admits that "gradually, in scientific circles, the 'Solaris Affair' came to be regarded as a lost
cause" (23). He considers the idea, most often held by the younger scientists in the field, that
Solaris has become "the touchstone of individual values" (23). "All things considered" Kelvin
recounts, "it was essentially a test of ourselves, of the limitations of human knowledge" (23).
Here, Sartorius's oft-cited assertion emphasizes Lem's stance:
We think of ourselves as Knights of the Holy Contact. This is another lie. We are
only seeking Man. We have no need of other worlds. We need mirrors. We don't
know what to do with other worlds. A single world, our own, suffices us; but we
can't accept it for what it is. We are searching for an ideal image of our own
world. (72)
Indeed, others, including Lem, have remarked upon this epistemological pessimism as one of the
defining characteristics of his work. One scholar succinctly argues that "Lem's novels…
demonstrate his disbelief in the existence of a common pattern of intelligent behavior of which
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human reason would be a typical and necessary exemplar (Swirski). In an interview, Lem
agreed, arguing that his fiction could be unified by such epistemological pessimism:
Their common denominator is my conviction that contact with, or any form of
federation of, extraterrestrial forms of intelligence is not possible. This owes to
the almost limitless diversity and distribution of evolutionary paths pursued by
different civilizations. (Swirski)
However, as other scholars have noted, this is not just pessimism for its own sake. Carl
Freedman reads Lem's interrogation of knowledge and exploration not as "epistemologically
nihilistic relativism…but in order to enforce an authentically critical view of scientific rigor in all
its complexity" (99). Lem, according to Freedman, exposes and frustrates the precritical desire
for certainty and finality in favor of a scientific progress that "consists more in the provisional
elimination of unworkable hypotheses and the evolving consideration of central problems from a
variety of angles than in any arrival at final resolutions" (100). Therefore, what Lem's
epistemological stance accomplishes is the estrangement of our conceptualization of scientific
inquiry. Inversely, Heinlein, by virtue of his definition of SF based on a knowledge of the
scientific method, sees our understanding of scientific inquiry as fixed and as the starting point
for our understanding of the universe. A similar point is made by George Slusser, who sees the
function of cognition in Heinlein's fiction as the opposite of Lem's. "If [Heinlein's] SF
recognizes the paradoxes of cognition," Slusser writes, "it is to manipulate them as a means of
making the phenomenal world obey the individual's deepest desires" (9). He concludes that "the
alien encounter, for Heinlein, does not require dissection and disintegration of self; it is rather the
chance to impose self on world…" (9). Such a relationship between the self and the world,
engendered by Heinlein's epistemology, will be significant in the upcoming discussion of
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Starship Troopers. What this dialogue between Heinlein and Lem' s fiction illustrates is that,
unlike Lem's emphasis on inquiry and the excruciating dilemmas of cognition, Heinlein's
positivism is defined by its pragmatic attempt to find a solution to the duplicity, anxiety, and
paranoia characteristic of American Cold War culture. This dialogue is far from the only
instance when epistemology intersects with the Cold War. What is interesting is that it occurs at
the same time that C.P. Snow's polemic, The Two Cultures, questioned the epistemological split
between academic cultures in western society: "Literary intellectuals at one pole- at the other
scientists…between the two a gulf of mutual incomprehension-sometimes…hostility and dislike,
but most of all lack of understanding" (4). Allen Thiher explains that Snow's criticism of western
education struck a resonant chord when it was published in 1959 because "the Western powers
perceived themselves at a critical historical turning point in their competition with the Soviet
Union" (6). After Sputnik, Thiher concludes, "many believed that defects in Anglo-American
scientific education had somehow created deficiencies, if not actually allowing Russian
superiority, in areas that could endanger the West" (6). If, in other words, Lem's fiction is about
raising questions, Heinlein's is about providing answers.
Since, as Franklin has noted, the period between 1947 and 1959 in Heinlein's fiction was
characterized by his interest in writing for young people, evidence suggests that those answers
were intended for America's youth. During this period two minor novellas (Nothing Ever
Happens on the Moon and Satellite Scout) were serialized in Boys' Life, the official magazine of
the Boy Scouts of America, in addition to the twelve well-known novels in the Scribner's
juvenile series: Rocket Ship Galileo (1947), Space Cadet (1948), Red Planet (1949), Farmer in
the Sky (1950), Between Planets (1951), The Rolling Stones (1952), Starman Jones (1953), The
Star Beast (1954), Tunnel in the Sky (1955), Time for the Stars (1956), Citizen of the Galaxy
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(1957), and Have Space Suit- Will Travel (1958). It is during this period that The Puppet
Masters and Double Star are both published.
The Puppet Masters, Heinlein's 1951 novel of alien invasion, follows three agents, Sam,
Mary, and the Old Man, of the secret government agency, the Section, as they defend the United
States from the parasitic creatures. The novel opens with the agents traveling to Iowa to
investigate the crash landing of a flying saucer. They soon realize the town has been taken over
by the "slugs," creatures that can attach themselves to a human being's back and control his or
her thoughts and actions, and as the novel goes on, more and more of the United States is lost to
their control. Although each one of the main characters is, at different times in the novel,
captured by the slugs, it is Sam who is captured for the longest time and whose experience
Heinlein chooses to narrate. He is eventually rescued and, through the course of the novel,
succeeds his father, the Old Man (whose name we later learn is Andrew) as the leader of the
Section. As the novel ends, the slugs have been defeated on Earth (through Sam's timely use of
biological warfare, the "nine-day fever") and Sam, with Mary as his wife, leads an expedition to
strike the slugs on their home moon, Titan. The novel's curious final lines promise, "Puppet
masters—the free men are coming to kill you! Death and Destruction!" (340).
Double Star, Heinlein's 1956 update of Hope's The Prisoner of Zenda, follows actor
Lorenzo Smythe, who has been hired to impersonate the recently kidnapped leader of the
expansionist coalition, John Joseph Bonforte. Smythe, as Bonforte, negotiates an alliance with
the Martians, continues to conduct Bonforte's political affairs until he is rescued, and is
eventually elected to become the Supreme Minister. Ultimately, when the real Bonforte dies due
to a drug overdose resulting from his captivity, Smythe chooses to continue playing Bonforte
because if he does not, he is told, "all that he lived for- and died for- will fall apart" (237). In the
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final section of the novel, some twenty-five years later, Smythe has played Bonforte for so long
that he has become Bonforte in thought and deed.
While not part of the juvenile series, per se, these texts share many of the elements that
characterize those works. For example, while Sam Cavanaugh in The Puppet Masters and
Lorenzo Smythe in Double Star are not technically boys making their passage into becoming
men, as Bruce Franklin has described the juvenile stories, these are both stories of maturation
into the typical Heinlein hero. In the case of Sam Cavanaugh this point was most recently
argued in Christopher Lockett's essay about domesticity in The Puppet Masters. Interestingly
enough, Heinlein remarked once that his juvenile fiction was distinguished from his adult fiction
only in that "younger readers relish tough ideas they have to chew and don't mind big
words" (qtd in Franklin 74). This lack of difference between juvenile and adult fiction is
precisely the point for Franklin, who offers that the story of the juvenile space epic is a stand-in
for Heinlein's version of the human epic, "best symbolized in the lives of children becoming
adults as they grow into a role in the galaxy" (93). Since these works were published between
1947 and 1959, it's hard to imagine that such a role was not influenced by Cold War culture.
In fact, other scholars have discussed the cultural work Heinlein and others were doing
through science fiction during the 1950s. Robert Chapman argues that Heinlein specifically uses
the frontier trope and its idolization of the violent hero to address 1950s America's concern with
juvenile delinquency (40). A marked increase in teenage involvement with police, greater
interaction with drugs, sex, and violence, and publication of various lurid exposés on the younger
generation, Chapman explains, led to various approaches to address such societal concerns. Rev.
Billy Graham, for example, formed the "Youth for Christ" movement to provide, he argued, "the
much needed answer to juvenile delinquency and communism among the young people of
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America" (qtd in Chapman 40). It is interesting how easily Graham conflates those two concerns,
having once argued that "the greatest enemy we have ever known [is] communism" (qtd. in
Chapman 39). Graham may have had his pulpit but Heinlein had his fiction. Chapman argues
that Heinlein hoped to inculcate the frontier values and pioneer spirit of hard work and selfreliance into his readership by using the frequent trope of the "spoiled youngster achieving true
manhood by accidentally confronting the unknown wilderness" (40). Chapman traces this trope
through Heinlein's Between Planets (1951), Tunnel in the Sky (1955), and Time for the Stars
(1956). The narrator's explanation in Between Planets that "Those who learned it lived; those
who did not died," recalls the appearance of the social Darwinism characteristic to Heinlein's
work. In these texts a character's maturation is contingent upon his ability to negotiate some
unknown world or situation. In other words, epistemology is central to the story. It is indeed a
positivist statement when a character achieves hero status upon his ability to conquer the
unknown world or situation.
This is precisely what occurs in both The Puppet Masters and Double Star. Sam
Cavanaugh and Lorenzo Smythe both achieve maturity and respectability after showing that they
can negotiate and control seemingly overwhelming situations. The slug invasion that threatens
Earth in The Puppet Masters is repelled ultimately by Sam's leadership and, most importantly for
Heinlein, his rational thinking and organizational skills in the administering of the nine-day
fever. Perhaps Lorenzo Smythe provides the most telling example of the intended effect of
Heinlein's fiction. The situation thrust upon him is so overwhelming, leader of the political
coalition soon to control the imperial government, that Smythe literally becomes another man in
the process. The long hours of studying the speeches, writing, and videos of John Joseph
Bonforte (whose surname Bruce Franklin reminds us translates tellingly to Goodstrong), along
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with his preparation at the hands of friends Dak and Penny, literally transform Smythe to the
point that in the last chapter, looking back on a manuscript he had written twenty-five years
earlier, Smythe/Bonforte remarks: "I have trouble realizing that I was ever he" (241). Smythe's
success, purchased by his hard work, is contrasted with the situation that arises when the group
considers Bill, who until that time had been a speechwriter and member of the trusted group, for
an appointment to assemblyman. Ultimately it is decided that Bill will not receive the
appointment since the real Bonforte passed him up in a previous term. Bill's vain attempt to gain
retribution by exposing Smythe's identity to the media essentially renders him the novel's only
substantial villain. However, it is important to point out that the novel condemns him primarily
because Bill expects something for nothing. The contrast between Bill's false sense of
entitlement and Smythe's noble transformation through an ethic of hard work provides the
novel's only clear morality and would seemingly have been constructed as a model to address the
concerns articulated by many in 1950s America.
Without a doubt, Heinlein's most imposing answer is the way this positivism affects the
issue of alien contact. Here, the contrast with Lem's Solaris is illustrative. Heinlein's fiction
consistently presents alien contact as understandable, knowable, and, in later novels such as
Starship Troopers, an opportunity for conquest. In this sense, Double Star most resembles the
optimism for alien contact that characterizes the juvenile works. Franklin notes that while the
juvenile texts recognize that we may have to fight against some hostile life forms, Heinlein's
juvenile fiction "consistently attacks xenophobia and dramatizes respect— and even love— for
the kinds of beings we may find in space" (100). That is certainly the case with Double Star.
Smythe's induction into the Martian nest comes after he has been able, via Dr. Capek's hypnosis,
to move past his own racist attitudes toward Martians. While the reliance on hypnosis comes off
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as a gimmick, the emphasis here, with Smythe smelling Penny's perfume "Jungle Lust" instead
of the Martian smell that had previously nauseated him, is the optimism that technology and
knowledge will eventually provide a snap-of-the-fingers solution to racism. Furthermore, the
complicated Martian ceremony that Smythe must complete and the Martian life wand that he
carries into his audience with the emperor are symbolic of the kind of multicultural consensus
Bonforte's political party is attempting to forge. Finally, Bonforte's Expansionist Party, in its
formulation by Heinlein, attempts to carry all of the good from libertarian political philosophy
while shedding the negative aspects of imperialism. In the novel, the Expansionists are, after all,
the alternative to the racist, Earth-centric Humanity Party and, so, Heinlein begins with a
statement against racism. Bonforte, Smythe tells the reader, "kept harping on the notion that the
human race must never again make the mistakes that the white subrace had made in Africa and
Asia" (158). Ultimately, the party's main tenet is a belief in universal values that unite Martians
and men. We all play by the same rules, Heinlein seems to suggest, and if we do not, "some
better race would slap [us] down for double-dealing" (162). "The price of expansion," explains
Heinlein, "was virtue" (162). Such a formulation is tenuous at best. Patrick Parrinder explains
how Heinlein attempts to distinguish expansionism from exploitative imperialism. Parrinder
notes that "the libertarian ideal…presupposes that there is within humanity an infinite but
frustrated potential for successful experimentation and self-realization" (85). "The liberationist,"
continues Parrinder, "is committed to the faith that self-realization is necessarily benign rather
than destructive in its social effects" (85). Here, one can see a connection to a major criticism of
the effects of jeremiad on American culture, particularly that of the form’s assertion of an
American exceptionalism driving foreign policy. Though the CIA’s efforts in this regard were
highlighted in the earlier part of the chapter, a recent example of this situation can be found in
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the problematic notion of spreading democracy to historically undemocratic parts of the world.
The primary criticism of such efforts is, of course, that they constitute a form of imperialistic
expansionism. This is distinguished from the way expansionism is termed by Heinlein during
the Cold War period. Expansionism, such thinking goes, is benign in its ability to spread
freedom, rights, etc. to those subsumed. Ultimately, underlying this formation is a strong
statement that the human experience is transferable to alien worlds and cultures.
But when the Titan slugs come to Earth, as in The Puppet Masters, readers are presented
with the same situation in reverse. Their "expansion" is our "invasion" and the high ideals they
promise humanity, "peace…contentment…and the joy of surrender" (later to be corrected by
Sam to "nirvana") are rejected immediately in an overt anti-communist statement by the Old
Man. "Me and my kind…have often been offered that bargain," the Old Man says after spitting
on the floor, "it never worked out worth a damn" (102). Regardless of the bargain offered, the
scene emphasizes that contact is possible to the point that the two species are able to converse
with the same ease of Sam talking with his father. The point is further strengthened by the way
that the aliens interface with humans. At first Sam compares the connection to the relationship
between a rider and a horse: "as a 'high school' horse gets his orders, responds to them instantly,
and is ready for the next signal from his rider" (70). Later, after being separated from the slug,
Sam revises his description in much more intimate terms: "An instruction came at once- or, I
made a decision, for the words mean the same; I tell you there was no conflict between my
master and me; we were one" (100).
Of course, Sam's description, in both cases, smacks of homoeroticism. In other places
Sam frequently refers to the slug as his "rider" or "master." When he is recaptured by the Section
and is recovering, Sam realizes that the Old Man is treating him "warmly and affectionately…as
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if," Sam says, "I were a girl" (88). Indeed, Sam's efforts throughout the rest of the novel can be
read as his attempt to reclaim his masculinity. Christopher Lockett, for example, reads Sam's
actions throughout the novel as a journey toward "the heteronormativity of community, family,
and responsibility" (45). Seen within the context of Cold War culture, this rejection of
homoeroticism coincides with the frequent conflation during the Cold War of communism with
homosexuality. As Robert Corber notes, "homosexuals and lesbians were thought to threaten
national security not only because they were emotionally unstable and susceptible to blackmail
but also because they might convert heterosexuals to their 'perverted' practices by seducing
them" (qtd. in Jacobson and Gonzalez 153). Increasingly during the 1950s, texts and films
would exploit this conflation of homosexuality and communism. Just as in The Puppet Masters,
this coding of communist/homosexual was just part of a larger fear of the effect of the Cold War
on the American family. Indeed, in many texts and films during this period the family is
rendered as both the site of possible communist corruption and the last, best hope against it.
Lockett's point, in seeing the novel as Sam's journey towards a championed heterosexual
normalcy, is valuable in understanding Heinlein's move in invoking a typical Cold War peril so
that his protagonist can negotiate and conquer it.
Indeed, Heinlein's characterization of the slugs as communists/homosexuals coincides
with Heinlein's overt allegorization of the slugs as communist invasion. The novel does not
make it as far as the second paragraph before Heinlein invokes and denigrates the Soviets. Other
scholars have remarked on the transparency of the allegory. Franklin cites, for example,
Heinlein's tendency to point out the allegory at intervals throughout the novel (99). Lockett
suggests that Heinlein's heavy-handedness collapses the allegory, thus rendering the association
unequivocal to the point of signaling a didactic narrative strategy (46). Such a move would
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suggest that Sam's journey toward maturity is also the reader's. After being given the chance to
kill the slug that controlled him, Sam, having done the rational thing, deciding to keep it alive for
research, turns to his father "feeling warm and relaxed, as if I had just killed a man or had a
woman" (91). Realizing that his father has orchestrated the moment, Sam asks, "How does it feel
to be a puppet master?" (92). His response is significant. "Not me," the Old Man says, "the most
I ever do is to lead a man on the path he wants to follow" (92).
What makes Heinlein's fiction dynamic as it promotes this cultural narrative to conform
is the way that it registers the inherent duplicity in such a message and then dismisses it.
Schedule Sun Tan, the American government's response to the invasion that requires near nudity
of its citizens, is consistently seen as a good idea, one, we are told, that even prevents vigilantes
from reaping havoc and physical violence on clothed citizens. To be clothed, to differentiate
oneself from the group, is to have something to hide. The dilemma that arises in the novel is
identical to that which plagued 1950s America: the effort to conform and lose autonomy is done
precisely to differentiate oneself from a Soviet society that demands conformity and loss of
autonomy. Heinlein seems to have recognized the dilemma and packaged his response as a kind
of gesturing at the loss of some trivial personal liberties. Sam says, "Conceded…things never go
back quite to what they were before" (321). At the same time, Heinlein attaches this gesture to
his frequent trope of personal choice and responsibility. Colonel Kelly replies, "as long as there
exists a possibility that a slug is alive the polite man must be willing to bare his entire body on
request- or risk getting shot" (321).4 That is what is demanded, suggests Heinlein, in a world
where "titans are trickier and more prolific than rats" (322).
Heinlein would return to this dilemma in Double Star. In the novel, authenticity and
deception are no longer seen as separate positive or negative values. Like the congressional
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hearings that validated loyalty by asking witnesses to betray the names of suspected agents, the
situation Heinlein presents shows that the two concepts are conflated to the point that
authenticity is achieved only through deception. In other words, the novel's last chapter suggests
that Smythe literally is Bonforte because his deception has become so perfect that it is
indistinguishable from the real thing. Heinlein's seemingly existential move suggests to a
readership dealing with the contradictions of Cold War culture that something as personal and
individualistic as identity can be constructed or "styled" as Smythe puts it. Given the choice
between the smarmy "Great Lorenzo" and the noble and powerful John Joseph Bonforte, it is
clear that one was intended to be preferable. Ultimately, Smythe's choice to "style" himself as
Bonforte presupposes a world in which a man can literally become another man.
Such is the case because Heinlein has very cleverly conflated conformity with
adaptability. Lorenzo Smythe and Sam Cavanaugh are better men at the conclusion of their
novels, Heinlein suggests, because they have adapted to meet the challenges of their fictional
worlds. It is this adaptability that Heinlein highlights as the virtue of the genre in his essay,
"Science Fiction: Its Nature, Faults and Virtues." Science fiction, he explains, "prepares young
people to live and survive in a world of ever-continuing change by teaching them early that the
world does change" (61). Such a message would have had particular resonance when it was
published in 1959: only two years after the Soviet launch of Sputnik sent shockwaves of anxiety
over possible technological and cultural inferiority throughout the United States. Heinlein's
answer to such a cultural problem was science fiction. He suggests that the genre's unique focus
on the future made it "the only fictional medium capable of interpreting the changing, head-long
rush of modern life" (53). It was science fiction, alone among its contemporary literary brethren,
that preached "the need for freedom of the mind and the desirability of knowledge…that prizes
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go to those who study, who learn, who soak up the difficult fields of knowledge…" (61). It
should be noted that Heinlein's claim for science fiction comes after a polemical section on the
state of contemporary literature. Calling "serious" literature a "sick literature," Heinlein criticizes
some of the major literary figures of the mid-twentieth century (James Joyce, Henry Miller, JeanPaul Sartre to name a few) for writing "autobiographical novels centered around neurotics,…sex
maniacs, concerning the degraded, the psychotic, or the "po' white trash" of back-country farms
portrayed as morons or worse" (55). This last criticism, it seems, was a reference to William
Faulkner who, only a few years earlier, had won the Nobel Prize in Literature. Heinlein's
characteristic no-nonsense pragmatism leads him to offer: "I, for one, am heartily sick of stories
about frustrates, jerks, homosexuals and comuters [sic] who are unhappy with their wives— for
goodness sake! Let them find other wives, other jobs— and shut up!" (56). Science fiction offers
an alternative, says Heinlein, and "leads in the direction of mental health, of adaptability" (61).
Ultimately, Heinlein's claim for science fiction is that its ability to posit the future allows
for the negotiation of the rapidly changing present, and that the genre instills, in its readers, the
work ethic necessary to do so. In The Puppet Masters and Double Star, Heinlein shows the
incorporation of a similar ethic in his protagonists while positing it as a maturation process. In
both cases, conformity attains a positive value when it exists alongside adaptation. Heinlein
suggests that as these characters adapt to meet the challenges of their fictive worlds, so too must
readers meet those of Cold War America.
Three years after the publication of Stranger in a Strange Land elevated Heinlein to a
status somewhere between a celebrity and a cult leader, Farnham’s Freehold, his nuclear war
survival novel, would enlist this characteristic positivism to explore the era’s most popular fears:
the cultural effects of the spread of communism, deteriorating race relations, and global nuclear
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war. Serialized in 1964 and published in book form later that year, Heinlein’s novel owes a great
deal to the national anxiety of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. As the novel opens, Heinlein
explains that mounting tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union have brought
the world to the brink of war. So serious is the threat that Hugh Farnham, the novel’s protagonist,
wears a radio earpiece in anticipation of an alert. Shortly, their relatively pleasant evening of
dinner and contract bridge is interrupted and all of the household’s occupants Grace (Hugh’s
wife), his son Duke, his daughter Karen, Karen’s college friend, Barbara, and Joe (the African
American employee/servant of the Farnham household) are rushed into a bomb shelter Hugh has
constructed under their property. After what seem to be successive hits by nuclear weapons
above them, they eventually open their shelter to find a near Edenic wilderness seemingly
untouched by the devastation of nuclear war. They find that they have traveled forward in time
over two thousand years to a future dominated by black cannibalistic Muslims. At the novel’s
end, while all other characters have met undesirable fates (Karen dies in childbirth, Duke is
castrated or “tempered,” and Hugh’s wife is, effectively, an addict to a future drug called,
ironically, “Happiness”), Hugh Farnham and Barbara (his new wife) are sent back to their time
by Ponse, a kind of feudal governor in charge of the protected wilderness in which they were
found, to live out the rest of their lives. There, Hugh and Barbara, Heinlein asserts triumphantly
in the novel’s final line, “are still going on” (333).
Farnham’s Freehold is, with little doubt, an exceptionally strange, controversial, and,
some would say, offensive novel. Its portrayal of a future in which black cannibal Muslims feed
on a defeated and servile white race is paranoid to the point of being hardly recuperable.
However, it is a novel that has been noted by scholars for having captured, albeit at a white heat,
the anxieties of its time. Bruce Franklin, for example, reads Heinlein’s characterization of the
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cannibals as a reaction to the burgeoning of Black nationalism movements, especially the Nation
of Islam, in the early 1960s. By capturing these contemporary anxieties and by suggesting a way
of transcending them, Heinlein’s text participates in the jeremiad tradition entirely consistent
with his work’s positivism and his Cold War politics. Heinlein is seen, then, for what he is at this
point in his writing career: a Cold War partisan, and in a broader sense, a staunch supporter of
dominant American cultural narratives promoted during this period. Such a characterization
becomes clearer upon close analysis of Farnham’s Freehold, perhaps the most problematic of
Heinlein’s texts that could be considered Cold War jeremiads.
At first glance, Farnham’s Freehold looks to be a novel entirely about fear. The book
begins with the fear of global nuclear war and transitions quickly to the anxieties of surviving
one. Finally, the novel’s concern with the oppression of the futuristic racial-feudal society
(providing yet another opportunity for Heinlein to extol the virtues of libertarianism) eventually
slides into the horror of outright cannibalism. In fact, the novel provides three clear allegorical
references to Cold War era concerns before it provides any gesture at transcending or defeating
them.
The first and most obvious is the novel’s concern with nuclear war. Not only does the
beginning of the novel capture the anxiety of a possible nuclear attack (for example, Hugh’s
earpiece tuned to the Conelrad channel, his wife complains, ruins their nice evening of dinner
and bridge), but, in characteristic form, the subsequent section illustrates how a family would go
about surviving after one did occur. In fact, much of the novel is reminiscent of other nuclear
survival novels, Pat Frank’s Alas, Babylon for example, until the intrusion of its ludicrous
cannibal-future plot. All of the usual suspects are here: a bomb shelter, a well stocked pantry, and
frontier know-how. This perhaps explains why the novel has become extremely popular among
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survivalist groups. Suffice it to say, however, that this aspect of the novel is remarkable for the
fact that it is so conventional. It is, literally, just like a number of other texts exploring the same
concern with nuclear war.
However, less conventional, perhaps, is the novel’s connection to Generation of Vipers,
Philip Wylie’s jeremiad on the deleterious effects of excessive mothering on a generation of
boys. Certainly, “Momism,” Heinlein suggests, has placed its mark on Duke (Hugh Farnham’s
adult son). Duke, it should be noted, is one of the few characters in Heinlein’s work that,
although he occupies a structural position in the novel that one would expect he would
eventually achieve maturity to the Heinleinian ideal, he, in fact, does not. He does not, in other
words, become like Hugh. Instead, by the novel’s end, he has been physically castrated and this
coincides with, it seems, the figurative castration and emasculation Heinlein suggests throughout
the novel (clearly the antithesis of achieving maturity). He is not the scientist/ engineer typical
to Heinlein’s novels, but a lawyer and, we learn, an atheist. He frequently argues with Hugh (in
one scene to the point of fighting), even in instances when he knows Hugh is right, and
excessively dotes on his alcoholic mother. Finally, Barbara, who one would suppose would be
the likely partner for Duke, chooses his father instead (despite the fact that Hugh is, of course,
married and significantly older). Even Karen, Duke’s sister, suggests that he may suffer from an
Oedipus complex. What seems clear, however, is that Heinlein posits Duke as the product of the
kind of softening of American masculinity that Wylie railed against. As discussed earlier, such
softening, some feared, made American culture (and specifically American males) more
susceptible to the cultural contamination of communism. By veering from his typical formula of
youth coming to maturity, Heinlein renders yet another popular anxiety in his novel.
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Finally, the state of race relations in the United States is the undeniable primary anxiety
of Farnham’s Freehold. The novel was, after all, serialized the same year that the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 was passed. Frustrating the desire to dismiss Farnham’s Freehold simply as a
conservative, even perhaps racist, response to the broad social changes occurring in the early
1960s are the frequent anti-racist assertions in the novel (clearly another example of the
influence of Heinlein’s mid-century progressivism). Duke, readers may remember, is the novel’s
only clear racist and, throughout the novel, Hugh Farnham consistently berates him for his
overtly racist attitudes and statements. In fact, Hugh, after a telling discussion over whether
miscegenation is worse than incest, give his blessing to Karen and Joe’s plan to marry. This is an
interesting moment in the novel because even though Heinlein seemingly allows for an
interracial marriage, Karen’s death in childbirth (whose father is not Joe, it should be pointed out,
but some man Karen knew in college before the attack) keeps the relationship from being
consummated. In addition, Heinlein makes a point of explaining Joe’s role in the house as an
employee, not domestic servant, who is making a fair wage. When Joe, at the novel’s end,
betrays Hugh, explaining that Duke and Grace are to become his servants, Hugh’s response,
while expressing his disappointment, illustrates an attempt by Heinlein to sympathize with the
plight of contemporary African-Americans. When Farnham, in his disbelief, argues that Joe was
a “decently treated employee,” Heinlein writes a response for Joe that attempts to express some
understanding and sympathy for the experience of African-Americans in 1960s America:
The younger man’s eyes suddenly became opaque and his features took on
an ebony hardness Hugh had never seen in him before. “Hugh,” he said
softly, “have you ever made a bus trip through Alabama? As a
‘nigger’?” (269)
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This is an interesting passage because, in a canon of fiction in which the Heinleinian
characters are usually portrayed as infallibly right, this passage suggests that Hugh Farnham has
something to learn. Joe’s response emphasizes the difference in their experiences as a way of
justifying his behavior. Of course, it is a behavior, subjugating his oppressors to the position of
the oppressed, that falls in line with the most paranoid of white fears (which, in turn, has been,
historically, a typical justification for further oppression). However, Hugh’s response is
interesting in its implications for the larger debate about race raging in 1960s America. When
Joe tauntingly asks Hugh what he thinks of his plan, Hugh responds, “I thought better of you,
Joe...I thought you were a gentleman...It seems I was wrong” (271). Hugh’s response, the
disappointment that he expresses, suggests a disappointment at the loss of an opportunity to work
out a new social arrangement, to forge a new understanding of race, now that they have been
removed from the toxic atmosphere of the 1960s American society of the novel’s initial setting
(which is, of course, the same as the original readers’). In point of fact, the little community they
forged after surviving the nuclear attack is relatively harmonious and, some could argue, utopian
(as long as one recognizes that Joe is second-in-command under Hugh, our white protagonist).
However, it is, of course, rudely interrupted by the future cannibal society narrative. That
narrative, in fact, could have provided a kind of cognitive estrangement through its inversion of
racial hegemony were it not for the introduction of cannibalism (which, of course, invites readers
to dismiss it as purely evil, horrifying, and ludicrous).
Ultimately, Bruce Franklin’s reading of the novel is perhaps the most helpful in
understanding the various tensions at work in the novel. To be sure, it is a convincing argument
that the novel is, or registers, a response to the Black nationalism movements growing at that
time. However, Heinlein’s staunch progressivism and expressed anti-racism register a disdain
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for the tenor of the race relations dialogue in 1960s America and a kind of sorrow at the lack of a
better understanding among its participants. This hints at the fact that Heinlein’s political history
is a bit more complicated than his fame as a libertarian icon would suggest. As a younger man,
Heinlein supported Upton Sinclair’s “End Poverty in California” socialist reform movement and
supported Sinclair when he ran for governor in 1934. In addition, in 1938 Heinlein ran
unsuccessfully as a democrat for a seat in the California State Assembly. Though he seems to
have flirted with progressive causes and politics as a young man, Farnham’s Freehold, suggests
that Heinlein’s mid-century progressivism was trumped by a mid-western wariness when it came
to race and radicalism.
However, in typical jeremiad fashion, it is in Heinlein’s novel that we find his solution to
the cultural anxieties that he articulates. Endure, the novel’s ending fiercely asserts. It is,
perhaps, unsurprising for a survival narrative that the ending of the novel is replete with images
and statements that emphasize that the solution to such problems rests on America’s ability to
outlast them:
They lived through the missiles, they lived through the bombs, they lived
through the fires, they lived through the epidemics...and they lived through
the long period of disorders while civil government writhed like a snake
with a broken back. They lived. They went on. (332)
The novel’s final image, the American flag flying high over the homestead, is followed by the
fierce assertion that “they are still going on” (333). Such an assertion is consistent with what the
novel’s plot suggests. If Duke is a failure as a son, a symbol for the “Momism” afflicting
American culture, the novel suggests that things will be different with Hugh and Barbara’s twin
baby boys (twice the man as Duke, etc). One need only wait for them to grow to manhood. If
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Cold War political tensions and the threat of nuclear war are a concern, one need only find
comfort in the idea that, as George Kennan asserted in his “Long Telegram,” the United States
and its economic system will outperform and outlast its enemies. Finally, if the state of race
relations threatens to tear the social fabric of the nation, one need not be alarmed by images of
rioting and strife broadcast on the nightly news, but only to wait for Nixon’s “Silent Majority” to
sweep a conservative President into office.
Heinlein’s admonition to endure is consistent with the positivism that pervades his other
novels. In such a call there is a distinct confidence in humanity’s or, specifically, America’s
ability to face and conquer future challenges. Unlike the jeremiads of the seventeenth century,
Heinlein’s confidence in his culture’s exceptionalism does not stem from a belief that such
exceptionalism springs from divine or spiritual roots, but rather from a fiercely nationalistic
belief in the ingenuity, toughness, and prowess of the United States. In this way, Heinlein’s
positivism serves to reinforce and promote the prevailing nationalistic Cold War cultural
narratives of his day. While his novels are jeremiads firmly rooted in the belief of an American
exceptionalism and warning against threats to that prominence, they are also committed to
supporting an understanding of America and Americans very much in line with the officialdom
of American Cold War domestic and foreign policy. This is perhaps why Samuel R. Delany once
wrote that when he was growing up, Robert Heinlein, as much as any writer, taught him to
“argue with the accepted version.”
The Puppet Masters, Double Star, and Farnham’s Freehold all end with the reflections of
their narrators sometime after the events of the novel. Strong, brave, responsible, rational, they
are changed men. Heinlein suggests that they have to be. "If this is just the opener," Heinlein
writes at the conclusion of The Puppet Masters, "we had better learn from it for the main
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event….if man wants to be top dog- or even a respected neighbor- he'll have to fight for
it" (338). Having thoughtfully considered the epistemological implications of Heinlein's fiction,
it is difficult to shake the feeling that that was precisely what he was "preparing our youngsters"
to do.
End Notes
1 For

a detailed review of the state of the discourse on this subject see Wilford 99-122.

2 This,

Saunders says, as opposed to Willy Brandt’s celebrated declaration, “we are the elected of
the people, not the elect”(36).
3

Carl Freedman defines epistemological positivism as "the dogmatic assumption of an
unproblematic and invariably positive adequation between knowing subject and known
object" (98).
4

Of course, this is not the only example of Heinlein's packaging politeness with libertarian
notions of personal choice and responsibility. The same situation occurs in Heinlein's 1966
novel The Moon is a Harsh Mistress. It should be noted that this notion of “politeness” is
usually associated with the threat of physical violence if it is not observed. After all, it was
Heinlein who wrote that “an armed society is a polite society.”
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CHAPTER THREE
“LIKE WE’RE JUST EXISTING IN THE RUINS”: THE AMERICAN JEREMIAD AND
ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER IN POPULAR SCIENCE FICTION FILM AND THE
WORK OF KIM STANLEY ROBINSON

Close to the end of the documentary based on Al Gore’s influential presentation, An
Inconvenient Truth (2006), Gore’s rhetoric shifts in tone from explanation and illumination to
exhortation and petition. In a presentation designed to help others understand what is, by its
nature, a global problem, he curiously appeals to the audience’s sense of nationalism. He
suggestively asks, “Are we, as Americans, capable of doing great things even though they are
difficult? Are we capable of rising above ourselves and above history?” Citing some of the
nation’s greatest achievements, his remaining slides build a case for America’s ability to conquer
similarly large problems. This is the country, Gore reminds the audience, that abolished slavery,
defeated totalitarianism, and went to the moon. Perhaps more to the point, he reminds the
audience that this was the country that took a lead role in reducing chlorofluorocarbon (CFC)
emissions. He explains that, technologically speaking, America has everything needed to combat
the problem. Everything, he says, except “political will.” Perhaps referencing the 2006 mid-term
elections (the film was released in June 2006) and the 2008 presidential election, he reminds the
audience that “political will is a renewable resource.” Such a nationalistic call to arms (albeit
electoral) is an interesting way to end a presentation devoted to articulating a global issue.
However, such a call is not inscrutable or contradictory when considering the distinctly
American tradition that such rhetoric engages. Just before the film ends, Gore explains that
global warming “is a moral issue.” It is an interesting statement coming, as it does, after a
presentation characterized more by persuasive data than platitudes. However, Gore’s framing of

95

global warming as a moral issue makes sense if one considers how An Inconvenient Truth is
reminiscent of the American jeremiad tradition.
There are two major characteristics of the American jeremiad, articulated in the work of
Perry Miller and Sacvan Bercovitch, that are also found in the Gore film. The first, and perhaps
most immediately recognizable characteristic, is the jeremiad’s polemical rhetoric. After all, the
jeremiad takes its tenor from the Old Testament’s book of Jeremiah, and, as such, is
characterized by lamentations that accounted for a society’s or era’s misfortunes as just penalty
for great social and moral evils (while holding out the possibility that change would bring about
a happier future) (Abrams 138). The second important characteristic of the American jeremiad is
its emphasis on the exceptionalism of the American community. Miller points out that the
jeremiad was eventually mapped onto a growing national narrative of election and purpose. It
was then that the colonists’ purpose in the New World became a “errand into the wilderness” as
Samuel Danforth’s 1670 sermon suggested (and from which Miller takes his title). Later,
Bercovitch would build upon this idea in order to assert the form’s “unshakeable optimism” to be
found in the jeremiad’s inversion of the doctrine of vengeance into the promise of ultimate
success (7). In other words, Bercovitch reads the sermon’s record of punishments (crop failures,
etc.) not as destructive but as corrective. The effect, then, was to reinforce the covenant that they
believed they had entered into with God. “His vengeance was a sign of love,” Bercovitch writes,
“a father’s rod used to improve the errant child” (8). It is this covenant, for example, that John
Winthrop, in his lay speech aboard the Arbella, compares to a marriage “of most strict and
peculiar manner” in which God would be “more jealous of our love and obedience” (215). This
proposed covenant would promote a belief in their exceptionalism that, Bercovitch concludes,
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explains America’s ability to conceive of itself as a culture that could transcend differences in
landscape, race, and creed “to believe in something called an American mission...” (11).
By beginning my analysis with An Inconvenient Truth, I do not mean to suggest, as critics
of global warming have, that Gore’s film is science fiction. The efficacy of Gore’s film
illustrates a tendency in American rhetoric and thinking that I wish to explore in American
science fiction narratives interested in environmental and social critique. In this way, the fact
that the film is polemical is unsurprising. However, that the solution to the problem is couched
in terms that engage and, in fact, promote notions of American exceptionalism suggest that
something more dynamic is at work. Gore’s appeal suggests that the success of fighting global
warming is dependent on the leadership of the United States and, perhaps more telling, that such
leadership is moral, and not only technological or scientific, in nature. In other words, the
difference in rhetoric does not merely suggest that Americans should build more hybrid cars or
limit carbon emissions, but rather asks Americans to be the kind of people that would want to
drive hybrid cars and limit emissions. Its aim is not technological or scientific, but a moral and
cultural one.
One need only look to other monuments in environmental writing to find the same
connection between the polemical and exceptionalism rhetoric. For example, Rachel Carson’s
Silent Spring (1962) is often hailed as a fundamental text in the modern environmentalism
movement. Certainly, a great deal of attention paid to Silent Spring was due to its stark appraisal
of the role of chemical pesticides. Such pollution, she warned, had become “for the most part
irrecoverable” (6). “The chain of evil it initiates,” she continued, “not only in the world that
must support life but in living tissues is for the most part irreversible” (6). As other have
remarked, Carson was astute to compare the environmental damage wrought by pesticides to that
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of radiation (a concern being given full attention in Cold War America) in its ability to change
“the very nature of the world- the very nature of life” (6).1
Yet, Carson leaves no doubt as to whom this message is directed. The first line of the
opening chapter in which she outlines her disturbing, dystopian vision of a silent spring, a
landscape in which most living things have been destroyed by chemical pollution, begins with
the line, “there once was a town in the heart of America where all seemed to live in harmony
with its surroundings” (2). Indeed, most of her examples of the pitfalls of community-wide
spraying are from the American mid-west. One of her case studies highlighting alternatives to
chemical spraying, the control of Japanese beetles for example, comes from the successful efforts
of communities along the eastern seaboard. Finally, her work in the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service and her testimony before the congressional committee investigating pesticides illustrate
an attempt to address the problem from within American governmental and political institutions.
Today, Carson’s Silent Spring is considered something of a phenomenon in the way it has
become incorporated in the culture. Its influence and popularity are widespread from public
policy to popular culture. The same, of course, could be said for Gore’s film (having greatly
contibuted to him winning the Nobel Peace prize in 2007). Ultimately, what these two texts
share (and what they share with the texts and films that will be discussed shortly) is a
fundamental assertion, much like the election sermons of early America, that audiences and
readers can and should act after seeing or reading them. In addition, such action is primarily
moral in nature. Finally, in their frequent assertion that the United States must play a leadership
role in global environmental policy, that the success of any global environmentalism movement
is contingent upon such participation and leadership, these texts and films continue to advocate
an American exceptionalism that has long been a hallmark of American discourse.
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In similar regard, ecocriticism, that relatively new approach to exploring connections
between literary studies and the environment (or ecology, depending on which term one prefers),
shares similar characteristics with the established jeremiad tradition. This connection, their
similar rhetorical stances, tells us something about why this approach and the texts studied are
effective in understanding these broad challenges, and in promoting social, political, moral, and
environmental change. In other words, this essay argues that these texts and the relatively new
critical framework within literary studies designed specifically to call attention to environmental
crisis explain a new problem in very old, established ways. In so doing, these texts are packaged
in a way, proven through the history of the nation’s discourse, to incorporate not only their
particular complaints to help us better understand the issues, but the very emotions of worry and
anxiety that serve as impetus for public policy designed to address them.
In their landmark collection of essays outlining the aim and approach of ecocriticism, The
Ecocriticism Reader, Cheryll Glotfelty and Harold Fromm argue that the job of the critic, literary
or otherwise, is to “help with...understanding” (xxi). Such understanding, their quotation of
Donald Worster in the collection’s introduction illustrates, is ethical rather than ecological.
“Getting through the crisis requires understanding our impact on nature as precisely as possible,”
Worster writes, “but even more, it requires understanding those ethical systems and using that
understanding to reform them” (qtd in Glotfelty xxi). At its heart, the jeremiad was a form
devoted to exploring the moral standing of the community. The early election sermons were a
form of reflection focused on assessing the community’s fulfillment of their covenant with God.
If they were falling short, and in most cases it seems that they thought they were, the sermon
turned naturally polemical in tone. Obviously, a similar vein of polemical rhetoric necessarily
runs in ecocriticism. In her early definition, Glotfelty says that the fundamental motivation
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shared in ecocritical work is “the troubling awareness that we have reached the age of
environmental limits, a time when the consequences of human actions are damaging the planet’s
basic life support systems” (xx). In a page seemingly pulled straight from the work of Increase
Mather she intones, “either we change our ways or we face global catastrophe, destroying much
beauty and exterminating countless fellow species in our headlong race to apocalypse” (xx).
Beyond polemical rhetoric and a concern for ethical reform, ecocriticism shares the jeremiad’s
concern with humanity’s relationship with the physical world. For example, many of the early
jeremiads tried to reconcile scriptural accounts of the apocalypse with new scientific knowledge
burgeoning during the seventeenth century. In other words, these writers were concerned with
how the end of the world was to come about when science was providing substantial evidence of
a universe governed by forces that could be understood and calculated. In addition, many
jeremiads are rife with attempts to read the physical world for proof of God’s displeasure. In
1680, for example, Increase Mather would read comets along with “droughts, catterpillars,
tempests, inundations, [and] sickness” as portentous signs of the community’s standing in the
eyes of God (qtd in Miller 229).
Like ecocriticism, these early jeremiads share a fundamental premise, articulated most
recently by Glotfelty, that “human culture is connected to the physical world, affecting it and
affected by it” (xix). It just happens that the Puritans saw such an understanding of the physical
world as a means to understand the spiritual one. According to Glotfelty, ecocriticism’s
emphasis on the “eco” of the term implies a focus on “interdependent communities, integrated
systems, and strong connections among constituent parts” (xx). One need only consider
Winthrop’s formulation of the Christian community in “A Model of Christian Charity” to see that
such an emphasis was incorporated within the Puritan’s attempts to theorize a new community,
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one in fact that would, said Winthrop, serve as an example to others. Finally, Glotfelty’s assertion
that ecocriticism studies the “reciprocal relationships between humans and land, considering
nature not just as the stage upon which the human story is acted out, but as an actor in the
drama” recalls the power of the popular metaphor for early America as the “errand into the
wilderness.” The “wilderness” became, for these early Americans, an entity whose elements
would test their spiritual resolve and, as others have argued, an entity whose influence would
lead them to a distinct American identity.2
As Bercovitch and others have argued, such a role in American identity formation is one
of the hallmarks of the jeremiad tradition. The jeremiad’s function as a popular form (indeed one
of the nation’s first) and the way that the election sermons were consumed by audiences and
readers suggest that the articulated, specific anxieties of those early jeremiads would eventually
become incorporated into the public consciousness. The concerns then became so acknowledged
as to become obvious, trite, and, ultimately, part of their everyday experience. Today, a similar
effect is occurring with the rhetoric of environmental or ecological disaster and such an effort, as
exemplified by recent popular nonfiction texts and documentary films (Alan Weisman’s The
World Without Us and Thomas Friedman’s Hot, Flat, and Crowded, for example), was built on
the cultural groundwork laid by dystopian science fiction, particularly the environmental
“problem” films of the 1970s. Science fiction, packaged along with the rhetoric of the jeremiad
tradition, effectively performs this function (helping to lay the groundwork for cultural changes
in the perception of an issue) for two important and related reasons. First, science fiction, as
Darko Suvin’s influential definition suggests, is the literature of cognitive estrangement. That is
to say, the genre encourages critical thought by its presentation of a reality estranged from the
empirical world of the reader or viewer. If ecocrticism’s aim is, as Glotfelty suggests, to direct
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“our attention to matters about which we need to be thinking,” it is precisely this ability of the
science fiction genre to shed or at least to mute, the cultural imperatives or ideological bonds that
stand as barriers to understanding issues like impending ecological disaster. Secondly, if science
fiction, as Suvin argues, has “always been wedded to a hope of finding in the unknown the ideal
environment...,” then, inversely, dystopian science fiction, he suggests, articulates “a fear of and
revulsion from its contrary” (5). In this way, the work of dystopian science fiction and the
American jeremiad are united by their polemical stance. That is, both seek to articulate precisely
what has gone wrong with the community. However, in both, a proposed solution is always
implicit. Therefore, not only does the problem become clearly articulated and incorporated into
the popular consciousness, but the author’s or filmmaker’s proposed solutions do as well. In this
way, science fiction and science fiction films (such as Soylent Green and Silent Running) seek to
do the early cultural work that later texts, films, and, perhaps, public policy makers, may later
utilize.
Eco-Jeremiads in the Work of Kim Stanley Robinson
Few authors of Kim Stanley Robinson’s stature have consistently written as much about
the environmental challenges facing the world. Having won the Locus Award (1985), Hugo
Award (1982, 1994, 1997), Nebula Award (1983,1987,1993), and having received a National
Science Foundation Grant (1995), Robinson may be the most important American science fiction
writer of his generation and, perhaps, one of the finest American novelists of his generation.
From his earliest novels to his most recent “Science in the Capital” trilogy about global warming,
a concern with the environment and the role of science in preserving the biosphere has been
central to his work. An avid devotee of nature, Robinson has remarked that his time spent
enjoying the wilderness (particularly mountain hiking) inspired a great deal of his work (“Kim
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Stanley Robinson”). “It’s got me thinking,” he once said in an interview, “about the
environmental catastrophe we’re sitting on the edge of and solutions to that.” He concludes, “It
doesn’t make any sense to just throw up your hands in despair and say, ‘The world is doomed!’”
Instead, his fiction, utilizing an established tradition in American rhetoric and letters, attempts to
stimulate social, political, and environmental change.
The polemical in Kim Stanley Robinson’s fiction runs the gamut from concern over
nuclear proliferation, the threat of impending environmental disaster, and frustration over the
disarray of postmodernism. In each of his major works (specifically his Three Californias
trilogy, Mars trilogy, and his “Science in the Capital” trilogy), Robinson places the polemical
within the context of the utopian concerns central to much of his work. The primary
characteristic of Robinson’s work, in other words, is a concern with exploring the possibilities of
the ideal world and the various polemics in his work play an important role in articulating those
spaces where the world falls short.
At the end of The Gold Coast (1988), Robinson’s alternative future novel in which urban
sprawl, a dizzying array of highways, and rapid technological advancement have drastically
transformed Orange County, California, Jim McPherson, the novel’s protagonist, is troubled by a
disturbing dream:
There’s an elevated freeway on the cliff by the edge of the sea, and in the cars
tracking slowly along are all his friends and family. They have a map of Orange
County, and they’re tearing it to pieces...Jim, down on the beach, cries out to them
to stop tearing the map; no one hears him. And the pieces of the map are jigsaw
puzzle pieces, big as family-sized pizzas, pale pastel in color, and all his family
take these pieces and spin them out into the air like frisbees, till they stall and
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tumble down onto a beach as wide as the world. And Jim runs to gather them up,
hard work in the loose sand, which sparkles with gems; and then he’s on the
beach, trying to put together this big puzzle before the tide comes in—[...]. (388)
Jim’s dream is relevant to this discussion of the polemical in Robinson’s work because it so
neatly encapsulates the anxiety of dizzying, rapid change characteristic of postmodernism that is
related to environmental concerns permeating not only this novel but, by degrees, the other
novels making up the Three Californias trilogy: The Wild Shore (1984) and Pacific Edge (1990).
The novel is primarily about Jim, his struggle to make sense out of his life, and his search for
authenticity in the increasingly artificial postmodern world. When the novel opens, Jim’s days
are spent working part-time as a writing instructor at a small technical college, while his nights
are spent “lidding” psychotropic drugs, party-hopping with friends, or driving for hours on the
Autopia, a complex series of highways built high above Orange County. He does not get along
with his father, a mid-level manager for an aerospace company, for a variety of reasons: not least
of which has to do with the fact that Jim blames the aerospace industry, in part, for the growth
that has decimated and transformed the Orange County landscape. He eventually falls in with
Arthur, the closest the novel comes to a revolutionary, and begins sabotaging the area’s aerospace
companies with shoulder-mounted rocket launchers. By the end of the novel, however, even this
one act of defiance has lost its significance for Jim after he learns that their sabotage may have
been organized and funded by rival companies looking to increase their market-share. Even
Jim’s rampage at the novel’s end, in which he foregoes attacking Laguna Space Research, the
company that employs his father, in favor of random buildings and malls, is strangely without
consequence. It is as if even Jim’s most erratic acts of defiance are anticipated and absorbed by
the culture in which he lives.
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What, though, does the novel’s polemic on rapid change characteristic to postmodernism
have to do with concerns over environmental disaster? For Jim, the two are heavily interrelated.
Throughout the novel, Jim is fascinated with finding some authentic piece of Orange County.
This is the significance of the novel’s opening scene in which Jim and his friends dig through the
parking lot of the Fluffy Donuts Video Palace in search of a relic from the past: in this case a
piece of El Modena Elementary School (long since buried underneath the parking lot). Jim,
writes Robinson, is “tense with excitement” over this “personal archaeology” (4). He has “an
uncontrollable urge to recover something—to see, to touch, to fondle some relic of the past” (4).
The failure of Jim’s efforts in this scene (the characters are chased from the lot by the police)
reinforce the overriding sense in the novel that Orange County, and whatever history might have
been there, has been literally paved over. This point is brought into sharp focus by the novel’s
recurring theme: the loss of the area’s orange groves.
As the novel opens, Jim is explaining the history of Orange County to his friends. “This
whole basin,” Jim says, “was covered with orange groves, over two hundred square miles of
them...There were more oranges then than there are lights now” (3). Robinson suggests through
the reactions of Jim’s friends that this is a story Jim has told before. Two friends share a
knowing grin while one of them eggs Jim on: “You’re kidding” (3). Sandy, another friend along
for the ride, cannot help himself and begins laughing at Jim. To be sure, his friends have heard
this one before. We, Robinson suggests, have heard this one before. After all, the story of the
loss of the Southern California groves is something of a cliche. Yet, for Jim, the story connects
him to a history that he perceives is more authentic than his daily experience and explains the
sequence of events that led to the society of the novel. Throughout the narrative, which the
reader comes to learn is written by Jim, short vignettes relate the economic and agricultural
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history of Orange County. The final one, of the loss of the groves, is a poignant elegy to what
Jim obviously perceives is a cataclysmic moment. The loss of the orange groves are, for Jim, a
symbol of everything wrong with the society in which he lives: the unbridled expansion and
growth that replaced the land’s natural beauty with concretized sprawl, the rise of the aerospace
industry providing the economic engine for such growth and the subsequent military technology
enabling further national expansion, and, finally, the loss of man’s connection to the natural
world. For Jim, however, these all culminate in the sense of a loss of agency that is thoroughly
postmodern.
Here, we return to Jim’s dream at the end of the novel. It is important that Jim has
couched his anxiety within imagery that emphasizes his connection to the natural world. His
family and friends are rootless, after all; suspended in air on the elevated freeway. On the other
hand, Jim, like Antaeus, is rooted on the beach trying to save the pieces of the map they have
discarded. This coincides with imagery throughout the novel that advocates for a culture with a
closer connection to the natural world. Some of the novel’s most beautiful images, for example,
are of Tashii and Jim enjoying the peace of night surfing. Jim’s sexual encounter with Hanna
under an oak tree is characterized by a transcendence completely absent from the novel’s earlier
scene in which Jim and Virginia perform, for lack of a better word, in front of an array of
cameras and mirrors designed to record themselves during intercourse. Jim’s connection to the
natural world is important because, Robinson suggests, it is in the natural world, and its small
degree of authenticity, that Jim can reclaim a degree of agency. This connection between the
natural world, authenticity, and agency is most evident when Jim and his friends travel the world
in search of something “real.” After eating at the same restaurants or staying in the same hotels
in Europe or Asia that they would in Orange County, the group becomes disheartened and bored.
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Something happens, though, when they travel to Crete. After venturing off from the tourist traps,
they come upon a long deserted ruin on a hill by the sea. It strikes Jim as nearly identical to the
coast back home and he wonders:
How could history have coursed so differently for these two dry coasts? It’s as if
they’re not part of the same history, they are separated by such a great chasm;
how to make any mental juncture? Are they different planets, somehow? It is too
strange, too strange. Something has gone wrong back home in his country. (237)
This is an important moment for Jim because it emphasizes the fact that Orange County’s
development was not an inevitability, not a matter-of-course, but the result of an unjust sequence
of economic events and processes. What follows is a nearly utopian section in which Jim and his
friends swim, bask in the sun, watch the local fishermen, cook and eat good food, and sleep
under the stars. It is a refreshing change of scenery from the ultra-urban, cyberpunk setting of
Orange County and Jim returns a changed man.
Robinson’s polemic in The Gold Coast works to engender the same kind of realization in
his reader. Given the population boom California and many of the nation’s urban areas have
seen in the last half-century, Robinson’s dystopia of an Orange County of rapid and dizzying
growth certainly seems prescient. However, his novel reminds, these things do not happen
overnight and such growth is not inevitable. There is still time.
At the heart of The Gold Coast is Jim’s struggle for agency in a culture exceedingly able
to deny, diffuse, or absorb it. Yet, at novel’s end, Jim seems hopeful that he will be able to
understand and to make meaning of his life in Orange County. After his troubling dream, Jim
decides to drive to Hana’s. The novel’s final image, of Jim on the freeway, driving to Hanna’s
exit and “the embrace of the hills, the touch of the earth” suggests his recovery of something lost,
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his reconnection with the natural world, and the progressive hope that the place you are headed is
better than where you started.
Indeed, a preoccupation with the challenges of postmodernism extend to all of the novels
in the Three Californias trilogy. In The Wild Shore, Robinson’s novel of a small Californian town
trying to survive after the complete destruction of the United States by surprise nuclear attack,
the more overt polemic on nuclear weapon proliferation is subsumed into the overarching
concern with postmodernism. In other words, the novel takes as its focus the confusion and
powerlessness of a society that was victim to sneak attack and its continued oppression in a new
world order. There is a great deal of confusion, for example, over how and why the attack
happened. Partly this is due to the fact that the events of the novel take place roughly one
generation after the attack. However, even among those of the older generation that have
survived, the characters Tom, John Nicolin, and Mayor Danforth for example, there is
disagreement and confusion over how the attack was perpetrated and who bears responsibility.
Robinson’s emphasis on the lack of information and the excess of rumor, innuendo, and bad
information, is perhaps the most realistic way of portraying such a widespread and devastating
event. People simply would not know what happened. However, even when the novel presents
its most definitive explanation for the attack, that Russians placed small neutron bombs in Chevy
vans and parked them in two thousand of the nation’s cities, the style of such an attack (the kind
of attack that currently has the American government and public policy-makers worried) is itself
unconventional, decentralized, and thoroughly postmodern. Under that style of an attack,
individuals and governments find they have little agency in defending against it.
This loss of agency is further emphasized in the failure of Mayor Danforth’s resistance
movement and the inability to keep tourists off the mainland. Near the end of the novel, after
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Hank, Steve Nicolin, and the others are betrayed by Danforth’s people and left to die, Hank,
having survived, discusses the possibility of any resistance with Tom. Specifically, Hank
considers the effectiveness of the Major’s original plan of killing the tourists who sneak onto the
mainland. Tom’s response is significant. “Murdering those dumb tourists doesn’t do a thing to
change the structure of the situation,” says Tom, “Catalina will still be Japanese, satellites will
still be watching us, we’ll still be inside a quarantine” (198). “Even tourists won’t stop coming,”
concludes Tom, “they’ll just be better armed, and more likely to hurt us” (198). Hank ponders
this for a moment. Tom reminds him that such plans usually cost lives and, with regret, Hank
thinks of Mando, his friend who died in the previous attack. At that moment, Hank’s will to
fight is sapped and he has a better appreciation for the things in this new world that he does not
control and for the lives of the people in his town. Tom’s response, Hank says, reminds him
“how grand military plans...translated into chaos and pain and meaningless death” (362). Hank
writes, “so in an instant I was all uncertain again, and my bold idea struck me as stupidity
compounded by size” (362). Tom, sensing Hank’s confusion, offers an interesting bit of comfort.
“Don’t fret about it, Henry,” he says, “We’re Americans; it ain’t been clear what we’re supposed
to do for a long, long time” (362).
The Wild Shore, like Robinson’s The Gold Coast, functions as a polemic on the effects
environmental disaster: albeit, in this case, as the result from a nuclear attack. The attack, it
seems, has permanently disrupted the world’s climate and conventional weather patterns. For
example, Hank and Tom learn that Russia has become plagued by permanent electrical storms
and devastating tornadoes (which, Tom muses at one point, is just retribution for Russia’s attack).
However, the major example is the fact that the San Onofre of the novel has become a strange
mix of meterological phenomena. Snow and bitterly cold weather has become commonplace in
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Southern California at all times of the year. Robinson posits that the weather patterns have
changed due to the altered nature of the Santa Ana winds. Commonly, the Santa Ana is known as
a hot, dry wind that, usually in the fall, blows down into Southern California from the high
inland plateaus. In Robinson’s novel, however, it coalesces with winds off an altered ocean
current to bring flash snow storms in the middle of Summer. This is dangerous for residents of
San Onofre because of its unpredictability. Simple put, simply staying fed and alive is a
challenge for the characters in Robinson’s novel. The unpredictable weather patterns make
growing crops difficult and fishing at sea treacherous. Sudden, powerful rains threaten to uproot
and drown the crops on which they depend. These are the daily challenges Hank and others face.
Yet, it is important to point out that San Onofre and the rest of the post-nuclear landscape of the
novel is not desolate or dead. To the contrary, the natural landscape of Robinson’s novel is lush
and the soil appears capable of growing what people need. This fact provides the basis for one of
the novel’s utopian moments.
Early in the novel, the town is besieged by powerful, driving rains in the middle of the
night. The residents rush out of their homes to spread tarps in an effort to protect the town’s
cornfields and gardens. The effort, though, is important for how communal it is. Surely realizing
that their survival depends on the survival of the crops, everyone comes out to help. Afterward,
the townspeople go to the bathhouse to dry their clothes and warm themselves in the baths.
People talk, laugh, and joke. Their naked bodies, defined by a demanding life, exercise, and bit
of deprivation, glisten in the lamplight. Hank’s surveys the scene: “I sat in my usual corner
listening to Kathryn and looking around contentedly: we were a room of fire-skinned animals,
wet and steaming, crazy-maned, beautiful as horses” (55). While much of the novel functions as
a post-nuclear dystopia in which the environment is permanently altered, such a scene suggests a
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relationship between man and his environment that is neither man exploiting his natural
environment nor being subdued by it.
Such a relationship is the focus of the series’ third and firmly utopian novel, Pacific Edge.
The town of El Modena, California in 2065 is a model of green living. Set after the Great
Change, a series of reforms that brought the world back from the brink of overpopulation,
plague, and destruction, the novel chronicles the efforts of a group of friends who, through their
positions on the community council, fight a measure seeking to build a massive business
complex atop the town’s last undeveloped hill.

From the various automobiles, airplanes, and

cruiseships powered by renewable energy and the highly efficient eco-friendly homes Kevin
designs, Robinson presents a community in equilibrium with its environment. However, the
novel is about so much more than the burgeoning of green technology and the dispute between
Kevin, the novel’s protagonist, his allies on the council, and the town’s mayor, Alfredo (who
supports the development). Pacific Edge is primarily concerned about the state of the human
condition in a utopian future. It is important to remember that even in Robinson’s utopian text,
such a society had to be pulled back from the brink. In doing so, Robinson is able to emphasize a
number of concerns about contemporary society that appear in more overt ways in the previous
two novels. In this sly way, Robinson engages the warning rhetoric so characteristic to the
American jeremiad by way of illustrating the turbulent past and its social troubles that had to be
overcome. By doing so, Robinson illustrates a dedication to the transformative possibilities of
the form and its polemical, covenant, and exceptionalism rhetorics employed within the fiction
of undesirable futures.
Scattered throughout the novel are sections of the diary of Tom Barnard, Kevin’s
grandfather, kept during the crisis that spawned the Great Change. As readers learn, Tom was
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instrumental in drafting the reforms responsible for saving the world. What these sections tell us
about that troubled time is very much like what the previous two novels have warned us against.
According to Tom, overpopulation, runaway growth, wasteful uses of resources created a world
characterized by depression, wars, and an AIDS plague (181). The fact of the planet’s degraded
state before becoming a paradise allows Robinson leeway to deliver the warning characteristic to
the genre and, then, the space to articulate his utopia. What the novel’s ending makes apparent is
that the human condition in this world is characterized by an absence of poverty, hunger, and
violence while those fundamental aspects of the human experience remain untouched. At the end
of the novel, Kevin has lost his grandfather and best friend, Tom, to a hurricane at sea, and the
woman he cares deeply for, Ramona, has decided to rehabilitate her marriage with Alfredo. The
novel’s ending passage brings the situation into focus:
Behind him Orange County pulsed green and amber, jumping with his heart,
glossy, intense, vibrant, awake, alive. His world and the wind pouring through it.
His hands came together and made their half swing. If only Hank hadn’t caught
that last one. If only Ramona, if only Tom, if only the world, all in him all at once,
with the sharp stab of our unavoidable grief; and it seemed to him then that he
was without a doubt the unhappiest person in the whole world.
And at that thought (thinking about it) he began to laugh. (326)
Pacific Edge’s ending brings the limitations of utopia into focus while accentuating its triumphs.
No utopia can prevent the death of a loved one nor prevent the woman Kevin loves from loving
another man. Yet, Robinson emphasizes this utopia’s triumphs and, also, its distinction from the
world of the reader, if, in fact, Kevin truly is the unhappiest person in the world.
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Robinson’s other major trilogies also emphasize the role of the polemical in articulating
the failings of the real world and in offering solutions for improvement. His Mars trilogy, made
up of his Red Mars (1993), Green Mars (1994), and Blue Mars (1996), has received the most
critical attention of any of his works. Those novels, a spectacularly thorough detailing of man’s
colonization of Mars, maintain their own polemical commentary on contemporary society. At
the heart of the Mars trilogy, for example, is Robinson’s characteristic critique of transnational
capitalism. In Red Mars, Robinson’s concern manifests itself in the conflict between the utopian
desires of the original colonists and the economic interests of the transnational corporations that
control much of Earth. The original colonists (known as the “First Hundred”), led by John
Boone, Frank Chalmers, Maya Toitovna, conceive of a utopian Mars focused on scientific
inquiry and discovery and devoid of the monetary system, poverty, violence, and corruption that
the transnational corporations or “Transnats” eventually graft onto the planet. Sensing a threat to
their growing hegemony, the Transnats eventually try to wipe out the remaining First Hundred
and launch a full-scale war on the colonists loyal to the original colonists. There is little moral
complexity to the actions of the Transnats. They are essentially evil, conspiratorial, and rapacious
and reflect Robinson’s overall critique of monopolistic capitalism as a system that is “grossly
unjust and a danger to us all” (Szeman and Whitman 182). It is important to place Robinson’s
critique of transnational capitalism within the context of the trilogy’s central fact: the
terraforming of Mars’s surface. Robinson takes pains to show the First Hundred agonizing over
the decision to permanently alter Mars’s surface. There is an intense debate in which friendships
are ruined and grudges are created. Yet, the decision to terraform is made from the most idealistic
visions for the future of Mars. By contrast, the erection of the space elevator is funded and built
by the Transnats for purely economic reasons. Once it is built, they conclude, Mars will become
113

the preeminent economic power in the solar system. Compared to the decision to terraform, the
decision to build the space elevator is done irrespective of its effect on the planet: a decision
made all the more important by the dramatic changes to the planet’s surface the elevator causes
in its destruction during the war that ends Red Mars.
Another example is the issue of the societal consequences of technological and scientific
advancement. In Red Mars, a new process, involving the repair of DNA strands as they replicate
over the course of a person’s life, effectively doubles the lifespan of those who receive the
treatment. Back on Earth, however, this causes riots as those who cannot afford the treatment
(given for free on Mars) grow angry. Eventually, the treatment’s lasting societal effect is to
create tremendous overpopulation and a scarcity of resources on Earth. This, in turn, fuels greater
numbers of people colonizing Mars; even past the point the planet can adequately sustain them.
Such unanticipated and unchecked growth is seen by Chalmers and others to be a major factor in
causing the social problems that lead to the war between the colonists and the Transnats.
Finally, the novels that make up what has been termed Robinson’s “Science in the
Capital” series, Forty Signs of Rain (2004), Fifty Degrees Below (2005), and Sixty Days and
Counting (2007), constitute a rather overt polemic on global warming and its consequences. At
the end of Forty Signs of Rain, for example, the breaking up of the polar ice caps has effectively
stalled the North Atlantic Current (a possibility we will see referred to again in the discussion of
the film The Day After Tomorrow). San Diego is ravaged by massive storms and swells that
cause substantial portions of the coast to fall into the ocean. On the east coast, severe
thunderstorms flood Washington, D.C. to the point that politicians and their staff, of which the
protagonist Charlie Quibbler is one, must be evacuated by boat. However, Forty Signs of Rain is
also remarkable for its contemplation of the ideal relationship between science and government.
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By the end of the novel, the reader has witnessed Senator Phil Chase’s global warming omnibus
bill become derailed and hacked to pieces by a hostile administration. Business as usual, it
seems, fails as usual. With government unable to answer the problem on its own, however, there
is the insistence at the novel’s end that a new arrangement between the scientific community and
public policy organs is what is needed. Frank Vanderwal, along with his colleagues at the
National Science Foundation, argues for a set of new principles for how they will seek to
influence public policy. Ultimately arguing for a paradigm shift “in how science interacts with
society,” Vanderwal lays out a much more aggressive mission for the NSF (321). Consequently,
this is Robinson’s point as well. With the exception of the dramatic meteorological events in the
novel’s final pages, Forty Signs of Rain is, to speak frankly, a rather uneventful novel. However,
this is precisely the point. The trilogy’s value resides in its role as a meditation on the ideal
relationship between society and science at a time when it appears more and more that the issues
raised in the novel will be of upmost importance for the foreseeable future.
What the previous analysis makes clear is that the major works of Kim Stanley Robinson,
particularly his early dystopian/ alternate future novels, illustrate the author’s dedication to the
transformative possibilities offered by carefully employed polemical rhetoric; warnings of
undesirable futures. Such a tendency is not new to the science fiction genre. However, these
narratives function within the established tradition of the jeremiad precisely because they employ
such rhetoric while interacting with the concept of America exceptionalism. Regardless of
whether Robinson’s novel’s promote or criticize the concept of American exceptionalism, his
interaction with the concept is yet another signal that he has engaged, though not uncritically, the
jeremiad’s long tradition in American fiction.
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Robinson’s interaction with the history and the rhetoric of the jeremiad is clear from even
the first pages of his Mars trilogy. When the novel opens, John Boone, the first man on Mars,
gives a speech about the first attempt to colonize the planet. How he structures the experience of
the First Hundred is remarkable for its similarity to the rhetoric of the early American colonists
led by Winthrop and Miller’s analysis of the cultural change the early colonists underwent upon
arriving in the colonies that launched them along the process of creating a distinct American
national identity:
And so we came here. But what they didn’t realize was that by the time we got to
Mars, we would be so changed by the voyage out that nothing we had been told to
do mattered anymore. It wasn’t like submarining or settling the Wild West—it
was an entirely new experience, and as the flight of the Ares went on, the Earth
finally became so distant that it was nothing but a blue star among all the others,
its voices so delayed that they seemed to come from a previous century. We were
on our own; and so we became fundamentally different beings. (4)
Robinson’s use of italics is interesting in the passage. This is, after all, a speech given by Boone
and so the italics suggest an insistence on his particular interpretation of their history. The
novel’s very next line illustrates that Boone’s interpretation, and the evocation of the rhetoric of
American exceptionalism, is not unproblematic nor uncritical. “All lies,” thinks Frank Chalmers
(4). Though Frank understands the political reasons behind Boone’s speech, efforts toward
Martian independence, he rejects the interpretation Boone has constructed of the events that
brought the First Hundred to Mars. Chalmers describes Boone’s interpretation as “a lens that
distorted everything he saw, a kind of religion” (4). In fact, the resulting chapters bear out
Frank’s interpretation rather than Boone’s. However, this opening section of Red Mars illustrates
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the trilogy’s engagement with the rhetoric of exceptionalism and the process of national identity
formation. It begins this interrogation by asking some very important questions. How is cultural
identity engendered? Are all narratives of exploration bound to this way of conceiving of
identity? As the subsequent novels focus more and more on the succeeding generations, these
questions become more and more pertinent. This passage in Red Mars is only a small example
of a pervasive interrogation of identity, particularly American, throughout his work. However, it
is an appropriate place to begin to illustrate the connections between Robinson’s science fiction
and this long standing tradition in American letters.
Throughout the Three Californias trilogy there is a consistent interrogation of the concept
of American identity and America’s role in the world. The America of The Wild Shore is one in
which defeat and the struggle to survive is the daily experience of its citizens. Yet, the reader is
exposed to passage after passage in which the story’s characters consider the nature of the past
America, the culture of the America in which they now live, what it means to be an American in
a defeated nation, and what it all means for their future. What occurs is a thoughtful
interrogation of the role of the covenant rhetoric so central to the jeremiad and to the notion of
American exceptionalism.
At the center of the story is the question of the past. Tom, the town elder and default
educator, has taught Hank, Nicolin, and others an exaggerated history of the United States. He
is, after all, the town’s teller of tall tales. In some cases, his stories embellished the
accomplishments of the fallen nation. At the end of the novel, Hank explains that he now knows
that America “never included Europe...that they didn’t bury their dead in suits of gold
armor...that we weren’t the first and only nation to go into space...that we didn’t make cars that
flew and floated over water...” (377). More the result of Tom’s love of storytelling than any
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attempt at purposeful aggrandizing, Hank’s conception of the past America is frequently being
revised throughout the novel. That is because Robinson has taken great pains to complicate any
concrete notion of America and an American cultural identity. This is never clearer than in the
contrast that the three main male figures in Hank’s life, Tom, Mayor Danforth, and John Nicolin,
offer for Hank’s understanding.
Mayor Danforth (whose name, perhaps, alludes to the Puritan minister, Samuel Danforth)
does not enter the narrative until the novel’s second part, but he is important for his effect on the
young Hank. When Hank and Tom travel to San Diego, they meet the charismatic Mayor, who
presents them with the notion of joining a resistance. The idea appeals to the young, energetic,
and idealistic Hank. Tom, on the other hand, is wary and critical of the Mayor and is resistant to
the point of rudeness. In his characterization of Mayor Danforth, Robinson leaves little room for
interpretation. Simply put, the reader comes to understand exactly what kind of American
Danforth is. He wears a little American flag lapel pin on his jacket. When speaking to Tom, who
is old enough to remember America before the attack, Danforth incessantly refers to America as
“Paradise.” During their pre-meal prayer, Danforth asks God to “make us strong in the service
of you and of the United States of America” (97). While at a party at the Mayor’s mansion,
Hank, drunk with the vision of Danforth’s new America, describes him as “the prophet of a new
age” (107). The girl Hank is dancing with replies, “He is like a prophet...just like from
church” (107).
Yet, behind Danforth’s request that San Onofre join the resistance is an unmistakeable
threat. Eventually Danforth and his men are shown to be cowards when they set up Hank,
Nicolin, and the other boys who join them, to take the brunt of a Japanese attack. Mando,
Hank’s friend, dies in the betrayal, and the other boys are left for dead. Although the Mayor is
118

shown to be a fraud, his idea of a resurgent America lingers. It is enough, for example, to
persuade Nicolin to leave the village. However, for Hank, Mando’s death is the concrete
evidence of the bankruptcy of the Mayor’s America. We know this because, as discussed earlier,
when Hank talks with Tom about taking over Catalina Island, Tom reminds him that such plans
mean taking lives: lives like Mando’s.
Offering a competing vision is John Nicolin, the father of Hank’s friend, Steve. Nicolin
is a stern man and a strict father. When Tom and Hank plan to leave San Onofre for San Diego,
Nicolin will not allow his son to go. Hank cannot understand this and Tom explains that, if it
were not for John Nicolin, the village would have fallen to starvation. It was John Nicolin’s idea
to find boats and to fish with nets that saved the village. However, Nicolin lost his youngest son
to a drowning accident, causing him to hold Steve that much closer. It is because of this history
that John Nicolin argues most vehemently, when a town meeting is called to discuss San
Onofre’s inclusion in the resistance, for a strict isolationism:
We should be working...We should be gathering food and preserving it, building
more shelter and improving what we got, getting more clothes and medicines
from the meets. Getting more boats and gear, firewood, all of that. Making it all
work. That’s your job, Rafe. Not trying to fight people out there who have a
million times the power we do. That’s a dream. If we do anything in the way of
fighting, it should be right here in this valley. Not for anybody else. Not for those
clowns down south, and sure not for any idea of America...America is gone. It’s
dead. (188)
Behind John Nicolin’s pragmatism is a complete dismissal of any history of America. For
Nicolin, such a thing is completely irrelevant. It does not help him, for example, bring in the next
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harvest or prepare the town for the next harsh storm. Yet, it is precisely John’s pragmatism that
drives his son away. Steve desires a life of adventure or, at the very least, to understand his place
in a world mostly unknown to him. Hank, by contrast, nearly dies on his journey back from San
Diego and, so, has his similar desires muted by the experience. However, he also has Tom to
inspire his imagination and his sense of the myth of America. It is precisely this notion, of
fighting for a myth, for a concept, that John Nicolin does not understand and detests. After all,
Hank explains that when Nicolin argues that no fighting should be done for “any idea of
America,” Nicolin “said it like the ugliest sort of curse” (188).
Hank, it must be remembered, is the author of the narrative in The Wild Shore and it is
because of him, and of course Tom, that the notion of America is complex. In Tom’s teachings,
the main characteristics of the jeremiad are fundamental to any notion of America. At issue in
many of Tom’s statements about America is whether or not America was a “good” nation and,
consequently, whether it deserved its destruction. Such considerations are unmistakably
grounded in the covenant rhetoric of the jeremiad. After the town meeting in which the plan to
join Mayor Danforth is voted down, Hank cannot understand why Tom would vote against the
resistance. “All our lives you’ve been telling us about America...how great it was,” Hank says
(198). Tom, he says, always makes America “sound like God’s own country” (198).
In truth, however, what Tom has said is much more complicated than that. His response
to Hank in this passage helps articulate some of that complexity:
I mean, America was huge, it was a giant. It swam through the seas eating up all
the littler countries—drinking them up as it went along. We were eating up the
world, boy, and that’s why the world rose up and put an end to us. So I’m not
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contradicting myself. America was great like a whale—it was giant and majestic,
but it stank and was a killer. Lots of fish died to make it so big. (198)
Here, Tom is rather critical of America and its role as a superpower. He invokes the nation’s
bloody history of expansion and subjugation of its native peoples. Later, though, when Tom is
stricken with a pneumonia-induced fever, Tom appears much more emotional and conflicted in
lamenting the loss of America:
“We were free then. Not perfectly so, you understand, but it was the best we could
do, we were trying, it was the best so far. Nobody else had ever done it better,
we...it was the best country in history,” he whispered, like he had to convince me
or die. “I tell you true now...with all the flaws and stupidities we were still the
leader, the focus of the world, and they killed us for it. Killed the best country the
earth ever had, it was genocide boy...the murder of a whole people. Oh it had
happened before, we did it ourselves to the Indians. Maybe that’s why this
happened to us. I keep coming on reasons but they’re not enough. We were wrong
in a million ways and had flaws as big as our strengths but we didn’t deserve
this.” (296)
However, Hank, the apt student, sees the same contradiction that the reader sees. “You
told us two different things,” he says at the end of the novel (360). “You made it seem like it was
the golden age,” he continues, “like we’re just existing in the ruins” (360). “You also said the
old time was awful,” Hank points out, “that we live better lives now than they ever did” (360).
Of course, Robinson intends both to be true. It is the culmination of Hank’s education (again
remembering that he is the author of the narrative) that he realizes that both understandings of
the past are true, that any understanding of the past is necessarily this complex. In addition,
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Robinson is able to raise the concept of American exceptionalism in a way that does not
necessarily promote an uncritical view of the nation or its past. Doing so would be much more in
line with the rhetoric of Mayor Danforth. Here, however, Tom’s fever-induced assertions about
the nature of America, whether it was good or bad, whether it was “the best country the earth
ever had,” and whether it “deserved” its destruction, all linger like questions posed to the reader.
In so doing in a narrative of a possible future, Robinson/ Hank encourages the reader to consider
their world in much the same way as the sermons of the American seventeenth century.
A similar focus on American exceptionalism rhetoric occurs in the remaining novels of
the trilogy. In The Gold Coast, this Orange County of the future is described by one character as
“some kind of brain mortuary” (41). “Just look at it,” Arthur says, “look at these sleepwalkers,
zombieing around in some kind of L-5 toybox...from sea to shining sea...while the rest of the
world is a real mortuary” (41). He concludes, “the world is falling apart and we devote ourselves
to making weapons so we can take more of it over!” (41). Similar critiques of American foreign
policy and the state of American culture permeate the novel. Jim, a frustrated revolutionary for
much of the novel, thinks about his new role as a saboteur the night before their first mission and
the excitement of finally acting on his frustration:
He’s thinking of the evil direction his country has taken for so long, in spite of all
his protests, all his votes, all his deepest beliefs. Ignoring the world’s need,
profiting from misery, fomenting fear in order to sell more arms, to take over
more accounts, to own more, to make more money...it really is the American way.
(111)
However, by the end of the novel, the thrill of this kind of resistance loses its flair for Jim and he
is forced to recognize that his frustration is with something much more complex and incapable of
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being articulated than merely American foreign policy. Like Hank, he comes to realize that a
truer understanding of America, one that accepts its inherent complexity, resides somewhere
between the competing visions offered by Arthur and his father. Jim writes that he “will have to
find his own way, somewhere between or outside them—find some way that cannot be co-opted
into the great war machine, some way that will actually help to change the thinking of
America” (380). Like The Wild Shore, The Gold Coast’s rejection of certainty preserves its
concerns on the postmodern condition in addition to allowing for a space in which the concept of
America and American national identity are not dictated so much as they are explored. Jim’s
contemplation on the past late in the book brings this point into relief:
The junk of the past, the memory’s strange detritus. Why should he remember
what he does? And does any of it matter? In a world where the majority of all the
people born will starve or be killed in wars, after living degraded lives in
cardboard shacks, like animals, like rats struggling hour to hour, meal to meal—
do his middle-class suburban Orange County memories matter at all? Should they
matter? (347)
Robinson leaves those questions suspended in the reader’s mind without dictating an answer and
without allowing his narrative of a postmodern Orange County to devolve into a kind of nihilism.
The questions suggest, and what Robinson seems to imply that science fiction can offer, is an
advancement of inquiry, of the project of science, and the avoidance of simplistic answers.
In Pacific Edge and the “Science in the Capital” trilogy, the fact that America is the
setting for these dramas is significant. In Pacific Edge, after all, Orange County is the site of
Robinson’s utopia. In addition, we know that Tom Barnard was instrumental in an American
delegation that led the reforms of the Great Change. In Forty Signs of Rain, the battle with and
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over global warming occurs in Washington, D.C., its major characters are officials of the United
States government, and its scientists work for the National Science Foundation. It would further
support the notion, articulated most recently in Gore’s documentary, that the such movement on
the issue of global warming is dependent on American leadership. This is perhaps an uncritical
view given the complexity of the other novels in dealing with American exceptionalism, but a
pervasive one nonetheless.
This analysis of Robinson’s work suggests that the leading science fiction novelist of his
generation has focused on a new problem, possible impending environmental disaster, by
utilizing a traditional American form in order to maximize its cultural impact. However,
Robinson’s use of the form is not an uncritical use of the jeremiad’s rhetoric. In their effective
contemplations about the nature of American identity and how such an identity translates to
political and social action on the world’s biggest problems, the works illustrate a savvy, complex
dialogue with the form’s characteristic emphases on polemical rhetoric and the concept of
American exceptionalism.
Eco-Jeremiads on the Big Screen
Silent Running (Douglas Trumbull, 1972) and Soylent Green (Richard Fleischer, 1973),
along with The Omega Man (Boris Sagal, 1971), Logan’s Run (Michael Anderson, 1976), and the
various Planet of the Apes films, constitute significant entries in science fiction environmental
problem-films of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Characterized primarily by the pervasiveness
of an intensely pessimistic vision of the future, they register an anxiety over man’s interactions
with the natural environment that are usually seen as abusive, exploitative, or untenable. They
offer an explanation for the disaster that indicts man’s destructive relationship with his
environment, and, in doing so, encourage the audience to make the necessary changes before the
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horror of the film becomes their reality. While there is, perhaps, only anecdotal evidence
concerning the efficacy of such messages with audiences (that is, people who were inspired to
political action and conservation by viewing Silent Running, for example), what seems clear is
that the films offer the kind of critique and attempt at understanding that ecocriticism pursues. In
addition, given the tenor of the national discourse on environment-related issues, it seems clear
that we are now living in a period of heightened awareness concerning human interaction with
our environment. For example, both the 2008 Democratic and the Republican presidential
candidate addressed the issue in some form alongside more traditional issues such as foreign
policy, healthcare, or education.3 What the indebtedness of these texts and films to the jeremiad
tradition suggests is that this contemporary awareness is the product of the cultural work done
years earlier by texts such as Carson’s Silent Spring and films such as Silent Running and Soylent
Green. By laying the conceptual groundwork for these issues, these texts influenced the ongoing
process of American identity formation.
Silent Running, a 1972 film directed by Douglas Trumbull, is set in a distant future in
which Earth’s forests have been completely destroyed. A fleet of large spaceships is tasked with
stewarding the remaining forests in outer space until the time they are recalled and successfully
replanted on Earth. Soon after the film begins, however, the fleet is ordered to destroy their
precious cargo and return to regular fleet service. Freeman Lowell, the caretaker of the
remaining forests, mutinies and murders the remaining members of the crew in order to save the
final biodome aboard the Valley Forge. During the course of the film’s remaining minutes,
Lowell must evade the other starship whose crew believes that only a malfunction has kept him
from jettisoning his final dome. In his attempt to flee, Lowell’s new course pulls the starship
further away from the sun’s rays and the forests begin to deteriorate. After reprogramming the
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starship’s robots to become the new caretakers of the remaining forests, the film concludes with
Lowell jettisoning the newly self-sustaining dome and destroying his ship and himself. The
film’s final image is of Lowell’s dome floating in the vastness of space: presumably saved from
destruction.
Soylent Green, a 1973 film starring Charlton Heston in one of his iconic science fiction
roles, is set in the New York of 2022. Overpopulation, extreme scarcity, and prevalent poverty
are the realities of this dystopian future and provide the background for the murder of a
prominent member of the board of the Soylent Corporation: the company tasked with providing
the world’s food supply. Detective Robert Thorn (Charlton Heston) is assigned to investigate the
murder and quickly uncovers a conspiracy involving the other members of the board and the
highest levels of the city’s government. In the course of his investigation he meets Shirl, the
murdered man’s companion who is bound to the apartment in a kind of indentured servitude. His
partner Sol is a “book,” a researcher of sorts, who pieces together the secret Simonson was
murdered to protect. In this future, euthanasia, or “going home” as it is called in the film, is legal
and encouraged. After Sol learns the Soylent corporation’s horrifying secret, he decides to kill
himself. While unable to stop Sol, Thorn arrives at the elaborate “going home” ceremony in
time for Sol to share his finding before he dies. When Sol’s body is disposed after the ceremony,
Thorn tracks his remains to what should be a crematory but, instead, learns the secret central to
film: Soylent Green, the food of the future, is made out of people.
As in Gore’s documentary, these films, dedicated to warning audiences of global
ecological peril, couch their message within surprisingly nationalistic terms. In the cases of
Silent Running and Soylent Green, the films conspicuously function as products of American
science fiction designed to speak to American audiences. In Silent Running, for example,
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traditional American symbols appear throughout the film alongside logos of familiar American
companies. The Valley Forge, the ship carrying Earth’s last forests and whose name, of course,
recalls one of the most famous episodes of the Revolutionary War, is, as many exterior shots of
the starship illustrate, owned and operated by American Airlines.4 Throughout the main deck of
the starship, containers holding various supplies are emblazoned with product logos from
familiar American companies such as Coca-cola, Dow chemical, and Polaroid. Meanwhile, the
crew members wear jumpsuits that are conspicuously red, white, or blue with American flag
patches. During the film’s very first establishing shot of the Valley Forge’s exterior, a
sanctimonious speech plays in the background that explains the ship’s mission:
On this first day of a new century, we humbly beg forgiveness and dedicate these
last forests of our once beautiful nation, in the hope that they will one day return
and grace our foul earth. Until that day, may God bless these gardens and the
brave men who care for them.
A march-like piece plays as the ship’s exterior is revealed from the outside of Lowell’s window
and the dual symbols of the American flag and the American Airlines logo (altered here to say
“American Airlines Space Freighter”) appear emblazoned on the side of the ship.
While Soylent Green was undoubtedly an American product (it was produced by MGM
and its director, screenwriter, and all principle actors are American) the film’s message is not as
overtly couched in American terms and symbols as Silent Running. However, there are still
convincing examples of ways in which the film invites viewers to read its narrative and its
warning in domestic terms. The film, for example, reduces the scale of global ecological disaster
to one American city and shows its effects on everyday Americans. Its narrative centers around a
traditional murder-police investigation led by clearly one of the most well-known and iconic
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American actors: Charlton Heston. The board of Soylent, the men responsible for running the
corporation tasked with producing the world’s food supply, is staffed, curiously, only by
Americans: with our only representative examples being the murdered Simonson and the corrupt
New York Governor Santini. In addition, the overtly domestic nature of the film exists alongside
what we later realize is a horrific parody of the American marketplace. Throughout the film the
audience is bombarded by references to Soylent products. There is a Soylent marketplace, for
example, in which vendors yell out advertisements such as “Quick energy yellow Soylent, made
of genuine soybean!” The audience sees the various incarnations of Soylent products: Soylent
crumbs, Soylent buns, Soylent Red, Soylent Orange, and, of course, Soylent Green. The film’s
first spoken line is, in fact, a television program in which a speech by Governor Santini, the
audience is told, is sponsored by Soylent Red and Soylent Yellow: “High Energy Vegetable
Concentrates” and “new, delicious Soylent Green: the miracle food of high-energy plankton
gathered from the oceans of the world.” Indeed, throughout the film, commercials for various
Soylent products float in the background appropriately alongside reelection posters for Governor
Santini. “Remember,” another commercial intones, “Tuesday is Soylent Green day!”
These keys to the films’s investment in American culture, their positioning of themselves
as American texts capable of speaking to American audiences, becomes especially clear when
one considers how these images of American culture connect to the polemical rhetoric employed
in each film. Soylent Green, at first glance, seems to trumpet a complaint that frustrates any
possibility for reform or action. The film, loosely based on Harry Harrison’s novel Make Room!
Make Room! (1966), begins with a raucous sequence of images showing mankind’s rush from
humble agrarian beginnings toward mechanization, mass production, and, the film’s explicit
concern, overpopulation. The film’s primary explicit complaint, then, is the disastrous effects of
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human overpopulation and throughout the film, the audience is made excruciatingly aware of not
only this pending disaster, but its subsequent evils as well (rampant crime, starvation and general
human misery to say nothing of a reemerged virulent sexism). Such a polemical stance
seemingly frustrates the natural transition to a call for political and social action (a hallmark of
the jeremiad). However, the implicit complaint of the film is not population growth, per se, but
population growth outside of a natural balance with the Earth’s ability to sustain such life. This
is, perhaps, where ecology’s emphasis on the connectivity and interdependence of life systems
on Earth is most relevant. The film’s famous line, “Soylent Green is people,” reveals that the
Earth’s natural interactions between biological organisms have been severed and forced into an
incestuous loop in which humans (albeit unknowingly) eat humans. What the film does
accomplish is an awareness of ecology and its emphasis on balancing human interaction and
human growth with the Earth’s other life systems.
In another sense, the horror of the film’s reveal could be read as mankind’s horror at the
realization that it is not above such interdependent ecology but a part of it. Such a reading draws
attention to a tradition of American conceptions of nature and human culture as separate and
sometimes opposed entities. In his essay, “Cultivating the American Garden,” Frederick Turner
argues that such a conceptual division has led Americans to conceive of natural space as either
sites for preservation (as in our National Park System) or sites of exploitation. Turner traces this
tendency back to Puritan roots and argues that Puritanism’s “denial of the validity and
permissibility of mediating terms” fostered a horror “of any spiritual miscegenation between the
human and the natural” (46).5 Therefore, Turner’s essay, in fiercely asserting that “the state of
America is the state of being able to change our myths,” calls for a rethinking of natural space
within American culture (48). Turner’s call for an “American Garden” is not so much a call to
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transform physical spaces in the American landscape than it is a call to re-conceptualize the
dialectic leading Americans to think of their nation’s natural spaces as separate from its public or
political spaces. It is a call for a distinct American ecology that attempts to redress the damage
done by the traditional concept of human culture outside of such interdependent ecology.
This is, despite all of the emphasis placed on DDT and other pesticides, the primary
complaint of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. For example, she explains the effects of pesticides
on the soil in precisely these terms: “This soil community, then, consists of a web of interwoven
lives, each in some way related to the others- the living creatures depending on the soil, but the
soil in turn a vital element of the earth only so long as this community within it flourishes” (56).
Carson targets pesticides precisely because they disrupt this natural exchange. In another
section, she describes efforts to control the Japanese beetle population by introducing their
natural predators into areas where the beetles were previously allowed to live artificially
unhindered.
The film’s emphasis on ecology manifests itself in the film’s political and social
concerns. All societal problems seems to emanate, as if to emphasize the connectedness of this
society to its natural environment, from the scarcity of resources articulated ad infinitum
throughout the film. The cities are overcrowded, we learn, because they are the only place to
find work and, thus, food. Crime is rampant because it pays (one of the few occupations that
does) and because the police are kept busy by frequent food riots. Sexism too has reemerged
because women have found that the clearest path to sustenance and comfort is by being a
companion to influential men as part of their expensive apartments (being literally referred to
throughout the film as “furniture”). Finally, religion, curiously portrayed as the last vestige of
morality and conscience in the film, is, in the representative character of Father Paul (Lincoln
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Kilpatrick) driven to madness at the revelation of the extent of the damage. In this way, Soylent
Green can be read as what Cynthia Deitering calls a postnatural narrative. That is, the film
functions as a narrative that renders what Deitering sees as the fundamental shift in American
culture in the twentieth century: “a shift from a culture defined by its production to a culture
defined by its waste” (197). Modifying Martin Heidegger’s notion of the “standing reserve,”
Deitering argues that the experience of the late twentieth century is one in which the Real shifted
from the standing-reserve to the “already-used-up” (199). Deitering explains how the symbols
that used to stand in for economic and technological possibility now represent that which has
already been exploited:
The tract of land is now represented as a possible site of contaminated waste, left
over from coal mining operations. The river is now represented as a possible
waste receptacle for the by-products of a nuclear plant. The airplane is now
represented as flaming debris. In other words, what is revealed now is the waste
of the empire. (199)
While such images are rampant in Soylent Green, none are so relevant as the Soylent Green
wafer. The conveyor belts filled with green wafers are horrifying because, by film’s end, the
audience knows that they are not sustenance, they are literally the last vestiges of the used-up
human body.
However, one of the film’s more subtle indictments provides another connection to the
anxieties of American culture. In his analysis, J.P. Telotte reads the film as an exploration of the
paradox of consumer culture. It was, he writes, a paradox in which “the very technologies we
had embraced to make life more convenient, more efficient, more pleasurable,were
contributing...to the very destruction of our way of life through air and water pollution,
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deforestation, the eradication of natural habitats, and the extinction of other species” (104).
Telotte’s point is especially convincing when considering some of the film’s dynamic images.
When Thorn (Charlton Heston) begins investigating the Simonson case he gets to enjoy, albeit
briefly, the spoils of the assignment. He steals Simonson’s bourbon, his food, his books (which,
the audience later learns, are the Soylent oceanographic survey reports that lead to the film’s
shocking revelation) and he enjoys the apartment’s air conditioning, bathes in its hot water, and
sleeps in Simonson’s bed with Simonson’s companion, Shirl (Leigh Taylor-Young). In one early
scene Thorn is visibly stunned by the sight of running water. When the bodyguard, whose
statement Thorn is taking at the time, leaves the room, Heston’s slow and deliberate splashing of
water on his face conveys the unspeakably rare pleasure that such an act is for Thorn. In a later
scene in which Shirl entices Thorn to stay the night, she tells him, “You can take a shower and let
the water run as long as you like.” Thorn is visibly persuaded and replies, “All right, you turn
that air conditioner on, all the way.” “All the way up,” Shirl responds, “we’ll make it cold like
winter used to be.” The scene’s conspicuous consumption is bittersweet not only because the
audience is aware of how rare and fleeting this experience is for Thorn (the contrasting scenes of
squalor and starvation throughout the film drive that point home) but also because the film’s
underlying indictment of consumer culture suggests that such consumption was the cause of the
film’s prevalent misery.
This overt conflation of consumerism and cannibalism naturally lends itself to a reading
of the film as an indictment of consumer capitalism. Telotte, for example, sees the film’s
fundamental conflation as “a metaphor for our current condition, one in which we are already
unwittingly in the process of destroying ourselves, consuming our fellow humans to maintain
some semblance of the status quo” (104). Such a reading allows, unlike the film’s polemical
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rhetoric on overpopulation, a space in which audiences can feel as if they have some recourse to
action to avoid the future presented by the film. Fighting economic exploitation is one thing;
asking people to stop having children is another.
A very similar polemic on consumer capitalism is found in Silent Running. When the
film opens the Valley Forge has been recalled to merchant duty by the Earth government. Before
they can return, however, they are ordered to jettison and explode their precious cargo. Freeman
Lowell (Bruce Dern), the ship’s caretaker, is horrified while his crewmates, John, Marty, and
Andy exhibit a complete lack of concern, outright hostility to their mission of conservation, and
even exuberance at the notion of exploding the domes so that they may return home.6 Their
reactions stand in for the prevailing attitudes on Earth that have presumably led to such
ecological disaster. To be sure, one of the film’s most memorable scenes is one in which
Lowell’s crew mates shout in excitement over being able to destroy the forest domes. There is
something particularly garish about their delight and Lowell’s contrasting horror.
Just as in Soylent Green, American consumerism and consumption are indicted as the
causes of ecological disaster leading to the Valley Forge’s mission. However, in a curious way,
this same nationalism leads to the small triumph of the film’s call for conservation. At one point
in the film, the camera lingers over a copy of the “Conservation Pledge,” clearly a flyer from the
National Parks Service, hanging near Lowell’s bed. “I give my pledge as an American,” it reads,
“to save and faithfully to defend from waste the natural resources of my country- its soil and
minerals, its forests, waters and wildlife.” Such conservation has come at a high cost for Lowell.
He is a murderer, after all, and ultimately commits suicide to safeguard the final dome’s survival.
While such morality may come into question, his actions, the film posits, are necessary to fulfill
the truer, higher charge of conservation.7 Perhaps, in this light, Lowell can be read as fulfilling a
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new charge. Like the Puritans of early America, Lowell, finding his initial objective dissolved,
launches upon his own errand (an errand with the wilderness, so to speak). The film’s final
image, of the dome containing the last forest solemnly floating in space, is surely meant to call
forth the iconic Earthrise image brought back from Apollo 8. Such an ending emphasizes, as that
famous photo did, the precarious, fragile nature of the planet and the desperate need for
conservation.
Yet, compare this tendency to provide social critique to another popular genre of the same
era, the disaster film, and one finds a profound distinction. The disaster film, having its roots in
the earliest science fiction films, really became a hallmark of the genre during the 1950s. Susan
Sontag, in her influential analysis of disaster films, “The Imagination of Disaster,” argues that
science fiction films of this era, in contrast to their counterparts in other genres and even to
science fiction texts, “have unique strengths one of which is the immediate representation of the
extraordinary: physical deformity, mutation, missile and rocket combat, toppling
skyscrapers” (453). In this way, says Sontag, science fiction film is a privileged medium. It can
provide something even novels of the same genre cannot: what Sontag terms “sensuous
elaboration” (454). However, this is not to suggest that Sontag has a very high opinion of the
genre and the uses to which it puts this unique ability. For example, she argues that the genre is
characterized by a stultifying repetitiveness. These films, she argues, utilize the same icons and
plots over and over again presumably in an attempt to duplicate box office success. In addition
Sontag finds that the films perpetuate “cliches about identity, volition, power, knowledge,
happiness, social consensus, guilt, [and] responsibility[...]” (465). However, her most damning
criticism of the film is precisely what sets the genre apart from the genre considered in this
analysis. She argues that disaster films contain “absolutely no social criticism, of even the most
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implicit kind” (463). In addition, she fiercely asserts that, instead, the films only illustrate “the
conditions in our society which create the impersonality and dehumanization which science
fiction fantasies displace onto the influence of an alien It” (463). For Sontag, this tendency
against social critique has much to do with how these science fiction films are viewed. At the
heart of the science fiction film, she says, “is a morally acceptable fantasy where one can give
outlet to cruel or at least amoral feelings” (456). Arguing that science fiction films “are one of
the purest forms of spectacle,” Sontag compares the act of viewing a disaster film to how people
view the physically deformed:
The sense of superiority over the freak conjoined in varying proportions with the
titillation of fear and aversion makes it possible for moral scruples to be lifted, for
cruelty to be enjoyed[…]. In the figure of the monster from outer space, the
freakish, the ugly, and the predatory all converge-and provide a fantasy target for
righteous bellicosity to discharge itself, and for the aesthetic enjoyment of
suffering and disaster. (456)
This is precisely the opposite of what occurs in the science fiction films discussed in this
analysis. In their dystopian polemics, these films have indicted the world of the viewer as cause
for the suffering in the film. It is unlikely that a viewer of Soylent Green or Silent Running
would not feel the sting of each film’s critique of consumer culture or lack of vigilance in
conservation. In this sense, the viewer has an intimate connection to the suffering in the films.
Such a connection provides the very real possibility for social change in merely the viewer’s
desire to avoid the suffering warned by the film. Finally, if the genre is known for the spectacle
and sensuous experience that its special effects and sheer imagination can provide, one can only
imagine the possibilities for social change if such aesthetic enjoyment of disaster and suffering
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were turned instead towards a concern for man’s fellow man and his place on this planet. That is
precisely what occurs in Silent Running, Soylent Green, and other films of the same genre.
Those aesthetic tools are used instead to foster collective responsibility and environmental
concern.
Perhaps this distinction would be made clearer in a comparison between Soylent Green
and a film that emerged the very next year: Earthquake (Mark Robson, 1974). In Soylent Green
it is clear that humanity, in general, and some groups in particular (perhaps the Soylent company)
are responsible for the ecological damage and resulting human suffering. There is certainly a
conspiratorial air to the film that is satisfied by Thorn’s investigation and his shocking revelation
of Soylent Green’s origin. Ultimately, the audience participates in assigning culpability and such
participation helps lay the conceptual groundwork for understanding their culpability in the
larger issue of ecological disaster. However, in a film like Earthquake the very notion of
culpability, of assigning blame, is a ridiculous gesture.
In this sense, Sontag’s analysis is appropriate. In Earthquake, there is no one to blame
and, as such, the audience is relieved of this moral connection to the world of the film. This point
is only made clearer by the soap opera-like narrative that constitutes the film’s exposition in
which, it seems, the audience is introduced to some characters only so that they can root for
some characters to live and (more importantly) some to die. Absent this connection to social
critique, the earthquake is merely something that all of the characters must survive and the
audience is meant to enjoy. It is appropriate, then, that some viewers have come to describe the
two films that make up Earthquake: the soap opera and the disaster/special effects film. It is
perhaps more appropriate that at Universal Studios Florida there was a special effects “ride,”
Earthquake: The Big One, based on the 1974 film that completely dismissed any mention of the
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plot in favor of explosions, flooding, and other spectacular thrills. Such a ride (it closed
permanently in November of 2007) did not, for example, ask riders to consider the plight of
earthquake victims or the enormous human challenges cities face, as they inevitably do, when
recovering from a disastrous earthquake (or any natural disaster, for that matter). In this way,
Earthquake: The Big One provided a purer disaster film experience in the terms that Sontag
describes (having, by cutting out plot and people, completely severed any hope of social critique
in favor of a purer thrill-seeking, sensuous experience). Perhaps this is why fans of films like
Soylent Green and Silent Running, films devoted to spectacle as a means to social critique, are
still waiting for their themed attractions.
The Day After Tomorrow (Roland Emmerich, 2004), on the other hand, seems in many
ways to be the kind of film that Sontag describes. In that film, massive hurricanes, tornados, wild
temperature shifts and flash-freeze storms are discovered to be the product of a kind of fasttracked global warming. Dr. Jack Hall (Dennis Quaid) discovers that the melting of the polar ice
caps have dumped enough fresh water into the world’s oceans to stall the North Atlantic Current.
The unfortunate result, Hall concludes, is that the northern hemisphere will be plunged into
another ice age. Set against the backdrop of dramatic global climate change, Hall sets out to
rescue his son, Sam, who is stuck in a New York City paralyzed by flooding, massive snowdrifts,
and killer flash-freeze storms. However, like Soylent Green and Silent Running, The Day After
Tomorrow’s emphasis on social critique redeems it from the genre of films only invested in
spectacle. That is not to say that The Day After Tomorrow does not employ spectacular images
of a world being destroyed by drastic climate change. Instead, Roland Emmerich’s film of a fasttracked global warming disaster utilizes such imagery to accentuate its overarching interrogation
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of the role of scientific knowledge and inquiry in a world hostile to the science of global
warming.
Indeed, the film’s allegorical aspects are pretty conspicuous. As the film’s hero, Jack Hall
is an under-appreciated paleo-climatologist whose calls for action on global warming and,
specifically, the broad-ranging effects of stalling the North Atlantic Current, fall on cynical ears.
The film’s major cynic (and, perhaps, only real antagonist) is Vice President Becker and a deadringer for Vice President Dick Cheney. In these ways and in others, the film mirrors the current
antagonism between the American environmental movement and its allies in the Democratic
party (such as former Vice President Al Gore) and critics on the political Right. Besides a more
overt concern (and characteristic warning rhetoric) over the perils of global warming, the film’s
central concern is really a warning against the dismissal of knowledge gained through scientific
inquiry and, in fact, knowledge, in general. In other words, Dr. Hall is the film’s protagonist
precisely because he is a man of science that values knowledge and the power it gives him to
understand the world. For example, it is Hall that discovers the reason behind the flash-freeze
storms that cause helicopters to fall out of the sky, entire buildings to freeze, and people to die in
their tracks. It is this knowledge that helps him negotiate the treacherous, icy trip to New York
City save his son, Sam (who is, appropriately, in New York for a scholastic competition) when
others have died. Admittedly, this emphasis leads the film into a few awkward moments. In one
scene, for example, scientists gathered in a NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration) war-room-of-sorts gasp (and the camera pauses to emphasize their shock) when
Hall announces that “we’ve hit a critical de-salinization point.” This is probably not the dialogue
nor the dramatic moment the audience was expecting. However, it is precisely the point that
even in its awkward way, The Day After Tomorrow seeks a world in which such discussions are
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found in the prominent discourse (whether political or meteorological). In other words, while it
would be easy to read The Day After Tomorrow as being designed to deliver the spectacle of
worldwide disaster of global warming (albeit accelerated at a ridiculous rate) in an attempt to
scare audiences into action, the film’s prominent (and more viable) message is one that asks them
to value scientific inquiry and warns them of the consequences if they do not. In this way, the
film’s warning and focus is not technological or even scientific, but, like Al Gore’s concern in An
Inconvenient Truth, moral. In this way, films like The Day After Tomorrow engage the tradition
of the American jeremiad.
This is exactly the situation in a similar film released the previous year: The Core (Jon
Amiel, 2003). In that film, the threat of global annihilation emerges because the Earth’s core has
stopped spinning (thus leaving the Earth without a magnetic field and susceptible to the ravages
of solar wind). This effect generates a series of bizarre natural disasters such as electrical
superstorms, violent birdstrikes (because, the film posits, birds have lost their ability to
navigate), and electromagnetic disturbances that instantaneously kill unsuspecting, pacemakerwearing citizens. Having correctly diagnosed the strange origin of the phenomena, Dr. Josh
Keyes (Aaron Eckhart) leads a team of scientists to travel down into the Earth’s core and, by
detonating a series of nuclear bombs, restart the core’s movement. Eventually, the audience
discovers that the Earth’s core was halted accidentally by a military project gone awry. In this
sense, the film functions as a familiar warning about the role of scientific research in the
military-industrial complex. However, such a criticism is specifically moral in nature because, in
one of the most familiar veins of science fiction, the film explores how science can have a good
or evil value given its application. After all, science in a military context is seen in the film as
the cause for near global catastrophe. On the other hand, it is science that allows the team of
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intrepid explorers led by Dr. Keyes to restart the Earth’s core. This point is further driven home
by the fact that the team uses nuclear bombs in a cascade effect to rehabilitate the core (seen here
not in their destructive use, but in a positive, constructive and benevolent sense) and the foil of
Keyes, the humble geophysics professor dedicated to his students, to Dr. Conrad Zimsky
(Stanley Tucci), the arrogant, self-absorbed scientist behind the military project responsible for
the disaster. The accomplishment of a film like The Core (2003) is that, despite its sensational
special effects, the film’s rhetoric comes across as so clearly focused on the morality of the
warrants behind the science and insists on the importance of scientific inquiry in general.
Wall-E (Andrew Stanton, 2008), a Disney/ Pixar film, expands upon this foregrounding
of the morality inherent in the use of science and technology by making its central, unavoidable
feature the irony and complexity engendered by its main character, Wall-E, who is both the
product of the rampant consumerism responsible for the Earth’s future wretched state and the
catalyst for humanity’s regeneration. In the film, the future Earth has suffered widespread
ecological disaster due in no small part to the Buy N’ Large corporation and its overabundance of
consumer products. Humans have abandoned Earth aboard a space cruiser, the Axiom, while
mobile trash compactor robots, Wall-Es (Waste Allocation Load Lifter- Earth Class), were
assigned to clean up the refuse literally littering the planet. However, with the environmental
damage proving to be too widespread, the cruiser’s original five year mission has ballooned by a
number of generations. The narrative begins with Wall-E, apparently the last operational robot, in
a lonely, desolate cityscape going about his daily business of trash compacting and, amusingly,
collecting nicknacks that are of interest to him. Soon after the film’s opening, an EVE
(Extraterrestrial Vegetation Evaluator) robot arrives from the Axiom in search of life on the
planet and Wall-E simply falls in love. After finding a small plant that Wall-E had collected
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earlier in the film, EVE is retrieved by a rocketship and sent on her way back to the Axiom. The
film then follows their attempts to deliver EVE’s finding to the ship’s Captain, their flight from
robots tasked to stop them and their possible return to Earth, and humanity’s triumphant return to
Earth.
Wall-E is a film invested in and made richer by its implicit ironies. A Buy N’ Large trash
robot, a product of the consumer culture partly responsible for destroying the planet, for
example, becomes the catalyst for the renewal of the human community and its new emphasis on
environmental responsibility. Such a situation mirrors the fact of the film itself, a shiny, savvy
product of one of the nation’s biggest entertainment companies (no doubt with its army of tie-in
toys and products) becoming the vessel for one of the year’s most articulate critiques of that very
same consumer culture. However, instead of making the film’s polemical rhetoric confused or
unintelligible, these ironies serve to foreground a kind of morality that the film’s insistence on
humanity and compassion engender. At its heart, Wall-E is a love story. His interactions with
EVE are perhaps the most endearing and authentic in the film: especially when compared with
the simple, mind-numbing consumption that has become the daily experience of the humans
aboard the Axiom. As his efforts to be with EVE progress, Wall-E interacts with more and more
people and robots aboard ship. They learn each others names, become friends, care about each
other and, ultimately, consider a life outside of the infantilizing comfort of the ship. In this small
way, Wall-E’s interactions with others constitute his own little community that, taken along with
the film’s emphasis on love and compassion, suggest a renewal of the human community finally
consummated at the film’s end.
Wall-E, in his love and compassion for EVE, becomes a catalyst for the other film’s
characters and their resulting revision of their society’s ethics. It is after the personal television
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screens are turned off that some characters branch out to meet and care about others. It is after
meeting Wall-E that the Axiom’s Captain becomes interested in Earth, its history, and,
humorously, gardening. These things are possible (the film’s hopeful ending is possible)
precisely because Wall-E’s existence, the very fact that he appears to have a soul, suggests that
the impulses and ethics behind a culture that needs a Buy N’ Large are instead deserving of
scorn. In other words, the film’s polemic is not simply a indictment of the overabundance of
consumer products, but rather the questionable ethics and morals, the laziness and the
predilection for excess, that lay behind them. This is the regeneration offered by the film. Even
though the film begins after the ecological destruction of the Earth, it is not ultimately a
pessimistic narrative because it holds out the hope that the moral underpinnings of a society,
especially those of the audience, are the real site for possible remedy.
In each of the above cases, such critiques occur alongside rather conspicuous and iconic
American monuments, buildings, and images (consider Wall-E’s frequent allusions to Hello,
Dolly!, for example). However, the salient point about these films is that they all discuss the
perils of forthcoming ecological disaster in a way that takes advantage of the cultural work done
previously in the tradition. It is a tradition in which knowledge about the issue has become so
culturally incorporated that they are able to bypass significant exposition in order to critique the
moral underpinnings of the issue’s rhetoric. As the twenty-first century unfolds and ecological
issues become more prominent in the national discourse, such efforts at social criticism allow
concerned citizens to directly focus on the warrants behind rhetoric that looks to shape American
and global policy in the new century.
There is little doubt that these texts and films seem to be set at a white heat. In their
strong polemical rhetoric, delivered through the cognitive estrangement of a dystopian future,
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they highlight something in our world that is unjust and destructive in order to articulate a path to
a just and great community. Therefore, implicit in that complaint is the assertion that within the
audience and the culture is the frustrated potential to solve the problem and the moral obligation
to do so. For better or worse, this is the legacy of the Puritan’s covenant rhetoric. As a concern
over global ecological damage continues to influence American discourse (political and
otherwise), what an understanding of the American jeremiad tradition suggests is that
Americans’ conception of the problem, how they envision their blame for it, and how they
understand their obligation to avoid it continues to be shaped by rhetoric equally invested in the
ways Americans have come to conceive of themselves.
End Notes
1

See Linda Lear’s introduction to Carson’s text in the latest Mariner edition.

2

Jill Lepore’s In the Name of War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of American Identity goes
into fascinating detail of the pragmatic aspects of the conception of the wilderness and its effect
on the settler’s mindset. Of particular interest is her section on the settlers’s need for
differentiation from the Native Americans, thus explaining why lost houses were tallied in raids
before human casualties.
3

John McCain, the Republican nominee, for example, allowed the issue to pull a kind of double
duty by conflating a concern with climate change with dependence on foreign oil. Such a move
allowed him to pivot to a perceived strength on issues of national security. For the Republican
party, this was, of course, a change in policy from previous positions of outright hostility toward
the issue of global warming.
4

While the ship’s name refers most explicitly to General Washington’s famous Pennsylvania
encampment in which his army survived the harsh winter of 1777-1778, the ship itself was
particularly named for the decommissioned aircraft carrier that director Douglas Trumbull and
crew used as soundstage for most of the film.
5

Such a conceptualization being traced back to Puritan roots seems to be at odds with an entire
tradition of Puritan writing that looked to the physical world for signs of the community’s
standing in the spiritual one. When Increase Mather cites an overabundance of caterpillars as a
sign of God’s displeasure, for example, is he not including the Puritan community within a
physical and spiritual world in which their salvation is read from and is connected to the natural
world? On this point Turner is silent. He might assert that his argument of attributing this
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conceptual division between the natural world and human culture to the Puritans remains intact if
the natural world had value only so much as it fulfilled this utility to Puritan culture. On the
other hand, Turner’s call for an “American Garden” seems to hinge on the historical conception
of the wilderness/ garden dialectic in early American culture. Only here, however, Turner’s
“wilderness” that needs cultivating (or rehabilitating) is the late 20th century American landscape
of parking lots, suburbs, strip mines, and strip malls.
6

It is significant that Lowell is also the name of a prominent New England family with roots to
early American that includes the poet Robert Lowell and nineteenth-century poet and critic
James Russell Lowell.
7

It should be pointed out that, though the mission was aborted after a number of years, America,
the film suggests, is the only nation who attempted such a dramatic mission of conservation.
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CHAPTER FOUR
“WOLVERINES!” THE AMERICAN JEREMIAD AS COUNTERSUBVERSION
AND RESPONSE IN SCIENCE FICTION CINEMA 1980 TO THE PRESENT
“Demonization allows the countersubversive, in the name of battling the subversive, to
imitate his enemy.”
-Michael Rogin, Ronald Reagan, the Movie.
In a climactic scene in John Milius’s 1984 film of Soviet invasion of the American
heartland, Red Dawn, two brothers stand against the fence of a drive-in theater that has
been turned into a “re-education” camp. While iconic Soviet images (Lenin’s portrait,
etc.) appear in succession on the movie screen, the public announcement system drones
its message in the background: “America is a whorehouse where the revolutionary ideals
of your forefathers are corrupted and sold in alleys by vendors of capitalism.” Jed and
Matt Eckert stare in, shocked, looking for the imprisoned father they have not seen since
the Cuban and Russian troops parachuted in to their small Coloradoan town weeks
before. It is one of the film’s most memorable scenes. It is shocking, horrific, and
frightening. Here, something as American as a drive-in theater has become the site for
the indoctrination of, the film suggests, an obscene and foreign ideology. However, the
fascinating aspect of this scene and the key to understanding the rest of the film, is that
the drive-in/ Soviet re-education camp and Milius’ film are one in the same. They each
function in the same way. Both seek to indoctrinate their viewers with a set of cultural
narratives and political directives. Both seek to sap the political power from their
opponent’s rhetoric as they present their own as undeniably true and ubiquitous. In this
way, Red Dawn functions as a countersubversive text reflective of the resurgent political
conservatism of the 1980s and its re-embracing of a Manichean worldview, characteristic
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of the early Cold War, in foreign and domestic affairs. Red Dawn and similar
countersubversive films and texts promote particular and intensely partisan cultural
narratives at the same time that they advocate for particular notions of American identity.
In this way, these countersubversive texts participate in the American jeremiad tradition
in their use of warning rhetoric to articulate the dangers posed by political enemies and
their specifically termed conceptions of American identity and the nation’s preeminent
role in world affairs. In some cases, the jeremiad is used in a countersubversive manner
in order to foreclose dissent. In other cases, the jeremiad is used on the other side of the
argument as a response to attempts at countersubversion. As we will see in the case of
President Reagan’s insistence on the subtext of his acting career during his presidency,
such responses exploit the countersubversive text’s reliance on the slippery power and
primacy of the image in postmodern culture and throw into doubt the very notion of a
coherent political ideology or program, countersubversive or otherwise.
Standing before the fence, Jed and Matt see their father stagger up to them from
deep in the camp. Perhaps once a strong man, he is visibly worn down by his internment.
“I knew it,” he says, “You’re alive.” He takes a moment to examine them closely and
then his voice becomes wistful. “I was tough on both of you,” he explains, “I did things
that made you...hate me sometimes.” Summoning a fleeting strength and resolve, he asks,
“You understand now, don’t you?” It is perhaps a question that the film’s director, at the
film’s conclusion, is also asking of his audience. The following analysis will consider,
precisely, just what it is the viewer of a film like Red Dawn is supposed to understand.
Political countersubversion is naturally a slippery concept. How does one define
political efforts designed to be inconspicuous, whose very success is determined by the
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unfettered, uninterrupted continuation of the status quo? The very process of definition,
of articulating the limitations and reach of its influence, would precisely necessitate the
exact critical, oppositional stance that countersubversive efforts are supposed to
neutralize and render impotent. Add to this fact that such terms are not usually in the
public or political discourse. Michael P. Rogin, in his influential Ronald Reagan, the
Movie: and Other Episodes in Political Demonology, articulates the connection between
political demonization and the countersubversive tradition in an attempt to explain the
dearth of radical politics (or even a strong strain of dissent) in the American tradition.
Put simply, political demonology, says Rogin, describes the “creation of monsters as a
continuing feature of American politics by the inflation, stigmatization, and
dehumanization of political foes” (xiii). Citing such figures as the Indian cannibal, the
black rapist, the bomb-throwing anarchist, and the many-tentacled Communist
conspiracy, he illustrates how such images are employed by the countersubversive to
generate fear of the alien, to focus anxiety, and to foreclose dissent. Ultimately, Rogin is
interested in the effect such efforts have in creating a bond between the countersubversive
and his foe and the effects that such a manufactured bifurcation in political discourse has
had on American national identity.
Rogin focuses his discussion within the American tradition because, he asserts,
“American countersubversion has taken its shape from the pervasiveness of propertied
individualism in our political culture; the expansionist character of our history; and the
definition of American identity against racial, ethnic, class, and gender aliens” (xiv). For
evidence he turns, appropriately, to Sacvan Bercovitch’s work on the jeremiad and the
role early Puritan America had in articulating a distinct national identity. Here he
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summarizes Bercovitch’s assertion that Puritanism was responsible for erecting and
enforcing a middle-class consensus, effectively stigmatizing those outside its boundaries
(283). By the nineteenth century, asserts Rogin, this consensus fused with notions of
American identity that incorporated concepts of God, the nation, virulent westward
expansion, and the ego into what he terms as the imperial self.1 The dialectic between the
imperial self and the alien is the foundational tension of countersubversive political
discourse. “For then,” explains Rogin, “the contradictions derived at the center of
American life are located in the dark side of Americanism, the alien” (284).
Perhaps one of the clearest examples of political demonization and
countersubversion in American politics (and perhaps a means toward illustration and
definition) can be found in the nation’s policies towards Native Americans. Few other
examples stretch back as far to the beginnings of the nation. In the seventeenth century, in
what became known as the principle of expropriation, John Winthrop argued that since
the Native Americans did not utilize their land for agriculture (since they, in Winthrop’s
words failed to “subdue and replenish” the earth) their lands could be acquired by white
colonists (46). Displacement in one century led to disenfranchisement in the next. In the
newly formed nation, George Washington, for example, justified the federal
government’s expropriation of Native American lands by treaty-making by arguing “the
propriety of purchasing their lands in preference to attempting to drive them by force of
arms out of our country” (qtd in Rogin 46). In a telling comparison, he likened such
efforts to “driving the wild beasts of ye forests...both being beasts of prey tho’ they differ
in shape (qtd in Rogin 46). In addition, Rogin cites specifically the Dawes Severalty Act
of 1887. That act, which originally offered Native Americans the opportunity to become
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free Americans and the opportunity to own an allotment of lands previously held by their
tribes, eventually resulted in granting those lands to railroad, mining, and cattle interests.
In addition, the Dawes Severalty Act effectively diluted any possible cooperative political
power by the tribes: most clearly seen in the loss of treaty making rights between the
tribes and the federal government (47). This short history of Indian policy could not
present a clearer illustration of countersubversive efforts. After Native Americans were
literally disenfranchised (denied land and thrust out of the community) and then subdued
by force of arms, efforts were taken to render their political power impotent as well.
Their ability to function as a collective political entity, as a tribe with bargaining power
with the federal government, was diluted. Finally, sequestered on reservations, their
economic potential was limited to the point that, in 1983, Secretary of the Interior James
Watt complained of their “socialistic” dependence on the federal government (47).
First, in the personal sense, Rogin best defines and illustrates the bond between
the countersubversive and his foe through his analysis of Ronald Reagan. Partly a
psychoanalytic reading of Reagan’s understanding and appreciation of his own films and
their role in his own maturation and partly a critique of Ronald Reagan’s relationship
with his various film personas and his persona as head-of-state, Rogin’s reading attempts
to correlate seemingly contradictory facts of Reagan’s rhetoric and political policy.
Suggesting that the countersubversive “needs monsters to give shape to his anxieties and
to permit him to indulge his forbidden desires” Rogin illustrates this natural conflation
and imitation between the countersubversive and his foe by, for example, pointing out
Reagan’s support in the 1980s of the Nicaraguan Contras as a response to the subversive
efforts of the Sandinistas (xiii). Painting Nicaragua as a “Soviet ally on the American
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mainland” Reagan could then justify engaging in precisely the kind of political and
military action that he was demonizing. Rogin traces this particular brand of
countersubversion to developments during the Cold War. Through readings of popular
films during the post-World War Two era until 1964, he highlights three major
developments that contributed to this conflation between the countersubversive and the
subversive. First, the rise of the national security state sought to counter Soviet influence
by effectively imitating Soviet styles of surveillance (238). These films, writes Rogin,
“politicize privacy in the name of protecting it and thereby wipe it out” (245). Secondly,
in American culture, the family (and particularly the role of the mother) was
simultaneously glorified as the bastion of American values and feared as the possible site
of subversive contamination (with the film, My Son John in 1952, used as an example of
the susceptibility to subversion excessive mothering could engender). Finally, the
emergence of a mass culture that served to homogenize difference (effectively making
subversives difficult to identify by traditional race or class markers) (238).
It can be imagined, however, that these developments have had consequences for
American culture’s conception of its own identity. What the fiction of the twentieth
century bears out is a tension between both the insider/outsider dialectic that such
political and cultural developments have engendered and a view critical of being forced
into a Manichaean conception of the world. In other words, the films considered in the
following pages, to be sure, do highlight the “rigid insistence on difference” that Rogin
argues occurs at each countersubversive moment of history. However, these films also
appear to draw critical attention to this manufactured system of difference in national
identity formation. As we will see, these films, especially those from the late 1990s and
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early 2000s, engage this constructed opposition in ways that suggest a critical reappraisal
of its role in culture. When in Red Dawn, the 1984 film about a Soviet-Cuban invasion
of the American mainland, a dead man’s rifle is pulled from his lifeless hands just before
the camera rests on a bumper sticker that says “You can have my gun when you pry it
from my dead, cold fingers,” there is an unmistakeable element of critique as well
alongside an attempt at countersubversion. This film, such a scene suggests, takes a much
more critical, engaged position in considering those divisions engendered by
countersubversion in Cold War cultural discourse. What this scene illustrates is that
national identity is precisely what is at stake in such a struggle.
Ronald Reagan, after all, was fond of paraphrasing John Winthrop’s “city upon a
hill” metaphor when describing the nation. When Winthrop talked of the new American
community as something exceptional, when he spoke of the “city upon a hill,” he was
drawing attention to the tremendous burden that such a relationship meant for the
colonists. This was not so much a source of pride as it was a reminder to be humble. It
was no endorsement of their growing power and prominence but a charge to exercise it
for justice. People, after all, have no trouble seeing a city on a hill. Their actions are
easily judged. In his farewell speech in January 1989, Reagan invoked the metaphor one
last time and his interpretation is striking for its distinction from Winthrop’s:
I’ve spoken of the shining city all my political life, but I don’t know if I
ever quite communicated what I saw when I said it. But in my mind it
was a tall proud city built on rocks stronger than oceans, wind-swept,
God-blessed, and teeming with people of all kinds living in harmony and
peace. A city with free ports that hummed with commerce and creativity,
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and if there had to be city walls, the walls had doors and the doors were
open to anyone with the will and the heart to get here.[...]And how stands
the city on this winter night? More prosperous, more secure, and happier
than it was eight years ago. But more than that; after two hundred
years...she still stands strong and true on the granite ridge, and her glow
has held steady no matter what storm. And she’s still a beacon, still a
magnet for all who must have freedom, for all the pilgrims from all the
lost places who are hurtling through the darkness, toward home[...].
(“Farewell Address”)
Reagan’s “city” in other words, is the envy of the world; Winthrop’s, the nation’s charge
and burden. Such interpretations over America’s place in the world, whose nation it is,
and the nature of our national identity are still being fought over. A major weapon in
such a battle has been the invocation of the Frontier Myth in fiction since 1980.
The Reaganite Return to the Frontier
The Frontier as a geographical and conceptual phenomenon in American history
is, of course, not a place or thing to which one may return. By definition, once one has
been to the Frontier it has become knowable, charted, and domesticated. The frontier
perpetually exists at the border of what is knowable and the abyss of our ignorance. Few
concepts in American culture have been so closely studied and agonized over as the
influence of the Frontier on American identity formation. Richard Slotkin, in his trilogy
beginning with Regeneration Through Violence and ending with Gunfighter Nation charts
the Frontier Myth through the entirety of American history and finding it, for example,
determining policy towards Native Americans at the nation’s earliest moments and
152

influencing conceptions of national defense problems late into the twentieth century.
However, in the 1980s, something curious happens to this common way of mythologizing
America’s past. Suddenly, it became possible to go back to the Frontier. It is at this
intersection of national myth, political demagoguery, postmodernism and science fiction
that popular films from the era jockey over definitions of American identity and invoke
the Frontier Myth in both conventional and radical ways as a means to lay claim to what
being an American was to be about.
The Frontier Myth, as Slotkin defines it, explains the historical fact of the
conquest of the wilderness and the native peoples of the continent as the means to the
achievement of a “national identity, a democratic polity, an ever-expanding economy, and
a phenomenally dynamic and ‘progressive’ civilization” (Gunfighter Nation 10). The
original task of the myth in terms of ideology, says Slotkin, “was to explain and justify
the establishment of the American colonies” (10). However, as the colonies expanded
and developed, the Myth, Slotkin explains, “was called on to account for our rapid
economic growth, our emergence as a powerful nation-state, and our distinctively
American approach to the socially and culturally disruptive processes of
modernization” (10). For Slotkin, there are two primary characteristics to the Myth.
First, conflict (or violence) became a characterizing element of the myth due to the early
settlers’ struggle with both the natural environment and the native peoples. In addition,
the economic engine of the Anglo-American colonies ran on the displacement of native
societies and the enslavement of Africans (11). As a result, says Slotkin, “the ‘savage
war’ became a characteristic episode of each phase of westward expansion” (11).
Secondly, such violence is read as regenerative to successive generations that employ the
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Myth. The Puritans, for example, read spiritual regeneration from their conflicts with the
land and its inhabitants, the Jeffersonians saw it as a “democratic renewal of the original
‘social contract’,” and Jacksonian Americans read the conquest of the Frontier “as a
means to the regeneration of personal fortunes and/or of patriotic vigor and virtue” (12).
In each case, says Slotkin, “the Myth represented the redemption of American spirit or
fortune as something to be achieved by playing through a scenario of separation,
temporary regression to a more primitive or ‘natural’ state, and regeneration through
violence” (12).
In his earlier work, Slotkin explained the role of myth as a cultural phenomenon.
It is, says Slotkin, “simultaneously a psychological and a social activity...articulated by
individual artists and has its effects on the mind of the individual participant... [while] its
function is to reconcile and unite these individualities to a collective
identity” (Regeneration Through Violence 8). In this way, myth-making is essentially a
conservative exercise and depends, argues Slotkin, “on its ability to play on conscious
and unconscious memory, to invoke and relate all the narratives (historical and personal)
that we have inherited, and to reach back to the primal levels of individual and collective
psychology” (14). Slotkin emphasizes the regressive or outright destructive possibilities
of myth’s influence on culture. “A people unaware of its myths,” he says, “is likely to
continue living by them, though the world around that people may change and demand
changes in their psychology, their world view, their ethics, and their institutions” (5). In
Gunfighter Nation, Slotkin argues the effect the Myth had in promoting “bonanza
economics,” what he terms as the “acquisition of abundant resources without
commensurate inputs of labor and investment” (645). While this led to economic
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expansion during the Reagan administration, its benefits were distributed so unequally
that the number of persons living in poverty actually increased and the income and assets
of most of the population declined all while the richest Americans were acquiring a larger
share of the nation’s wealth (648). Foremost, then, Slotkin’s aim is to articulate the Myth
and its influence on contemporary culture as a means of warning against the power of
myth to “reach out of the past to cripple, incapacitate, or strike down the
living” (Regeneration 5).
Like Rogin, Slotkin identifies the 1980s as an exceptional time in American
culture due, in particular, to the myth-making/ myth-utilizing administration of Ronald
Reagan. He suggests that the beginning of the era was characterized by a crisis of public
myth. America, facing the trauma of defeat in Vietnam and the economic difficulties of
“stagflation” and the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973-74, was feared to have lost its
exceptional status among nations: of becoming a ‘second rate’ power (625). In other
words, the incoming administration believed that the mythological underpinnings of the
nation had been called into question in such a way that sapped the nation’s confidence.
This had implications in the arenas of economic, domestic, and foreign policy.
The Reagan administration began, as one of its primary goals, the task of
rehabilitating the nation’s foundational myths both as a campaign and political strategy
and as a means to generating support for actual policy goals. With his experience as an
actor, Reagan, as Rogin and Slotkin both point out, was ideal for such a role. Primarily,
the myth-makers of the Reagan Revolution, says Slotkin, sought to “overcome the
‘malaise’ of the 1970s...by substituting for the distressing memory of ‘the Sixties’ a
fictive replica of a simpler time: the ‘Happy Days’ when the Cold War was young and the
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world was divided between an ‘evil empire’ and a TV-pastoral...” (643). The ultimate
goal of these efforts, Slotkin argues, “was the systematic resanctification of the symbols
and rituals of ‘public myth’” (643). There is significant evidence, of course, that such
efforts did resonate within the culture. A television commercial from Reagan’s 1984
reelection campaign, popularly titled “Morning in America,” is commonly hailed as a
stroke of genius for its ability to symbolize and sanctify American work, wealth, and
progress. When Reagan died in 2004, the image that Time magazine chose for its
commemorative issue was the now iconic picture of Reagan in his Stetson. So iconic was
this image that erroneous references to Reagan primarily as a western/ cowboy actor
began to permeate the culture (though, like all actors of his generation, he surely did
appear in some films in the western genre). In fact, many of Reagan’s roles, such as
Storm Warning (1951) and Bedtime for Bonzo (1951) had him playing the young, liberal
intellectual.2 Much of Reagan’s mythos, this suggests, was retroactively written. Indeed,
it was Reagan’s uncanny ability to seamlessly include and invoke images of a heavily
nostalgic and stylized America (clearly influenced by the Frontier Myth) as a means of
articulating and advocating heavily ideologically determined policies, that made him a
savvy and persuasive politician and the focus of various works of cultural studies of the
era.
However, Reagan’s status as cultural myth-maker is made all the more dynamic
by the fact of his distance from the actual historical experience to which he incessantly
referred. Indeed, Slotkin contrasts Reagan’s claims to the cowboy persona to Teddy
Roosevelt’s (a President responsible for a substantial promotion of the Frontier Myth in
American culture). In contrast to Roosevelt’s actual deeds as a stockman, sheriff, and
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Rough Rider, Reagan’s claim to a heroic past was, as Slotkin puts it, “based entirely on
references to imaginary deeds performed in a purely mythic space” (644). However, this
is not meant to disparage Reagan’s persona as cowboy-President but to highlight a
thoroughly dynamic, postmodern moment in the Frontier Myth in American culture.
According to Slotkin, “the myths produced by mass culture have become credible
substitutes for actual historical or political action in authenticating the character and
ideological claims of political leaders” (644). This slippage appropriately coincides with
the unhinging of the Frontier Myth from its historical anchor within the genre of the
Western in popular cinema (633). In other words, the fundamental assertions of the
Frontier Myth became separated from the context of their historical past. Instead, they
began showing up in the generic successors to the Western:
The “post-western” genre map suggests that, while the Western may no
longer provide the most important of our ideological symbolic languages,
the underlying mythic structures it expressed remain more or less intact.
Action in the imagined world of myth-symbolic play still takes the form of
captivities and rescues, still invokes the three-part opposition in which the
American hero stands between the extremes of bureaucratic order and
savage license, and still requires a racial symbolism to express the most
significant ideological differences. What has been lost is not the
underlying myth but a particular set of historical references that tied a
scenario of heroic action to a particular version of American national
identity. (642)
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I quote Slotkin’s explanation of what aspects of the myth survive and appear in successor
genres because, as we will soon see, it is science fiction’s fierce assertion of these aspects
of the Frontier Myth that suggest a haggling over conceptions of American identity
during the 1980s and well into the first years of the twenty-first century. These
distinctions, therefore, will be instrumental to this chapter’s later reading of
representative films from the period.
This shearing between actual historical experience and myth, a thoroughly
postmodern moment in which claims by political leaders or cultural texts (such as film)
are authenticated by myth and not by any basis in historical fact is worth considering for
a moment. Again, the primary issue at stake here is America’s conception of itself after
the trauma of Vietnam. The clearest example of how this new relationship between
politics and myth functions can be seen in how political leaders and popular culture tried
to explain the nation’s defeat in that conflict. One common theme in the war movies of
the 1980s that dealt with Vietnam directly was a re-situating of blame for defeat in
Vietnam on liberal politicians and inept bureaucrats who betrayed the military (650).
This conception reaches its ridiculous fever pitch in Rambo: First Blood Part II (1985)
(in which John Rambo returns to Vietnam to rescue prisoners of war left behind) when
Rambo asks Colonel Troutman, “Can we win this time, sir?” Such a conception of the
war’s outcome, says Slotkin, was echoed by Reagan (who Slotkin calls the chief
spokesman for the revisionist history of the war) who frequently represented American
involvement in Vietnam as a “noble, unselfish struggle that could have ended in victory if
only the liberal politicians in Washington had not tied the hands of the military” (649).
However, the clearest example of how this shearing between historical experience and
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myth leads to authenticating the ideological claims of political leaders is President
George H. W. Bush’s assertion that the Gulf War rehabilitated the defeat in Vietnam
(652). While for many Americans victory in the Gulf War lessened the sting of defeat
and restored confidence in the military to the American people, Slotkin’s point is that
Bush poses this relationship in “exclusively mythic terms” (652). In other words, Slotkin
asserts that President Bush substitutes a conventional rationale for war, as a means to a
necessary end or as a defense of vital interests or principals, for a conception of war “as a
cure for the illness of our imagination- to erase the discomforting memory of our
historical experience of error and defeat, and to substitute in its place the lie of ‘symbolic
victory’” (652). Understanding myth’s new status in political rhetoric and policy is
essential to understanding films of the 1980s and, later, of the early twenty-first century
that utilize political allegory and myth to advance particular variations and interpretations
of American national identity. In other words, they work to refashion those myths as
arguments for just what kind of Americans we ought to be.
Countersubversion and the American Jeremiad in 1980s Film
As Slotkin showed in the Rambo and Missing in Action films, the frontier
narrative continued to shape the ways that Americans conceived of their past and current
conflicts at the same time that, as Rogin argued, a resurgent conservatism sought to
control and eliminate opposition and dissent in cultural as well as political arenas. Before
moving into a discussion about how all three of these concepts converge in Red Dawn
and other popular texts of the 1980s, it would be helpful to illustrate how
countersubversion was already in play in other genres.
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According to Mark Winokur, the comedy films of the 1980s, for example, were
characterized by a general erasure of “the history of blacks in America in the
eighties” (195). Noting that, under the Reagan administration, African Americans and
other minorities “saw a gradual erosion of the civil rights gained and consolidated in the
fifties and sixties,” Winokur sees a strategy of racial passing that occurred in the films of
the 1980s as a way of gaining “token inclusion into the essentially white society those
films depict” (194-5). For example, Winokur sees the rise of The Cosby Show as an
example of “a particular rewriting of American history as including only those blacks
who are really white- [with] success, upward mobility, and virility defined as white- and
exclusion of blacks who are black” (195). The problem with Winokur’s reading is that it
does not allow that the African Americans on the Cosby Show, that of an African
American middle and upper class, are, in fact, “black” too. In this sense, he has
committed the same error for which he criticizes the show: reducing the experience of
African Americans to a single, simplified category that is not representative of the
African American experience in America. In another example, he points to Eddie
Murphy’s performance in Beverly Hills Cop (1988), which depends greatly on Murphy’s
imitation and “faking” (200). In the course of the film Murphy pretends to be a reporter,
an effete homosexual, a customs agent, black-marketeer, a truck driver, and a florist
delivery person. Winokur rightly points out that Murphy/Foley “is constantly explaining
his presence as a black man” and notes that Murphy is, in fact, the only significant black
man in the film” (200).
This argument extends to other genres as well. Back to the Future (1985) is an
interesting example. Winokur illustrates the next logical step in his point about the
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disappearance of African Americans from 1980s film by pointing out the film’s attempt at
a cultural revision. In one of Back to the Future’s famous scenes, Michael J. Fox leads
the band playing at the high school dance in a 1980s and Van Halen inspired version of
“Johnny B. Goode.” Because we discover that Marty (Fox) has unwittingly played this
version in front of Chuck Berry’s cousin, Winokur reads this moment as a rewriting of the
history of rock and roll that is somehow more agreeable (202). The scene, he says,
“reflects a desire on the part of white America to have been less beholden to black culture
(among others) for the structure of its own culture” (202). This fact, Winokur suggests,
speaks to the film’s overall attempt to roll back American culture to a time more palatable
to whites. He points to Robert Zemekis’ nostalgia in this and at least two other films, I
Wanna Hold Your Hand (1978) and Who Framed Roger Rabbit? (1988), conspicuously
set “a few years after the trauma of war and its attendant racial tensions, [and] a few years
before the trauma of the civil rights movement” (204). On the other hand, in both Back
to the Future and Who Framed Roger Rabbit?, the present, notes Winokur “is offered to
us as an insane future” to be avoided or, in the case of Back to the Future, altered into a
kind of Reaganite utopia (205). The time travel scheme of the film writes out the
experience of the 1960s and bridges the 1950s and the 1980s directly. It is significant,
then, that one of the most popular television shows of the later years of the decade,
Quantum Leap (1989-1993) promised to “put right what once went wrong.”
Red Dawn, the 1984 film written and directed by John Milius, may be one of the
strangest and most recognizable cult films to emerge from the 1980s. Clearly in the vein
of alternate history science fiction, Red Dawn is the story of a Russian-Cuban sneak
attack on the United States. It follows a band of high school students who become
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guerilla fighters when their town, Calumet, Colorado, is overrun by Russian-CubanNicaraguan allied forces. They are led by Jed Eckert (Patrick Swayze) to sabotage,
ambush, and harass enemy forces and to hide and survive off the land in the nearby
ranges of the Rocky Mountains. At the film’s end, many have been killed by counterinsurgent forces. The remaining members, comprised primarily of the film’s three biggest
stars (Swayze, Charlie Sheen, and Lea Thompson), stage a daring assault on the Soviet
headquarters in the town center. The Eckert brothers (Swayze and Sheen) die in the
attack and Erica (Thompson) and Danny (Brad Savage) escape to Free America. The film
ends with Thompson’s voice over discussing the nature of their sacrifice as the camera
lingers over Partisan Rock: the rock face-turned-monument where the guerillas etched the
names of those who died.
Red Dawn has received little attention from scholars. There are many reasons for
this. Certainly, the film is, by no measure, considered an exceptional achievement in
formal composition. Its basic premise of Soviet invasion is neither profound nor unique;
having been done nearly fifty years before in other Cold War films. Finally, its intensely
paranoid vision of the future and its staunchly conservative assertions can appear
uncomplicated and off-putting. However, Red Dawn has undeniably attained cult film
status, having seemingly engendered an unmistakeable level of passion among its fans.
In the following pages I argue that the film, in fact, says a great deal about the political
moment in which it was released. Red Dawn can best be understood as a
countersubversive film reflecting the anxieties and aims of a resurgent political
conservatism in the 1980s. Like the jeremiads discussed in earlier chapters, Red Dawn
(and similar texts and films) packaged a polemic about the state of contemporary
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American society along with particular and intensely partisan notions of American
cultural identity and assertions about the nation’s place in the world.
From the first moments of Red Dawn the film makes clear that its complaint, its
warning message, is politically determined. With ominous chords playing in the
background, yellow font on black title cards explain the state of foreign affairs that led to
the invasion:
-Soviet Union Suffers Worst Wheat Harvest in 55 Years.
-Labor and Food Riots in Poland. Soviet Troops Invade.
-Cuba and Nicaragua Reach Troop Strength Goals of 500,000. El Salvador
and Honduras Fall.
-Greens Party Gains Control of West German Parliament. Demands
Withdrawal of Nuclear Weapons from European Soil.
-Mexico Plunged into Revolution.
-NATO Dissolves. United States Stands Alone.
These are important not only because they set the political stage for the film’s invasion,
but because they give a glimpse into how the film defines the kind of world in which
such an invasion is possible. The opening title card, explaining the failure of the Soviet
wheat harvest as impetus for the film’s events, suggests the film’s investment in political
realism (in which international relations among states are governed by a struggle for
power and security as opposed to ethics or ideals) and a pessimism over the efficacy of
international institutions. This is borne out in the final title card in which the image of
America, standing alone against a hostile world, invokes the frontier narrative and the
notion of America as Rooseveltian Rough Rider. Interestingly, this comparison is made
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explicit as the film’s opening scenes of the beautiful landscape of the American West and
establishing shots of the town of Calumet give way to an actual statue of Theodore
Roosevelt in the town’s center entitled “Rough Rider.” The monument comes complete
with an inscription that the camera lingers over for a moment: “Far better it is to dare
mighty things than to take rank with those poor timid spirits who know neither victory
nor defeat.” While the film means this to foreshadow the struggle of the Calumet
guerrillas, the “Wolverines” as they come to call themselves, the inscription also serves to
reinforce assertions of America’s greatness (staunchly unapologetic) in fashion in popular
and political culture when the film was released in August of 1984. The explicit
reference to Roosevelt and the early definition of the political landscape both signal the
film’s effort to term American hopes and problems in specific ways.
Nowhere is this clearer than in the warnings the film makes to contemporary
society about how America became so vulnerable to invasion. Very much in the tradition
of Cold War films (and, it would seem, in the tradition of American frontier narrative), in
addition to the invading forces, the film suggests that America’s troubled state is also the
result of various failings from within. Before settling into its guerrilla resistance
narrative, the film functions as a kind of list of warnings, a hodgepodge of conservative
criticisms of American society that make it vulnerable to attack. In this way, the film’s
polemic, as we have seen a major characteristic of the jeremiad, functions to subvert the
politics with which it disagrees. Some are rather overt. The previously mentioned scene,
invoking the well-known pro-gun motto (eventually turned into a bumper sticker), is
perhaps the most overt. That scene, its unabashed support for a particular interpretation
of the second amendment, is followed later in the film by another pro-gun moment that
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tries to illustrate the danger of gun registration. In the midst of the Cuban-Russia attack
on the town, Commander Bella (the Cuban commander) tells a Russian subordinate to
“obtain form 4473” because it “will contain descriptions of weapons and lists of private
ownership.” This example is distinguished from the earlier pro-gun moment in its
countersubversive attempt to, instead of advocating a pro-gun position, sap the political
support for gun registration. After all, the film seems to say, in case of invasion, that is
exactly what the Russians will count on. Perhaps this is not a particularly powerful or
persuasive effort, but it does signal a rhetorical stance taken throughout the film. It
should be noted that this particular scene is made all the more amusing coming, as it
does, in the middle of Cuban-Russian efforts to take the town center in the midst of an
air-raid attack by American helicopters. Clearly, the film suggests, registration lists are a
priority of those who wish America harm.
Red Dawn is filled with so many similar moments and they are each significant
because they suggest a return to the jeremiad’s covenant rhetoric. The good community
will behave in ways presented by the film. On the other hand, the bad community, the
one not fulfilling its charge, behaves in these ways (thus illustrating them in the film’s
characteristic warning rhetoric). For example, just as in the Rambo and Missing in Action
series, Red Dawn warns against betrayal by conniving, treacherous politicians. Early in
the film, Mayor Bates (Lane Smith), betrays the families of the members of the guerrilla
outfit, leading to their execution, because, he explains, troublemaking “runs in some of
the families.” Later in the film, when the Wolverines are inexplicably tracked by the
Russian counterinsurgent forces, it is discovered that Daryl, Mayor Bates’ son and
Calumet Student Body President, swallowed a homing device after he was turned in to
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the authorities by his father. While some characters are sympathetic to the fact that Daryl
was betrayed by his father and forced to eat the device, Jed, furiously complains that
Daryl “went and got caught.” Though he cannot bring himself to kill Daryl, Robert,
whose growing fanaticism has begun to trouble even the Air Force officer that has since
joined the group, shoots and kills Daryl with little or no remorse. What should be an
excruciatingly difficult moment in the film amounts to only a quick nod at any moral
complexity in the situation. In doing so, the film presents Robert’s actions as regrettable
but necessary. Daryl, it must be remembered, was the character who, earlier in the film,
tried to usurp Jed’s authority over the group. Referencing his position as class president
and attempting to appeal to some form of democracy (asking that the group vote), Daryl
argued that the group should surrender. This fact, taken along with Mayor Bates’
betrayal, conforms to a common trope in films of the post-Vietnam era. The redemption
of national honor that is the central desire of these films requires, in addition to defeating
the guerillas of the previous conflict via a reversal of roles, the defeat of the domestic
enemy, the American politician or official who, these films contend, stabbed the soldiers
in the back and kept them from winning the war (Gunfighter Nation 650). However, it is
ironic that the very same form of government that the film strongly praises in its patriotic
fervor and is contrasted with the authoritarian Soviet style, is cast aside by the Wolverines
in favor of Jed’s unquestioned dictatorship. This, of course, speaks to Rogin’s point
about the desire of the countersubversive to imitate his enemy. However, it should be
noted that in another significant way the film participates in the desire for national
redemption that is a trope of the frontier narrative and the post-Vietnam films.
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That trope, of course, is the captivity/ rescue narrative. Slotkin terms it the “cult of
the POWs/ MIAs” that emerged in popular film during the Reagan years (649). In these
films, there is what Slotkin calls an “obsessive repetition of the rescue fantasy” that
“makes them seem like rituals for transforming the trauma of defeat into a symbolic
victory” (649). Indeed, there is a great deal of captivity and subsequent rescue in Red
Dawn. Overall, it could be said that the narrative itself functions in this way as the
Wolverines attempt to liberate their besieged Calumet. There are more obvious
examples, though. The two girls, Erica (Lea Thompson) and Toni (Jennifer Grey) were
sexually assaulted by Russian officers, the audience is told, on their way to Calumet.
While the details of the assault are left hazy (no doubt to suggest the worst possible
transgression), this fact provides a constant subtext for their characters and the impetus
for their involvement in the resistance.
The primary example of the captivity/rescue trope in the film brings us back to the
re-education camp. In what is the most daring attack of the film, the Wolverines liberate
the drive-in camp. It is an interesting scene for how closely in dialogue it is with the
frontier and captivity narratives. Richard Slotkin defines the captivity narrative, the
oldest American rescue fantasy, as a narrative in which “a single individual, usually a
woman stands passively under the strokes of evil, awaiting rescue by the grace of
God” (Regeneration Through Violence 94). “The sufferer,” he continues, “represents
the...chastened body of Puritan society; and the temporary bondage of the captive to the
Indian is dual paradigm-of the bondage of the soul to the flesh and to the temptations
arising from original sin...and the self-exile of the English Israel from England” (94). In
those early narratives, once freed, men who had fallen to captivity were feared or
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mistrusted: seen as weak and too willing to embrace Indian life (Lepore 129). Of course,
one recent example, John Ford’s The Searchers is widely held as the greatest artistic
expression of the captivity narrative in modern American culture. Red Dawn brings this
point into sharp focus when, upon first attacking the camp, the Wolverines hand out
weapons to the prisoners, remilitarizing them. Jed drives the point home: “We’re all
going to die. Die standing up!” While there is little that is original about this command (it
could easily be spoken in a number of war films), its effect in this film is to immediately
invest those prisoners with a new identity. On Jed’s calling, they are no longer
downtrodden, passive vessels for Soviet indoctrination, but soldiers with nothing to lose.
This point speaks to what is, perhaps, the most important function the film seeks to
perform. Red Dawn is, ultimately, a film about American identity and American
exceptionalism.
To say that Red Dawn is a nationalistic film would be to simplify and homogenize
its particular brand of patriotic fervor. That is not to say that it misses an opportunity to
evoke standard American images and icons. The “Battle Hymn of the Republic” and
“America the Beautiful” figure prominently in the film. The American flag appears at the
film’s beginning and in its final shot. In addition, the concept of American
exceptionalism is unabashedly promoted throughout the film. After all, against extremely
poor odds, America repels the Russian invaders and wins the war. The film’s final image,
of a monument erected in honor of the Wolverines and others who fought in the cause, is
evidence of this fact. This point is made all the more important by the fact that America,
it seems, is the only nation with the will to challenge the invaders. When Col. Andy
Tanner joins the group he brings with him information on the state of the war. In his
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briefing, Tanner explains that Europe is “sitting this one out.” “I guess they figured twice
in one century was enough,” he says. The only ally left is Great Britain and they, Tanner
explains, “won’t last very long.” In other words, not only is America exceptional in its
ability to conduct the war, but, more importantly, in its will to oppose the invader. This
point is driven home in one of the film’s more histrionic scenes. Just before the Calumet
citizens betrayed by Mayor Bates are executed, they begin singing “America the
Beautiful.” As they reach the song’s chorus (“America, America...”), they are shot down
by the Russian tank. Taken alongside Jed and Matt’s father’s final words at the drive-in/
re-education camp (“Avenge me, son, avenge me!”), these examples illustrate an
unwavering patriotism and will to resist. However, Red Dawn is very specific about what
kind of American it is valorizing and what kind of American it suggests we all should be.
Here, the figure of Theodore Roosevelt and the frontier narrative loom large. Red
Dawn’s American is self-reliant to the point, perhaps, of being isolationist, severely
masculine, and, when necessary, ferociously violent. This assessment is best illustrated
through the characters Jed and Robert.
Jed (Patrick Swayze) is, of course, the group’s leader. At the beginning of the
film we learn that he is out of school but not in college (therefore not too educated, the
film suggests) and that, like his younger brother Matt (Charlie Sheen) he too played
football (quarterback even). He is quick to respond to the crisis and it is because he
returns to the besieged high school that the other major characters survive to eventually
become the Wolverines. It is his idea to stock up on supplies and head for the mountains
where, he explains, he has hunted and camped for years with his father. As the narrative
progresses it is because of his stern leadership that the group survives, learning how to
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hunt and, more importantly, how not to get caught. Upon returning to Calumet to see the
state of the town since the invasion (which brings us to the scene at the re-education
camp), it is Jed’s idea to begin an armed resistance. For the most part, Jed’s leadership is
shown to be just and effective. It is only after the group is betrayed by Daryl that they
incur any substantial losses. His final act as their leader involves a bold attack on the
town that results in his and his brother’s death. However, the film portrays this as an
unselfish sacrifice to assure Danny and Erica’s escape and safe passage to Free America.
If this all seems a good deal familiar and not a little trite, it is because Jed is very much in
the tradition of American western heroes. Even in the scene in which he and the others
are betrayed, he is compassionate and cannot bring himself to kill Daryl. However, this
scene presents an opportunity to distinguish Jed from another American type offered in
the film.
Robert (C. Thomas Howell) is the film’s most memorable character because of his
unsettling fanaticism. It is Robert that kills Daryl without reservation. It is also Robert
who delivers the film’s most memorable line. When Col. Andy Tanner (Powers Booth)
sees him etching marks for his kills into the stock of his weapon, he tells Robert, “All that
hate’s gonna burn you up, kid.” “It keeps me warm,” Robert replies with a smile. After
the group ambushes its first small group of Russian soldiers (who are sightseeing in
Araphaho National Forest), Danny, the youngest of the group, is clearly troubled by
killing them. “They were people,” he says, clearly trying to work out the morality of it
all. “So was my dad,” Robert responds coldly. At the film’s end, Robert dies in a
suicidal standoff with a Soviet helicopter and his act of self-immolation serves as an
appropriate end to his role in the film.
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The film suggests that Robert is a type of American that necessarily emerges in
these kinds of situations. That is to say, the film sees the emergence of a character like
Robert as necessary and unproblematically appropriate to a national invasion or,
presumably, any other equally justifiable American military adventure. However, such an
uncomplicated endorsement should give pause. Harvey Greenberg, for example,
questions the psychological and cultural effect of using popular forms (film) to
“recuperate the narcissistic injuries sustained by America in its Indochinese
experience” (63). Along with Uncommon Valor (1982) and Top Gun (1986), he reads
these films as an example of a rise, in the Post-Vietnam period, of an uncritical patriotism
(which he erroneously identifies as New Decaturism, named after the nineteenth century
American Naval hero who famously said, “My country, may she always be in the right,
but right or wrong, my country!”) (qtd in Greenberg 63). In this particular instance,
Greenberg seemingly misunderstands Decatur and what is actually an older, more modest
understanding of loyalty to one’s country. What Greenberg means to highlight is an
uncritical patriotism, in which a country is equated with a morally absolute cause, that he
sees as an inevitable slide towards moral disorientation. The clearest example is found
in the role reversal of soldier and guerilla that is characteristic to this genre of films and
articulated by Slotkin as the latest iteration of the frontier narrative. Just as in the Rambo
and Missing in Action films, Red Dawn has shifted the American soldier into the role of
the savage guerilla. Here, a character like Robert is unrestrained by ethical or political
limits to do his worst to the invader. For this, he is applauded and cheered by the film and
not a small number of viewers. By portraying Robert in a heroic light, as some kind of
new American ideal, Red Dawn falls in line with what Greenberg refers to as “bellwether
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productions of popular culture [that] seem to be clearing the way for yet another
generation of American youth to be enlisted in yet another dubious foreign
adventure” (69). Perhaps, but what this situation makes excruciatingly clear is that the
frontier narrative continues to structure our understanding of our conflicts and our roles at
the same time that the jeremiad is enlisted to demand even greater vigilance to these
slippery directives.
Science Fiction and the Postmodern Response
Films like Red Dawn, First Blood/ Rambo, and Missing in Action soon
disappeared from the box office. In 1987, ABC aired a twelve-hour mini-series called
Amerika, set roughly a decade after a Soviet takeover of America. Preachy, stiflingly
serious, and tardy (airing in the last year of the Reagan presidency), Amerika, one
observer joked, may “have extended the Cold War by roughly twelve hours” (Conelrad).
By then, it seems, the party was over and by the time that Starship Troopers (1997), Paul
Verhoeven’s surprisingly ironic take on the classic, militaristic Heinlein novel, was
released, such films were impossible. The change, it seems, was the rise of
postmodernism in popular film and television. Such partisan advocacy in films and
television was unlikely and ineffective in a world in which shows like the highly popular
X-Files pointed out the inconsistencies and instabilities of identity, experience, reasoning
and other problems of epistemology coming to the forefront in the 1990s. That is not to
say that the jeremiad disappeared from the popular films of the era, but rather that it
adapted to account for the disruption, confusion and pessimism characteristic to
narratives erected in response to those earlier films and the political narratives of the
time.
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Discussing postmodernism is a slippery exercise. The concept itself challenges
definition. However, in the following analysis, several key aspects of postmodernism will
be discussed and, to make this discussion as precise as possible, a few basic
characteristics of postmodern literature and film are offered here having been adopted
from Keith Booker’s helpful discussion on the relationship between postmodernism and
science fiction. One of postmodernism’s primary characteristics is an intense suspicion
of totalizing metanarratives that grew out of the trauma of World War II, the realization of
the immorality and brutality of colonialism, and the dizzying, rapid growth of technology
during the war (23). Because of this rapid pace of change in the post-war era, there
emerged an increasing sense of the instability of personal identity accompanied by
growing alienation (24). This bewildering pace of change instilled subsequent
generations with a sense of loss of historical continuity. They, as Booker concisely puts it,
“increasingly felt that they were living in unprecedented situations to which the
experience of the past was irrelevant” (24). Next, a loss of faith in historical
metanarratives led to a weakening of the utopian imagination. This led, says Booker, to
an anxiety over the fact that “terrifying change was accompanied by an equally horrifying
sense that, within the routinized context of late capitalism, nothing ever really changes at
all” (24). This point will become excruciatingly clear when the discussion turns to the
2006 film, Children of Men. The final point relevant to this discussion is the
problematization of polar oppositions (Good versus Evil/ Us versus Them) through which
Western society had defined itself. The following analysis intends to show how these
factors engendered a generation of films in response to the countersubversive films of the
1980s and the geo-political events of the 1990s and 2000s.
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In his influential essay, “Progress versus Utopia, or, Can We Imagine the Future,”
Frederic Jameson argues that science fiction, in presenting its various possible futures,
does not actually attempt to imagine one “real” future, but insists instead on re-situating
our understanding of the present, that “its multiple mock futures serve the quite different
function of transforming our own present into the determinate past of something yet to
come” (288). This serves to estrange the present and Jameson points to a number of
works, by John Wyndham, Larry Niven, and Philip K. Dick, that employ “a process of
distraction and displacement, repression and lateral perceptual renewal” and “elaborate
strategies of indirection...therefore necessary if we are somehow to break through
our...insulation and to ‘experience,’ for some first and real time, this ‘present’” (287).
This is similar, says Jameson, to the function performed by the mysteries of Dashiell
Hammett and Raymond Chandler. In those novels, the mystery plot, with all of its
puzzles and suspense, is a blind that distracts so that “the intolerable space of Southern
California can enter the eye laterally, with its intensity undiminished” (287). “SF,” says
Jameson, “thus enacts and enables a structurally unique ‘method’ for apprehending the
present as history” (288). Taken in aggregate, these renewed, contextualized
understandings of the present move us toward utopia. In other words, our attempts to
conceptualize utopian or dystopian futures, having estranged and invigorated our
understanding of the actual present, allow for a kind of success by failure. They serve,
says Jameson, “to serve as unwitting and even unwilling vehicles for meditation...a
contemplation of our own absolute limits” (289). This an ultimately hopeful situation
because, he argues, it suggests that the present is not seized, immobile forever, in some
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‘end of history,’ but move[s] steadily in time towards some unimaginable yet inevitable
‘real’ future” (288).
Therefore, this function places science fiction in an important role in its ability to
address the challenges of postmodernism. Postmodernism, as it is defined by Jameson, is
the concluding phase of the bourgeois cultural revolution: which he defines as “the
process whereby the definitive establishment of a properly capitalist mode of
production...reprograms and utterly restructures the values, life rhythms, cultural habits,
and temporal sense of its subjects” (284). As Jameson explained in a subsequent work,
postmodernism is the cultural situation in which:
[...]Late capitalism has all but succeeded in eliminating the final loopholes
of nature and the Unconscious, of subversion and the aesthetic, of
individual and collective praxis alike, and, with a final filip, in eliminating
any memory trace of what thereby no longer existed in the henceforth
postmodern landscape. (Late Marxism 5)
In addition, the critique of postmodernism can be understood as “an attempt to think the
present historically in an age that has forgotten how to think historically in the first
place” (Postmodernism ix). However, it is science fiction’s ability to break through what
Jameson calls the “monadic insulation” of contemporary culture and this process of
contemplating the present through imagining the future that he argues gives science
fiction a profound and unique role in addressing postmodern culture and offers,
ultimately, a degree of optimism in its movement toward utopia (287). The following
films, though dystopian in nature, provide precisely this sort of movement by refocusing
on and recontextualizing our attention to the present.
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This is the accomplishment of the 2006 film Children of Men, Alfonso Cuarón’s
adaptation of the P.D. James novel.3 The film presents a future world in which human
beings can no longer reproduce and follows Theo (Clive Owen) as he attempts to help a
pregnant woman, Kee (Clare-Hope Ashitey), make her way out of the tortured,
decimated, warring English landscape to a rendezvous with a group of scientists known
as “The Human Project.” At first glance, Children of Men would appear to present
problems for interpreting it as a twenty-first century American jeremiad. The film’s
production history certainly frustrates an attempt to place the film within the American
tradition. Cuarón, who gained no small amount of critical acclaim for his film Y tu mama
tambien (2001), is Mexican. This film, adapted from British novelist P.D. James’s book
of the same title, features Clive Owen, Chiwetel Ejiofor, Michael Caine, Clare-Hope
Ashitey (all British) and Juliane Moore (the lone American). Finally, the film’s setting is,
of course, England.
Furthermore, the film seems to directly address and dismiss overt moralizing and
spiritual condemnation. Early in the film, as Theo makes his way to visit an influential
cousin who will help him get transit papers to make their trek across the English
countryside, his car passes by a mass of people who are kneeling and holding signs that
read “Repent!”. A man on a loudspeaker preaches: “Earthquakes! Pollution! Disease and
Famine! Our Sins have encouraged God’s wrath, and in his anger he has taken away his
most precious gift to us!” Before Cuarón cuts away, the camera rests on wall graffiti that
reads: “Infertility is God’s punishment!” It would be a sobering scene if Cuarón had not
invited viewers to dismiss it in an earlier one. As Theo goes to visit an old friend, Jasper,
they talk briefly about Theo’s love life and a woman from his past:
176

Theo. She, uh, decided to renounce.
Jasper. Renouncers? Are those the ones that kneel down for a month for
salvation?
Theo. No, they’re the repenters. The renouncers flagellate themselves for
the forgiveness of humanity.
Jasper. Oh, right. Dating ain’t what it used to be, is it amigo? [laughs]
In so doing, Cuarón frustrates any desire to read the film as an overt allegory in the same
way that, say, a text like Jericho can be interpreted. However, there is no denying that
Children of Men is a film that attempts to say something about the major political issues
of its day. A reading by Slovoj !i"ek, that accompanies the film’s DVD release, sheds
light on how the film comments on and participates in contemporary political discourse.
In !i"ek’s reading, Children of Men is characterized, much like Cuarón’s Y tu
mama tambien, by a tension in its formal composition between foreground and
background. He argues that “the true focus of the film is...the background and it’s crucial
to leave it as the background” (“Children of Men Comments by Slovaj !i"ek”). This is
necessary, he says, because of a fundamental paradox in the film that he calls
“anamorphosis.” He explains, “if you look at the thing too directly, the oppressive social
dimension, you don’t see it. You can see it in an oblique way only if it remains in the
background.” Therefore, under !i"ek’s reading, such tension exists on an allegorical level
between the major political issues of the film’s day (immigration, terrorism, pollution)
and their symbolic appearances in the background of the film. The film provides a
tension between the shadowy, ill-defined symbolic references to such problems that exist
in the film and the concrete referents in the world of the viewer. This is important
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because, for !i"ek, these problems are but symptomatic of the “true despair of the film:
[...]the ideological despair of late capitalism, of a society without history.” So, for
example, !i"ek argues that the Ark of the Arts, a collection of the world’s great art that
was saved from annihilation and maintained by Theo’s cousin, symbolizes this “very lack
of meaningful historical experience” in having, for example, Michaelangelo’s David
removed completely from its cultural context. Such an emphasis on the broader,
overarching problem of the historical experience of late capitalism is only maintained,
says !i"ek, “precisely because it doesn’t directly make some kind of political, moralistic
parable.”
In essence, !i"ek reads the film as a jeremiad against the economic, cultural, and
social conditions caused by late capitalism. In the same way that the Puritans did not
look to droughts, attacks by Native Americans, and the secular behavior of the younger
generation as the source of their misfortune, nor does !i"ek see pollution, immigration,
and terrorism as the contemporary source of despair. Both looked to a larger, overarching
cause. The Puritans looked inward and blamed their misery on a lack of spiritual
vigilance and a failure to uphold the convenant. The film, !i"ek argues, finds a more
contemporary fountainhead.
However, this does not completely explain how Children of Men functions as
jeremiad within the American tradition. After all, as previously mentioned, so many of
the production facts of the film resist this reading. Consider, though, that if the
fundamental problem proposed by the film is the ideological despair of late capitalism, is
such despair not, by virtue of the definition of the economic functions of late capitalism,
particularly its emphasis on increasing globalization, universal to all western capitalist
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economies? In other words, in an increasingly globalized economy, how is such despair
limited by national borders? In fact, !i"ek argues the exact opposite of this point by
saying that England is the only place that such despair can be felt. He attributes this to
the fact that England does not have a constitution but, instead, relies on its substance of
traditions. He argues that “in such a country, the loss of this historical dimension, the loss
of this substance of meaning is felt much worse.” Perhaps so, but it seems naive to
underestimate the degree to which British and American economic and political policy
came to mirror one another in the decade in which Children of Men was released (even
among political parties that, on paper, should be substantially distinguished).
Furthermore, this says nothing of the degree to which American and British culture
coalesced over the fundamental issue during the decade: the War on Terrorism/ The Iraq
War. In this light, Children of Men functions in much of the same way as On the Beach.
The film’s setting and principle characters, because they are raced as predominantly
western and white, are easy stand-ins for Americans, American cities and American
audiences (to whom, it seems, this complaint is being made). Consider, for example, that
among the images that float unfocused in the background throughout the film, the images
that come into sharp focus during an early scene with Theo, Jasper, and his wife, are
photos of a demonstration with signs that clearly read “Don’t Attack Iraq,” “Get the
U.S.A. Out of [illegible]” and “BU$H” (with a bloodstained splat across the font): signs
clearly in the American consciousness from various domestic demonstrations before and
during the Iraq War. Jasper’s wife, Janice, the audience learns from the newspaper
clipped to the wall, was a journalist that was tortured by MI5; a clear conflation of the
concern over torture techniques used in the terrorist detainee camp at Guantanamo Bay,
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Cuba and the two journalists, Matthew Cooper and Judith Miller, who were threatened
with imprisonment for refusing to disclose their sources in the 2005 Valerie Plame leak
case. In addition, the film’s emphasis on illegal immigration, on “fugees” as they are
called in the film, is indicative of the polarizing national debate in the United States (just
before the film’s release) on illegal immigration culminating in the dramatic defeat of the
McCain-Kennedy Bill (S. 1033) in 2005. The frequent appearance of Quietus, the
suicide pill issued by the government so that, as the commercial explains, “You decide
when,” is a sinister comment on the American pharmaceutical industry’s aggressive
practice of advertising prescription drugs. Finally, it is important to note the political
moment into which Children of Men was released in the United States: less than two
months after the mid-term elections that gave the Democratic party control of both
houses of Congress. These referents and the fundamental anxiety that is manifested in
the tension of the film’s formal elements, add up to a language through which the film’s
complaint was uniquely packaged for American audiences. In doing so, the film adopted
the form of the American jeremiad, a uniquely American rhetoric, to speak directly to an
audience trained to hear it. However, by having all of these referents floating in the
background, by the film purposefully frustrating the possibility of clear one-to-one
connections in its allegory, the film functions precisely in the way Jameson argued
science fiction could work as a way of addressing the crisis of postmodernism. The film
comes at the overarching issue of the lack of political and individual agency sideways,
allowing for the focus to sharpen on the present. This is perhaps why the film’s final
image is so very appropriate. In his commentary, !i"ek lauded the metaphor of the boat,
pointing out its inherent rootlessness. He explained, “the condition of the renewal means
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you cut your roots.” The image of the boat, being pushed by the current, is an
appropriate image for the film’s emphasis on the present. Such an image is also
quintessentially jeremiac. Cut off by the restoration in the seventeenth century, colonial
America was left unanchored, alone, and, yet, with the opportunity to reconsider and
redefine itself. Americans viewing the film in 2006 found themselves in an equally
precarious position embroiled in two wars abroad and having recently witnessed the
destruction of a major American city by hurricane. What films like Children of Men do,
what science fiction does, is encourage reflection of the present and, in doing so, drift
closer to a more promising future. It is fitting, then, that the ship that Theo and Kee wait
for is called the Tomorrow.
In May of 2007, 28 Weeks Later, a sequel to Danny Boyle’s 2003 zombie film, 28
Days Later, was released. Directed by Juan Carlos Fresnadillo (born in Spain), the film
begins some twenty-eight weeks after (hence the title) the initial infection of the “rage”
virus decimated England (the events of the first film). It should be noted that the sequel
generally ignores the first film’s use of zombies and the rage virus as broad critique of the
role of violence in culture. Instead, this film emphasis is an allegory of the Iraq War. The
rage virus having essentially destroyed England, repatriation begins once all of the
infected have died or have been destroyed. This effort, we are told, is being administered
by a United States-led N.A.T.O. force. At the film’s opening only the Isle of Dogs is
open for repatriation and, as one can guess, it is the site of the eventual outbreak leading
to the film’s subsequent acts. In the film’s climactic outbreak scene, military
sharpshooters, stationed on the roofs of buildings, struggle to distinguish the zombified
infected from the frightened, fleeing uninfected on the streets below. At first they are told
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to pick out the infected. As the film shows, this is an impossible request and, eventually,
they are given orders to kill everyone (itself a morally impossible command). This, of
course, is meant to evoke images of soldiers in Afghanistan or Iraq being given an
equally flawed directive to distinguish between hostile and non-hostile in a culture they
do not fully understand.
However, the film’s overriding referent is, perhaps, the loss of New Orleans to
Hurricane Katrina and, more importantly, the ensuing chaos and human suffering that
resulted from a failure of governmental action. After all, the infected eventually
overwhelm the military safeguards and it becomes clear that the city has been lost again.
The particular allegorical referent does not matter. The reason that an allegory about the
Iraq War can so easily slide into one about Hurricane Katrina is that both signal a
suspicion in the efficacy of governmental action: itself the symptom of a larger cultural
concern. When taken in context with Children of Men, these films signal a thoroughly
postmodern skepticism of the power of political agency and action. Just as in Children of
Men, 28 Weeks Later comes at its subject from a direction that suggests this same
suspicion. Watching those snipers, high above the night streets, struggle to discern the
infected from the uninfected encourages a kind of sympathy for the impossible mission
they have been given. The scene is only a microcosm of the larger conceptual failure of
an Army (designed for a completely different type of mission) being tasked to control
something as uncontrollable as the Rage virus. Six months later, I Am Legend (2007), the
third film version of Richard Matheson’s novel, presented a New York City empty save
for one man, Robert Neville (Will Smith), after a cancer cure-turned-virus decimated the
city and, presumably, the world. Robert Neville is the last man alive in the city, except
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for the photo-sensitive zombies, and, before the outbreak, was the Army’s biological
warfare officer charged with finding a cure. The empty streets of the city are a constant
reminder of his failure and, of course, the larger failure of the government, military, or
any other authority to address the problem.
These films function as criticisms of governmental action and political agency for
a number of reasons. First, they illustrate a profound level of disaffection reflected by
popular culture. Such disaffection makes sense when placed in the context of the
geopolitical moment in which these three films were released. As the above analysis
illustrated, Children of Men, especially, conveyed a despair at the efficacy of political
action in general and pointed criticisms of American foreign policy and of the Bush
administration, in particular. This is supported by the film’s rather overt references to the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. At times, however, the film’s frustration and invective
devolves into a kind of uncomplicated grunt. For example, the film’s end titles roll to a
Jarvis Cocker track whose chorus intones that “cunts are still running the world.” Of
course, there are similar instances of this disaffection in all three films. It is
conspicuously the American military, in 28 Weeks Later, that is leading London’s
repatriation and, of course, the American-led force that loses control to an infected/
insurgent population. In an early scene of I Am Legend, Neville retrieves gasoline from a
station that, when it was in operation, was charging over six dollars per gallon. The scene
provides one of the film’s few overt criticisms of a foreign policy that, having sown
turmoil in various oil-producing parts of the world, resulted in record-high prices in 2007
and 2008.
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However, in a rhetorical move that speaks to that particular frustration, these films
serve as responses to the meta-narratives brought recently back into service. After the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration styled its response, a
“War on Terror,” similarly to the previous “wars” on equally elusive concepts such as the
“War on Poverty” and the “War on Drugs.” In addition, the rhetoric that permeated
political discourse for the next years seemed to take a page from the Cold War Manichaen
framework. As a nation was rallied to war with Afghanistan and, subsequently, Iraq,
Americans saw an attempt to return to the polar oppositions (Good versus Evil/ Us versus
Them) through which Western society had previously defined itself. However, as we
have seen, these conceptions of the world and their succeeding rhetoric were already in
doubt when employed a generation earlier. The change in that time, of course, was the
rise of postmodernism and the consolidation of the economic processes that engendered
the anxieties that Jameson, !i"ek, Booker and others have noted (and that I highlighted in
the earlier analysis). This was, to recapitulate, an anxiety over the contradiction inherent
in postmodern culture: that rapid changes in technology and culture were accompanied by
the growing belief, based in the routinization of life under late capitalism, that nothing, in
fact, really ever changes.
However, in responding to these dubious meta-narratives, their rhetoric and
resulting policies, these films employ traditionally American rhetoric to do so. In 28
Weeks Later and in I Am Legend, the frontier narrative, here rendered as infected/
uninfected, reemerges as the conceptual framework for each film’s plot. Similarly, we
see a return to the situational framework of a civilized fort under siege by a savage
outsider/other. Such a situation would seem to fall back into the very polar opposition
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rhetoric that the film responds to if it was not supposed to function as a critique of the
notion of “homeland security” that lent its name to a sprawling governmental agency.
Of course, these films also function as jeremiads. Complex and critical, they also
seek to critique the characteristics of the tradition that they engage. For example, 28
Weeks Later problematizes any notion of exceptionalism in its rendering of an American
attempt and failure at repatriating England. Yes, the film seems to say, America is
perhaps the country powerful enough to lead such an effort, but such an effort is
susceptible to poor management, incompetence, and failure. It should be noted that the
film’s recolonization of England is a kind of reversal of the one that gave birth to the
jeremiad. I Am Legend also struggles with the concept of American exceptionalism. After
all, Robert Neville, the last man on earth (we presume), is American. He is alive, healthy,
and, apparently, well prepared for the challenges of such a life. However, he is also
isolated, lonely, violent, and possibly losing sanity. More importantly, the film’s ending
provides what is perhaps the most overt reference to the jeremiad tradition of any film of
recent memory. In the film’s conclusion, the KV (Krippendorf Virus) infected zombies
assault Neville’s house and force him, and the recently arrived Anna and Ethan, to retreat
to his basement-turned-laboratory. As the zombies begin to force their way into the
basement, Neville has a kind of religious epiphany upon seeing the shape of a butterfly in
the shattered glass of the wall dividing him, Anna, and Ethan from the bloodthirsty
zombies. It reminds him of something his son said before his death and now,
disregarding his previous statements to the contrary, Neville is convinced of the existence
and benevolence of a God orchestrating the events of his life. He gives Anna a vial
containing a cure made from his blood which, for reasons that are never fully explored,
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happens to carry a natural immunity to the virus, and ushers her and Ethan into a coal
shute where they can wait out the zombies until dawn. Resigned to sacrificing himself in
order to give Anna and Ethan time to escape, he pulls the pin on a grenade and launches
himself into the crowd of onrushing zombies. Neville’s sacrifice rather overtly cements
his position as a Christ figure: a point heavily suggested throughout the film. This is
backed up by the other versions of the film and Matheson’s novel. For example, viewers
of the 1971 version, The Omega Man (starring Charlton Heston), will remember that
film’s blatant final image in which Heston poses, at the moment of his death, identically
to Christ on the cross. This, obviously, does not explain the film’s reference to the
jeremiad in and of itself. In the following scene Anna and Ethan drive through what
appears to be the New England countryside in autumn. They come upon a large gate,
stop the car, and get out to have a look. The gate opens and we see and idyllic New
England town. Children are walking to school and in the background a church bell rings.
The camera pulls back to an aerial/ bird’s eye view of the town among its beautiful
foliage but surrounded, ominously, but large perimeter walls. It is as if the film suggests
that America has had to boil itself down to its most fundamental size and type. Doing so,
it seems, it uncovered the Puritan township. Lest we forget how such an ideal place is
possible, Anna’s voice over reminds us, the audience, of Neville’s sacrifice:
In 2009, a deadly virus burned through our civilization; pushing
humankind to the edge of extinction. Dr. Robert Neville dedicated his life
to the discovery of a cure and the restoration of humanity. On September
9th, 2012, at approximately 8:49 P.M. he discovered that cure and at 8:52
he gave his life to defend it. We are his legacy. This is his legend.
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What is clear is that this message, though stilted and strangely meticulous, is meant for
the audience. Neville’s sacrifice is supposed to illustrate something, some virtue, to us.
The screen fades to black and Anna’s voice says “Light up the darkness,” referencing the
film’s continued fascination with Bob Marley as his “Redemption Song” plays in the
background. While the ending’s sanctimonious dialogue seems to clash with the cool
appeal of Marley’s track, the situation reveals something about the film’s critique and
revision of the jeremiad. Earlier in the film Neville explains that his love of Marley’s
song is due to its role as a vessel for social justice. By its continued use throughout the
film and its featured use during the end credits, the film sanctifies Marley’s track and its
progressive aims within a narrative about the physical and social redemption of America.
This attempt, taken alongside the fact that the film’s protagonist and Christ figure is the
African American actor Will Smith, seems to broach, precisely, the exclusive nature of
the jeremiad tradition, arguing for the inclusion of other races in a tradition so heavily
involved in the construction of American national identity. In so doing, the film’s ending
suggests a revision to the very covenant rhetoric on which the concept of American
exceptionalism is based.
Starting in the 1980s, popular fiction reflected a movement in politics to
determine, through various means, how Americans thought about the issues facing them,
the world, and their role in addressing those issues. Alongside other American traditions
such as the frontier narrative, the American jeremiad was enlisted by popular forms in
this process of identity formation and myth making. Like castles built on sand, however,
those directives eroded as more dynamic cultural movements and economic processes
began to shape understandings of American national identity and conceptions of the
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global community. Then, when similar narratives were attempted some twenty years
later, popular culture reflected an articulate and substantial opposition and level of
disaffection among Americans and those abroad. In the films after the Iraq War that some
have erroneously termed “apocalyptic,” we see, instead of a yearning for revelation, a
much more active focus on the present and an overriding concern with maintaining a just
community (local, national, global or otherwise). Though they illustrate a recognition of
the challenges of postmodernism, these films do not attempt to (and in fact challenge
those that do) paper them over with simplistic, totalizing slogans, worldviews, or politics.
It is, then, the trajectory argued in this essay that a step toward utopia has been made.
Despite the startling, dark visions of dystopian futures in these films, such a fact should
invite a small, though justified, feeling of hope.
End Notes
1

While Rogin’s analysis includes a significant discussion of American exceptionalism, it should
be noted that he has termed that concept quite differently from other uses. In Rogin’s analysis, it
was offered as the explanation scholars (such as Richard Hofstadter and Louis Hartz) came to in
trying to explain the lack of radical politics in American in general, and, in particular, the
“limited and superficial” class conflicts in American as compared to the “the more tenacious
European social and political divisions that had generated revolution and dictatorship” (275).
These scholars, Rogin explains, claimed that the United States “lacked the class loyalties, the
fixed and deeply rooted statuses, and the powerful state structures of societies with feudal and
absolutist pasts” (275). He concludes that consensus historians “attributed American
distinctiveness to such factors as material abundance, the pervasiveness of liberal individualism,
social and geographic mobility, ethnic conflict, and a pluralist political tradition” (275).
2

I am indebted to Carl Freedman, in conversation, for this information on the ironies of Ronald
Reagan’s film career versus its retroactively written mythos.
3

The title of both the film and the book is a direct reference to Psalm 90 as quoted in the Book of
Common Prayer: “Lord, thou hast been our refuge: from one generation to another. Before the
mountains were brought forth, or ever the earth and the world were made: thou art God from
everlasting, and world without end. Thou turnest man to destruction: again thou sayest, Come
again, ye children of men. For a thousand years in thy sight are but as yesterday: seeing that is
past as a watch in the night.”
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However, Bercovitch happens to end his book on the American Jeremiad by quoting a passage
from 2 Samuel that, he claims, was part of Winthrop’s lay speech on the Arbella. It is perhaps,
more significant to our understanding of the film. It reads: “Also I wil appoint a place for my
people Israel, and wil plant it, that they may dwel in a place of their owne, and move nomore...I
wilbe his father, & he shalbe my sonne: & if he sinne, I wil chasten him with the rods of men,
and with the plagues of the children of men. But my mercy shal not departe away from
him[...]” (210).
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CONCLUSION
“THEIR GREAT AND TERRIBLE FREEDOM”
This analysis has illustrated that the notion of American exceptionalism, of the nation’s
and its people’s election in the world born from a spiritual covenant with God, continues to shape
American thought into the twenty-first century. This, as we have seen, is not always a good
thing. Uncritical notions of American exceptionalism are the ingredients of national arrogance,
poorly formulated political policy, and bad fiction. The jeremiad, like other forms, is susceptible
to the prejudices and persuasions of the eras in which it is written. However, it can also wield a
great deal of power in encouraging social criticism. This project has illustrated that the form’s
collaboration with the science fiction genre in the twentieth century has involved both. Though
someone might disagree with the politics or worldview of Robert Heinlein or the director of Red
Dawn, these are not uncritical entries into the genre. These men provided their own critique of
the America in which they lived and offered up their own notions of American identity. It
illustrates the healthy state of discourse and inquiry that those texts and films generated
responses of their own and that the process continues over a broad range of issues. What such a
process emphasizes is a refocusing of such rhetoric on the burden Winthrop spoke of when he
described America as the “city upon a hill.” It is this constant process of self-reflection that
defines the American experience.
If that is so, then science fiction has played a much larger role in defining and fashioning
this nation’s concept of itself. Considering that the twentieth century has been described as the
“American century,” this is no small point. For much of the century science fiction struggled for
legitimacy among other popular genres. When one considers that the “American century” was
defined by rapid technological progress, it seems rather obvious now that the one genre that
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consistently engendered perspective and reflection on the century’s dizzying changes was
science fiction. At the same time, the twentieth century, for the most part, was defined by the
invention of the atomic bomb and subsequent nuclear weapons. The first chapter illustrated that
American discourse had long been preoccupied with predicting or rendering the end of the
world. With the invention of the bomb, such imagining became concretized in the possibility of
total nuclear annihilation. If life under the bomb was such a central concern to American culture,
then science fiction, again, was the genre that was most relevant to that experience. As each of
the chapters illustrate, science fiction provided a consistent and critical reflection on the
American experience under the atomic anxiety of the twentieth century.

It continues to do so

for the effects of other emerging technologies and threats on American culture such as
environmental and ecological disaster, terrorism, and economic collapse. Given the influence
science fiction has had in our understanding of contemporary American culture, it should be
clear why assigning such slap-dash distinctions as “apocalyptic” to texts and films that such a
term does not accurately explain, is a dangerous exercise. This should be obvious. Americans,
though they arrogantly may consider themselves the elect, do not yearn for revelation but are
intensely focused on the present.
Having repositioned this subgenre from apocalyptic to jeremiac and argued for a more
accurate way of understanding what now constitutes a great number of science fiction texts and
films, further study is still possible. This project has not attempted to be an exhaustive catalogue
of the jeremiad in twentieth and twenty-first century science fiction. There are other eras in
which this connection between the jeremiad and science fiction could be further explored to
compelling ends. Sinclair Lewis’ It Can’t Happen Here (1935) exhibits a fascinating
intersection, for example, between depression-era anxiety over the state of American culture and
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politics and the science fiction of the magazine era. While this project has considered the role of
science fiction in asserting cultural narratives during the Cold War, a similar analysis of science
fiction during World War II could yield interesting observations of the role the genre played in
articulating the nature of American identity and its enemies during wartime. Of course, the
primary characteristic of this subgenre is its ready adaptation of new, unimagined things.
Science fiction continues to be one of the most popular and profitable genres in American
culture. Because of its ability to adopt and critique emerging technologies or reflect upon
evolving societal concerns, as we move further into the new century, science fiction will continue
to be a genre well-suited to understand the human experience.
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